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Preface 
Doing a research project like the one that is presented in this book, is often 
characterised by depths and heights. For me personally, from the very 
beginning I have not experienced these strong fluctuations at all. Before joining 
the university in March 2002, I expected my academic career to be temporary 
and short. But I am afraid that this kind of work has grabbed me in a big way. 
The freedom that I have experienced, especially in the beginning, is something 
that can hardly be paralleled in any other working environment. This freedom 
needs to be accompanied by discipline and the will to explore on behalf of the 
researcher. But probably more important, it also needs to be matched by an 
academic environment that stimulates the exploration. This environment is 
made by people. 
There is one person in particular that I want to thank for all his help during the 
process. Barrie Needham has proved to be a great teacher, source of 
inspiration, colleague and person. His honest curiosity for both theory and 
practice, his engagement with my project, and his constructive and stimulating 
attitude has made this research project a pleasant journey. 
I also want to thank my colleagues in the department of Human Geography, 
Spatial Planning, and Political Sciences of the Environment. There are some 
who I would like to thank in particular, which are my colleagues from our 
thematic research group 'Land policy and location development': Esther 
Geuting, Peter Hendrixen, Wouter Jacobs, George de Kam, Erwin van der 
Krabben, Barrie Needham and Arno Segeren. This group is part of a bigger 
team called Governance and Places (GaP), which is led both practically and 
substantively in a very inspirational way by Arnoud Lagendijk, who deserves to 
be thanked for creating such an environment. He has contributed to this book 
more than he probably is aware of. He and Esther Geuting are also gratefully 
acknowledged for reading, and making comments to, the manuscript as a 
whole. 
This book includes comparative research, for which the willingness of many 
respondents and other people was needed. All these people - most of them 
mentioned and acknowledged in the appendix - are thanked for sharing their 
knowledge and experiences. There is one person in particular that I want to 
thank in this respect, which is Janet Askew from the University of the West of 
England. Her help has made chapter 5 much better than it would have been 
without, and made my stays in Bristol extremely interesting and entertaining. 
Other people who had an important role at some stage in the research by 
making comments to a chapter or a paper, by pointing me to the right sources, 
or helped me in any other way are Ernest Alexander, Raffael Argiolu, Margo 
van den Brink, Dan Bromley, Andreas Paludi, Cecilia Giusti, Henri Goverde, 
Patsy Healey, Rob van der Heijden, Leonie Janssen-Jansen, Ton Kreukels, 
Michael Neuman, John Raggers and Roelof Verhage. 
Obviously, a good personal environment is the most important prerequisite for 
performing professionally. The people who are responsible for that are my 
parents, my brother and my friends. Thank you all! 
Utrecht, January 2007 
Edwin Buitelaar 
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The cost of making land use decisions 
"The long and winding road", which would become the Beatles' last number one 
song in the US (in 1970), was most certainly not written by Paul McCartney with 
the evolution of our cities in mind. It is however equally applicable to them. In 
every country the built environment is continuously under construction. This 
means that one land use is turned into another. This includes both the 
development of undeveloped greenfield land and the redevelopment of the 
existing urban fabric, the brownfield locations. However, these conversions do 
not occur instantly and without costs. Beside the fact that a structure needs to 
be built, decisions have to be made about how the land should and should not 
be used. Because of the decision-making process, many projects take up much 
more costs and time than intended. An interesting - though not uncommon -
example is that of Hofpoort, a case study (Buitelaar et al. 2006) in the city of 
Amhem (in the Netherlands), in which it took 10 years to deliver around 80 
houses. One could cynically say that this project had a production of 8 houses a 
year. In many cases government regulation and the role of the government in 
general, is held responsible for delays in the development process. 
In the Netherlands for instance, a task force responsible for investigating 
the reasons of the lagging building production, concluded that the primary 
source was delays in the building process, caused mainly by the extensive 
permit system1. Many developers also regard this as the main factor. It is said 
about planning in Britain that: "The reality of land-use planning in Britain has 
often been one of institutional sclerosis and special-interest capture. Benefits 
have been concentrated on interest groups and bureaucrats with costs 
dispersed across an invisible mass of tax payers and consumers." (Pennington 
2002 p. 71) 
Recently, there have been many initiatives or intentions in many 
countries to cut rules and bureaucracy and to streamline procedures of land use 
planning. In France for instance, a law (Loi SRU; urban solidarity and renewal 
law) was adopted in 2000, which intended, among other things, to break with 
the desire to create detailed rules in the local land use plan. In England, the 
proposals to reform the planning system in the Planning Green Paper (from 
2001 ) were mainly focussed on reducing complexity of the system and 
streamlining the procedures. The Treasury was worried about economic 
competitiveness, and at the national level a view prevails that the planning 
system delays development so much that England's competitiveness is 
suffering. However at the same time, one of the (possibly contradictory) goals is 
to increase citizen participation during the development process. The Planning 
and Compulsory Purchase Act that was adopted in 2004 took over the main 
goals that were posed in the Planning Green Paper. In the Netherlands also, 
the cabinet is preparing a new planning act (that will probably be operational in 
2008) that is driven partly by a desire to cut rules and to speed up the planning 
process. The maximum duration of the procedure for adopting a land use plan 
(the bestemmingsplan), which is the core planning document on the basis of 
which building permissions are granted or rejected, is halved in the new act. It 
1
 Taskforce Woningbouwproductie (2002) 
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remains to be seen in each of the examples just mentioned whether the goals of 
cutting rules, reducing complexity and streamlining procedures really work out 
as intended Looking at the first experiences in England, this seems most 
questionable 
More privatisation, more market, less bureaucracy and fewer rules are 
phrases that can be heard on a regular basis in almost every democratic 
country In the US and the UK this discourse took off significantly in the late 
seventies and early eighties when both Reagan and Thatcher came to power In 
continental Europe it generally emerged a few years later In the Netherlands 
for instance, generally regarded as a highly regulated country, the mission 
statement of the Dutch cabinet (Balkenende 2), after its inauguration in 2003, 
was "participation, more work and fewer rules" It was argued that there were 
too many rules in every policy sector In essence, this cabinet's strategy was a 
continuation of a neo-hberal discourse that emerged in the mid-eighties when 
prime-minister Lubbers came to power Recently, China and former members of 
the Warsaw Pact are also following this line This observed pressure on public 
intervention also applies to spatial planning, or as Sorensen (1994) formulates 
it "Our era is reconsidering the ends and means of governments in general in 
view of limited public finance, concerns over national economic efficiency, and a 
growing community preference for individual responsibility, self help, and small 
government Planning is not immune to these trends " (Sorensen 1994 ρ 198) 
This book is about the formal rules that are made and used to steer land 
use decisions These rules are primarily public rules, but they can also be 
pnvately made, which is the case with covenants Whatever the origin of the 
rules, all of them are applied at a site-specific level This application is not 
without costs The relationship between the way land use institutions are made 
and used at the site-level, and the costs associated with that, form the core of 
this book One of the key debates that always seems to be behind discussions 
on regulation and deregulation, is the market versus government debate 
1.1 Beyond the market versus the government debates 
The starting point of this book was2 the recurring and fascinating market versus 
government debate, which is also held m academic fora For over two decades 
in the UK and the US (with the coming of Thatcher and Reagan) and for more 
than one decade in many continental European countries, there has been a 
renewed attention for more private involvement in traditional government 
activities Some academics claim that more 'market' is more efficient in co­
ordinating land use decision-making (Ellickson 1973, Pennington 1999) The 
argument from welfare economics against this claim is to say that 'the market' 
often fails to operate efficiently, as a result, correction by government 
intervention is justified (Pigou 1920) In economics, the discussion is often held 
around the concepts of market and public failures 
In neo-classical economics, it is assumed that m perfectly competing 
markets, demand and supply will become equal at an equilibrium that leads to 
an optimal allocation of resources But in practice, markets are rarely (and might 
never be) fully competitive If the competitive equilibrium cannot be achieved, 
2
 See for an extensive account on the starting point Buitelaar (2003) 
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there will be a sub-optimal allocation of resources3. Pigou (1920), who can be 
seen as the founding father of welfare economics, addresses these situations 
as market failures. These market failures are the justifications for government 
interventions. To welfare economists, the task of land use planning is to take 
care of the goods which the market will not provide, undersupplies (Webster 
1998) (e.g. public transport in remote rural areas) or oversupplies (e.g. office 
buildings). 
One of the implicit assumptions of this welfare economic approach is the 
idea that when the market fails and the government intervenes, the latter will do 
that perfectly and without costs. In addition, it assumes that the government 
acts always and only in the public interest. These assumptions have led to an 
important counter reaction. It is argued that there are not only market failures 
but also public or government failures (Levacic 1991; Lai 1997; Webster 1998; 
Pennington 1999), or nonmarket failures (Wolf 1979). These authors challenge 
the welfare economists' implicit assumption of an imperfect market allocation 
versus a perfect administrative process of allocation. That assumption suggests 
that planning is without costs, which it is obviously not4, and also that a public 
body is always able to find and apply the best correction. 
So, although markets often do not succeed in achieving economically 
efficient results, government intervention is not necessarily a guarantee for 
achieving these either (Levacic 1991 p. 45). Welfare economics and the idea of 
a costless, selfless and perfectly operating government, in casu a planning 
agency, have their shortcomings5. The conclusion can be drawn that both the 
market and the government have their failures (Wolf 1988; Cpb 1999). 
However, this discussion between the failure of the market and the failure of the 
government does not bring us any further. In welfare economics, every situation 
that is not optimal is qualified as inefficient or as a 'failure'. But because these 
optima are hardly ever reached, there is only failure, which significantly 
devaluates failure as a concept forjudging the allocation of resources. 
In addition, reality is often too complex to fit within the neat dichotomy of 
'the government' versus 'the market' (Dixit 1996; Buitelaar 2003) and 'planning' 
versus 'the market' (Lai 1997; Alexander 1992; 2001a; 2001b). It is not fruitful to 
regard the government and planning on one side and the market on the other 
as counterparts (Alexander 2004), since they are not mutually exclusive. The 
market is structured by the government who makes the rules that facilitate 
exchange. In addition, the government can and often is a market actor. 
Comparing the market to the government, therefore, is like comparing apples 
and pears. 
Therefore, I start from a different perspective. Many land use decisions 
are made by many agents and agencies. Those have to be co-ordinated. 
"Without co-ordination these agents and agencies might all have different and 
potentially conflicting objectives resulting in chaos and inefficiency" (Thompson 
3
 By optimal allocation, I mean 'economic' or 'allocative' efficiency. Allocation is more efficient if 
more goods and services are produced, or if goods and services are produced which people 
value more highly 
A
 See for an extensive enumeration of planning costs Sorensen (1994:19Θ). 
5
 This is often argued by public choice theonsts, who start from the assumption made in many 
economic theones that rational actors are charactensed by self-interested behaviour In line with 
this, public choice theory argues that government serves itself rather than the public interest. 
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et al. 1991 p. 3)6. Co-ordination can be seen as "...the bringing together of 
otherwise disparate activities or events. Tasks and efforts can be made 
compatible by co-ordinating them" (Thompson et al. 1991 p. 3). This co-
ordination can be fulfilled in different ways. There are various governance 
structures (Williamson 1975; Williamson 1985), or models of co-ordination 
(Thompson et al. 1991), that can be distinguished, which will be set out in more 
detail in the next chapter. 
Transaction cost economics7 assumes that the choice of one structure 
above another depends - when all other variables are equal - on the nature of 
the transaction and the costs that result from it. This theory describes and 
prescribes which institutional design (more specifically, which governance 
structure) is and should be aligned to which type of transaction. Transaction 
costs are the independent and the governance structures the dependent 
variables. This version of transaction cost theory has been endorsed also in 
planning theory (Alexander 2001a). What these accounts somehow neglect is 
that setting up and using institutions also involves costs, which I also classify 
under the heading transaction costs. The attention in this book is on the 
relationship between transaction costs and institutions, and especially the effect 
of institutions on transaction costs. There is very little empirical knowledge in 
land use planning and land economics on this. In the development process, one 
land use is converted into another, but the same counts for the institutional 
arrangements with regard to land use; these are also converted (Healey 1992). 
But how does this work? The goal of this book is to get more insight in the 
nature of the institutions and related transaction costs in the production process 
of the built environment (i.e. the development process). What makes this 
particularly complicated is the multiple character of the concept 'institution'. 
Institutions occur at different levels and in different fashions. In addition, 
institutions are dependent and independent variables at the same time. Gualini 
illustrates this nicely for planning, by saying that planning is at the same time 
"an institutionalised practice" and "a factor of institutionalisation" (Gualini 2001 
p. 55). This study tries to handle with this multiplicity, this complexity and these 
dynamics by looking at the relationship between different institutional levels and 
how that affects transaction costs. The central question that emerges from this 
is: how are the different institutional levels and transaction costs interrelated 
under different circumstances, and how does this affect the existence, size and 
incidence of transaction costs in the development process? 
6
 Some (e.g Scharpf 1993 p. 125) argue that the need for co-ordinating the choices of actors, is 
increasing through an increased interdependence and differentiation of interests 
7
 Although transaction cost economics is a more specialised strand than the broader new 
institutional economics (Williamson 1993), both are used interchangeably. In my view, the 
difference is more in the label and the message it is supposed to send; the label transaction 
cost economics is used to emphasise the importance of transaction costs, whereas new 
institutional economics illuminates the importance of institutions. Since this research focuses on 
both transaction costs and institutions, both labels will be used, depending on what I want to 
stress. 
14 
1.2 The study of transaction costs in planning and property research 
There is a field of study that can be called economics and planning. Economic 
analyses of planning have been carried out for some decades now, and many 
textbooks have appeared in the past (see e.g. Harrison 1977; Evans 1985), 
recently a new wave of textbooks has emerged (Heikkila 2000; Webster & Lai 
2003; Evans 2004; Oxley 2004; Needham 2006b). Some of these (Heikkila 
2000; Evans 2004)8 follow the mainstream economic tradition and analyse the 
(welfare) economic effects of planning. Others turn into new pathways that are 
closer to this book. Webster & Lai (2003) combine insights from Hayekian 
economics, with public choice and new institutional economics in order to 
explain how organisations, institutions and cities emerge and change. By 
applying ideas from Barzel (1998), there is a very close link and overlap with 
law & economics. The first comprehensive book about this branch of literature 
in combination with planning has been written by Needham (2006b). Although 
law & economics could be seen as a part of (or closely related to) new 
institutional economics, it differs in the way that it is a combination of two 
disciplines, not surprisingly: law and economics. It finds its roots in both 
disciplines, whereas new institutional economics, originates mainly from one 
discipline, as a group of economists were dissatisfied with the a-institutional 
nature of neo-classical and welfare economics. A more elaborate treatment of 
the differences between new institutional economics and law & economics can 
be found in the next chapter. This book builds upon those just mentioned, by 
exploring 'new' theories from economics and applying them empirically. 
With the focus set out above, this study lies not only on the interface 
between economics and planning, but also between planning and property 
research. This study could be regarded as being part of the institutional turn that 
has emerged in both fields. With respect to planning theory, Gualini (2001) 
speaks of an institutional turn, which follows the earlier identified argumentative 
turn (Fischer & Forester 1993) or communicative turn (Healey 1996; Innes 
1995). In property research, neo-classical and to a lesser extent Marxist 
approaches have for a long time dominated research on the development 
process. Due to a lack of appreciation for the interaction between structure and 
agency (see e.g. Ball 1998; Healey 1992), an institutional turn in property 
research emerged in the early nineties (see Guy & Henneberry 2000). Although 
the number of contributions with an institutional perspective has risen (see e.g. 
Healey 1992; Van Der Krabben 1995; Ball 1998; Keogh & D'arcy 1999), it is still 
a very small stream compared to the vast majority of scholars that take a 
mainstream economic stance. 
In planning theory, two streams within the institutional turn have been 
identified (Gonzalez & Healey 2005): the sociological (e.g. Innes 1995; Healey 
1997; Gualini 2001) and the economic institutional (or transaction cost) strand 
(Alexander 1992; 2001a; Lai 1994; 1997; Webster & Lai 2003; Webster 1998; 
Though, Heikkila briefly pays attention to new institutional economics in the last chapter of his 
book. 
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Buitelaar 2004) . Although they are set out as two separate and almost 
incompatible strands, both approaches are combined here. As the cases will 
show, transaction costs are not made by agents that act independently of others 
and solely pursue economic self-interest; in fact the actions of these agents are 
embedded in social structures (Granovetter 1985). Transaction costs in other 
words are the result of continuous structure-agent relations. By making this 
amendment, transaction cost economics becomes a very useful analytical 
framework, which should not be rejected, as some do, just by referring to its 
objectivist ontology and oversimplified psychology of rationally acting 
individuals. 
There is scepticism towards the integration of transaction cost economics 
and planning (Poulton 1997; Moulaert 2005), which I share when it comes to 
transaction cost theory as an explanatory theory for institutional change 
(Buitelaar, Lagendijk & Jacobs 2006). The quest for reducing transaction costs 
as a determinant for institutional change, or even broader, as determinants of 
the emergence and evolution of cities (Webster & Lai 2003), as often assumed, 
remains unproven and seems to be only part of the explanation of the 
emergence, continuity and change of socially constructed institutions. 
Nevertheless, transaction cost economics provides interesting analytical tools to 
investigate and compare institutional arrangements in theory and practice. In 
addition, "the comparative institutional analysis of the world of positive 
transaction costs is a worthy challenge." (Williamson 1993) 
Although the attention for transaction cost economics has increased, 
empirical applications of transaction cost theory in general, but in planning and 
property research in particular, are rare (see for one of the very few examples 
Needham & De Kam 2004). This study seeks to identify transaction costs 
empirically, and to understand their existence, size and distribution. It will not 
provide exact numbers of transaction costs, nor calculate a total amount. This is 
almost impossible as transaction costs are often hidden, indirect and are not 
quantified (in terms of money, man hours etc.) by the people involved in the 
development process. Where possible, an indication of the size of the 
transaction costs will be given. 
1.3 The relevance for planning practice 
This study should be relevant for planning in two ways. The first is the market 
versus government debate in planning, which has remained topical, throughout 
the years. This has often been held in the same way, namely putting the two 
opposite to each other (see e.g. Dahrendorf 1966; Klosterman 1985), and the 
economic approaches applied usually employ the same (neo-classical and 
welfare economic) language. I argue (see also Buitelaar 2003) that this is a 
fruitless and counterproductive discussion that should be approached 
differently. Approaching an old debate by a different language could shed a 
refreshing light that might serve planning theory as well as planning practice in 
thinking about institutional design. Transaction cost economics is a more 
See for a comprehensive overview of contributions to transaction cost economics and 
planning, Lai (2005). 
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pragmatic approach that can be used to compare realistic alternative 
institutional arrangements. 
There is another potential benefit that this book could have for planning 
and development practice. If we know how to identify transaction costs, and 
why they are made and distributed as they are, we might be able to reduce 
them, or redistribute them better. There are some transaction costs that 
contribute to better land use decisions, by whatever criterion (e.g. spatial quality 
or legitimacy) that is measured. What is also interesting is which transaction 
costs can be seen as dead weight losses, in other words, a waste of money and 
time. Identifying particularly those dead weight costs might help to improve the 
efficiency of planning practice and the development process. This could be 
done in policy and institutional evaluations. 
1.4 The structure of this book 
In the next chapter, I explore the literature on institutions and transaction costs 
and illuminate the relationship between them. The main source of inspiration 
here is the institutional economic literature, but supplemented with insights from 
sociological institutionalism. This leads to a broad conceptual framework that 
indicates different institutional levels and how they bear on transaction costs. A 
distinction is made between macro, meso and micro level institutions. In chapter 
three, both institutions and transaction costs are operationalised for the 
empirical research, focusing in particular on the micro level institutions, since 
this is the level at which transaction costs are directly produced. Applying land 
use law at the local level involves costs: transaction costs. However, a 
development process does not start and develop in an institutional void. There 
are rules of the game - the meso level institutions - that set the stage within 
which the site-specific regime (i.e the user rights regime as I call it in chapter 3) 
is created and used. Therefore, chapter three also pays attention to the meso 
level, which includes the formal land use institutions that can be used and 
applied at the site level. In addition the research strategy for the empirical part is 
set out in more detail. 
Chapter four, five and six, deal with one case study each, showing which 
transaction costs are made during the development process of a small housing 
site as the result of the creation and use of the micro level institutions. Each 
chapter starts with an exploration of the most important meso level institutions 
in each country (like the planning act) that each stakeholder has to take into 
consideration. The three case studies are from Nijmegen (the Netherlands), 
Bristol (England) and Houston (Texas, United States). After the analysis of each 
case study, the cases are compared to each other (chapter 7). What follows 
from this chapter are some of the most discriminating dimensions with regard to 
transaction costs, which do not stand on their own but are related to deeper 
social and cultural norms and values (i.e. the macro institutions). 
Contextualising the transaction costs - which is done in chapter 8 - provides an 
important part of the explanation of their existence, size and distribution. 
Chapter 9 contains the conclusions, in which the findings of the empirical part 
are confronted with the transaction cost theories of planning. In addition some 
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key issues in planning practice are fundamentally discussed from a transaction 
cost perspective. 
2 
Institutions and transaction costs 
This chapter contains an exploration and analysis of the role of institutions and 
transaction costs in economic theory, most notably within new institutional 
economics. First a brief overview will be given of when and how institutions 
entered economics, together with a conceptual exposition of the kind of 
institutions that can be distinguished in various branches of economic research. 
After that, I will focus more specifically on the role and place of institutions and 
transaction costs within new institutional economics, as it emerged with the 
work of Ronald Coase. Institutions will be confined to and divided in property 
rights and governance structures, two elements that play an important role in 
the production of the built environment at the micro level. Transaction costs, 
and how they emerge, according to transaction cost economists, will be 
discussed after that. This chapter concludes with a section in which transaction 
costs and institutions will be linked again, leading to a conceptual framework 
that serves to guide the analysis. 
2.1 Economic approaches to institutionalism 
"The proper subject-matter of economic theory is institutions [...]" (Hamilton 
1919) 
Neo-classical economics, that probably had its starting point with the classical 
economist Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations (1776), focuses on markets, on how 
equilibriums are achieved and what the role of prices is. The market is usually 
seen as a self-adjusting10 system, in which the price mechanism adjusts 
demand and supply in such a way that an equilibrium is reached in the end. 
In the early twentieth century there was a reaction against this dominant 
neo-classical paradigm from what we would now call 'old' or original 
institutionalism11 (e.g. Commons 1931). In general there are three sorts of 
criticism to neo-classical economics (Hazeu 2000). The first is the level of 
abstraction of the theories, attributed to the inclination to be an exact science 
and not one that deals with human interactions. Secondly, neo-classical 
economics has been accused for its limited empirical basis. The last and 
arguably most important point is its image of the motives of human action. To 
facilitate mathematical formulation and exposition, neo-classical economists 
adopt psychologically unrealistic behavioural assumptions like individuals and 
firms as rational maximisers (Posner 1993). As a reaction against this, Veblen 
(1899) introduces the term 'conspicuous consumption', which he explains by 
arguing that rich people often do not prefer more expensive goods over the 
cheaper ones because they are better or nicer, but because that shows their 
prosperity. This does not correspond with the neo-classical behavioural 
assumption of rationally acting humans. The original institutionalists argue that 
10
 This is the (Scottish) 'invisible hand'. 
11
 The way this strand is called differs. Many use the modifier 'old', while other use 'original', 
probably because it has a more positive connotation than 'old', which is close to old-fashioned. 
Yet others use no modifiers at all and talk about 'institutional economics'. 
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people also have irrational preferences, and that actors do not act 
autonomously but are influenced by institutions and relations with others, which 
makes their preferences not only irrational but also relational (see e.g. Veblen 
and the importance of fashion). In line with this, notions as the 'institutionalised 
individual' (Hodgson 2000) or 'cultural animal' (Dequech 2002) are used. 
Therefore, although the neo-classical approach focuses on markets, it is not 
very good at explaining how markets work (Hodgson 2000), because it does not 
take account of institutions. 
The old institutionalist branch in economics was not taken completely 
serious by economists, to say it euphemistically, because it was not found very 
academic, and because it refuted the neo-classical paradigm almost entirely. 
Coase (1984 p. 230) said about it: "without a theory they had nothing to pass on 
except a mass of descriptive material waiting for a theory, or a fire." However, 
since (relatively) recently, it seems as if a new wave of old institutionalism has 
emerged (e.g. Hodgson 1988; Dequech 2002) 
Like the old historical-descriptive institutionalists, the new institutionalists 
recognised that neo-classical economics was overly abstract (Furubotn & 
Richter 1991). However, new institutional economics (which goes back to 
Coase 1937) did not reject the micro-economic approach altogether, but 
gradually adjusted it, by adding the institutional component (Furubotn & Richter 
1991; Hazeu 2000). What new institutional economics shares with old 
institutionalism is the attention for institutions. Where it differs from old 
institutionalism is in its treatment of neo-classical economic assumptions, as 
just mentioned, and also in the attention for the role and the type of institutions. 
Formal and informal institutions 
A very common distinction in the literature on institutions is between formal and 
informal institutions (North 1990)12. Formal institutions can be understood as 
institutions with a legal character like legal norms and contracts. Informal 
institutions include conventions, habits and informal social norms, in other 
words, institutions that are not legally enforceable, but do nevertheless 
influence our actions. 
Within new institutional economics, the main emphasis is on formal 
institutions like contracts and property rights and less on informal institutions, 
like habits and conventions, which the old institutionalists emphasise (Dequech 
2005)13. Some accuse new institutional economics of overemphasising the 
restrictive function of institutions on actions and not taking account of the 
deeper cognitive function they have (Dequech 2002)14. This critique is valid, 
since there is indeed very little attention for the way institutions frame the way 
actors look upon the world. The reason is probably the focus on formal rules 
and not on informal practices. Nevertheless formal rules too, like planning 
regulations, have their symbolic meaning. An example is zoning in the US, and 
12
 Bromley (1989 p. 41) makes a similar distinction by distinguishing between conventions and 
rules. 
13
 Though there are exceptions within the new institutional economic literature. 
14
 In this sense, the old institutional economics is closer to sociological or political 
institutionalism. Pierre, a political institutionalist, defines institutions as " .. overarching systems 
of values, traditions, norms, and practices that shape or constrain political behavior." (Pierre 
1999 p. 373) 
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in Houston in particular (see chapter 6). In Houston, the debate about the 
introduction of zoning is very ideological since it has become a clash between 
people who ask for government intervention to prevent negative externalities 
versus people who want the market and private freedom to flourish (Buitelaar 
forthcoming). 
The restrictive function and deeper cognitive function are however to 
some extent interrelated. An instrumental (and restrictive) rationality is often 
socially highly appropriate, since people want problems to be solved (Buitelaar, 
Lagendijk & Jacobs 2006). But the disregard of the deeper cognitive function 
and symbolic meaning of institutions is probably more a result of a focus on 
formal instead of informal institutions. This is because restrictions are often 
seen as something external to the actions of people, while informal institutions -
e.g. habits - are often regarded as being internalised by the actors. 
The primary attention for formal institutions brings new institutional 
economics close to law and economics, which both originate from the same 
source: Ronald Coase15. The Nobel Prize he won in 1991 was awarded 
primarily on the basis of his two classic papers: The nature of the firm from 
1937 (Coase 1937) and The problem of social cost from 1960 (Coase 1960). 
His article from 1937 is a seminal paper for transaction cost economics, while 
his 1960 paper is one of the key sources of law and economics. Law and 
economics is literally concerned with economic analyses of law (see e.g. Cooter 
& Ulen 2004). The core of the law and economics approach is similar to that of 
neo-classical micro-economics. Micro-economics - among other things -
investigates and predicts how organisations and individuals react to prices and 
price differences. Law and economics, quite similarly, tries to predict how 
(economic) actors will behave with regard to law, like for instance the 
introduction or change of legal sanctions. There is considerable overlap 
between law and economics and transaction cost economics. One of the 
leading theorists in law and economics, Richard Posner, says they diverge on 
theoretical emphasis. According to him, transaction cost economics is pre-
occupied with transaction costs, which leads it away from price theories, and 
the mechanism of utility maximisation, that are central to traditional neo-
classical economics and law & economics (Posner 1993 p. 83). 
In this study the primary focus is on the formal institutions that stem from 
planning and property law, how they are used and how that affects transaction 
costs. But the informal institutions are not neglected as they have an important 
impact on the way the formal rules are used, and hence on the transaction 
costs. 
2.2 Institutions and transaction costs in the (early) new institutional 
economics 
Although the starting point of new institutional economics goes back to Ronald 
Coase's article The nature of the firm (1937), it was not until the early seventies, 
and especially until Williamson's Markets and hierarchies (1975) that new 
15
 Posner (1993), however, argues that beside Coase there are three other founding fathers of 
law and economics. According to Williamson (1993), this does too little justice to Coase's 
prominence. 
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institutional economics received attention from 'mainstream' economics. 
Coase's work got attention retroactively, according to himself due to a hesitancy 
among economists to appreciate the role of markets, firms and laws in 
economic systems, as he illuminated in all his work (Coase 1988). 
In The nature of the firm, Coase asks the very basic question: if the 
price mechanism regulates production, as argued by many mainstream 
economists, then why do organisations (like firms) exist at all? Neo-classical 
economists assume that demand and supply, consumption and production, 
are adjusted to each other automatically, elastically and responsively. In the 
economic system there is no central control since it 'works itself. However, 
Coase (1937) argues that this description of the economic system does not fit 
very well for transactions within a firm, which he describes as 'islands of 
conscious power", as distinct from the automatic and atomistic market system. 
If somebody in a firm moves from one department to another, he does not do 
that because of a change in price but because he is ordered to do so. This is 
what Coase calls 'economic planning', others (Bradach & Eccles 1989) talk 
about 'authority' as the co-ordinating mechanism in these hierarchical forms of 
co-ordination. 
Coase's central argument is that firms arise because there is a cost of 
using the price mechanism. There are for instance the costs of discovering 
what the price is. In addition, there are costs involved in negotiating and 
concluding every single contract. Later (e.g. Williamson 1975), these costs 
were called transaction costs. Firms are set up, or expanded, to minimise 
those costs. Although firms, or organisations in general, indeed have the 
ability to reduce transaction costs they cannot eliminate them. Moreover, they 
produce organisational costs. According to Coase, firms are expanded or 
downsized on the basis of the returns from the size of the hierarchy. When 
more hierarchy means increasing returns, a firm is likely to expand, while 
'diminishing returns to management' (as Coase phrases it) lead to shrinking 
firms, which for instance start hiving off activities to other firms. To explain the 
size of the firm and the way entrepreneurs decide about that, Coase uses the 
principle of marginalism (from Walras, 1874), which is central to neo-classical 
economics. "Will it pay to bring an extra exchange transaction under the 
organizing authority? At the margin, the costs of organizing within the firm will 
be equal either to the costs of organizing in another firm or to the costs 
involved in leaving the transaction to be "organized" by the price mechanism." 
(Coase 1937 p. 405) 
Coase (1988 p. 6) complains that The nature of the firm was much cited 
but little used. The reason, according to him, why transaction costs did not 
become part (until later) of the equipment of the economist, was that it did not 
fit in the conventional analyses that assumed the market to function without 
frictions. Others (Williamson 1975) assert that the concept was not sufficiently 
operationalised to permit systematic analyses of transactions in relation to 
governance structures (like markets and firms)16. The main contribution of the 
16
 However, Williamson values Coase's contributions highly. Together with Kenneth Arrow, 
Alfred Chandler and Herbert Simon, Coase is regarded by Williamson as one of his teachers, 
although that was only through the latter's publications and not through physical encounters 
(Williamson 1985). 
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Nature of the firm is that Coase draws our attention to transaction costs, as the 
discriminating factor for the mode of governance. In his 1960 paper - The 
problem of social cost -, he builds on his earlier contribution, but his emphasis 
is slightly different; in that paper he shows us mainly the importance of 
institutions - in particular property rights - for economic exchange. 
In The problem of social cost, Coase deals with the issue of the social 
costs of individual actions, that was earlier addressed by the welfare economist 
Pigou (1920), in The economics of welfare. However, Coase approaches the 
issue differently than Pigou. Pigou argues (see also the introductory chapter) 
that in the case of market failures the government should intervene, for instance 
by levying taxes or imposing regulations. Such failures are often the negative 
social effects (externalities) caused by individual action. Both Pigou (1920) and 
Coase (1960) use the British example of uncompensated damage to 
surrounding woods, caused by sparks from railway engines, in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. In Pigou's reasoning the railway 
company should be forced to compensate those whose woods were burnt by 
the sparks from the steam engines. Coase argued that this, like many other 
examples of externalities from neighbours (and he cites many of them), is not 
just a problem of the one who harms compensating the harmed, but is 
reciprocal in nature. Coase (1960 p. 2) describes this as "To avoid the harm to 
Β would inflict harm on A. The real problem that has to be decided is: should A 
be allowed to harm Β or should Β be allowed to harm A? The problem is to 
avoid the more serious harm." In other words, should the railway company be 
allowed to burn the woods, or should the owners of the woods be protected 
from sparks that could burn the woods down. The decision depends on a 
trade-off between the gains and the sacrifices the two property rights owners 
would make. 
Coase goes one step further by assuming a world of zero transaction 
costs, in other words, that bargaining and making up an agreement between 
two neighbours would be costless. In that situation, he argues, it would not be 
important who would be made liable for the damage done. The railway 
company and all the adjoining landowners bargain without costs until a socially 
optimal situation has been reached. This thesis has become very famous as the 
'Coase Theorem'17, which Coase (1960 p. 8, ; 1988 p. 14), formulates as "[...] 
the ultimate result (which maximizes the value of production) is independent of 
the legal system if the price system is assumed to work without costs." Demsetz 
(1967) embraces the theorem in his paper on property rights and reformulates it 
(though leaving the content intact) as "There are two striking implications of [...] 
a world of zero transaction costs. The output mix that results when the 
exchange of property rights is allowed, is efficient and the mix is independent 
of who is assigned ownership." This optimum will be reached because there 
would be a total trade-off, since the value of the gains and losses of each 
participant are known, without costs for acquiring this knowledge. Secondly, this 
trade-off would be 'on the margin', in other words the negotiators stop 
bargaining at a point - the margin - where there are no more gains to be made 
without a loss of the total (i.e. social) result. 
17
 It was Stigler (1966) who introduced 'Coase Theorem' as a label for the thesis. 
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Coase has been attacked by many for the unrealistic assumption of a 
world of zero transaction costs. This critique is based on a very limited 
knowledge or understanding of Coase's paper; he fully acknowledges that such 
a world does not exist. What he particularly wanted to show is the reverse of the 
Coase theorem. If transaction costs are zero it does not matter how property 
rights have been assigned and delineated, is the same as the statement that 
when transaction costs are positive it does matter how we define and attributed 
our property rights. To make the connection with The nature of the firm, without 
transaction costs, there would be no firms, but since there are transaction costs, 
they become essential organising units. 
Ronald Coase has also been identified with free market 
environmentalism, since his emphasis on the reciprocal nature of externality 
problems, led to the conclusion that these issues do not necessarily have to be 
internalised by means of government intervention. In the planning field, 
especially in the US, Coase has had some followers (Fischel 1985; Ellickson 
1973; Siegan 1972), who are very critical about zoning and make a plea for 
market-based arrangements for internalising externalities. In The problem of 
social cost Coase is very qualified since he makes no a priori or ideological 
decision for the governance mode. Like in The nature of the finn, he states that 
the mode of governance is dependent on the transaction. Sometimes, for 
instance when making an arrangement with your neighbour about reducing 
nuisance, it might be suitable to sign a long-term contract, instead of more 
short-term and fluid market transaction. In other cases, it could be appropriate 
to incorporate a transaction between two parties into one organisation. There 
are also instances, like in the case of smoke nuisance, which make it difficult 
(because of high transaction costs) to co-ordinate the transactions within one 
organisation; then government regulations18 become appropriate. Therefore, 
Coase does not a priori reject government regulations, like zoning ordinances. 
But he also argues that all these alternative modes of regulation are not without 
costs themselves. All these costs should be taken into account in what Coase 
calls an opportunity-cost approach, in which realistic alternatives are compared 
on the basis of their transaction (or opportunity) costs. This is a more realistic 
approach than starting - as Pigou did - from a situation of laissez-faire that 
needs to be corrected by the state. Laissez-faire does not exist; some even say 
it is planned (Polanyi 1957). Williamson has given Coase's methodology, which 
he followed, the label remediableness. "A condition is held to be remediable if a 
superior feasible alternative can be described and implemented with net gains." 
(Williamson 1996 p. 379). This replaces the concept of failure as it is often used 
in economics, especially in welfare economics (see also chapter 1). 
The main message of Coase in his 1960 article is that in a world of 
positive transaction costs institutions matter, and more specifically, the way 
property rights are defined and assigned matters. This attention for property 
rights makes clear, that we need to be more precise how we theorise about the 
exchange of goods and services. In the case of land: "We speak of a person 
owning land and using it as a factor of production, but what the land-owner in 
fact possesses is the right to carry out a circumscribed list of actions." (Coase 
1960 p. 44) Or described in other words: "It is not the resource itself which is 
18
 Coase (1960 p. 17) describes that as a 'very special kind of super-firm'. 
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owned; it is a bundle, or a portion, of the right to use a resource that is owned. 
In its original meaning, property referred solely to a right, title, or interest, and 
resources could not be identified as property any more than they could be 
identified as right, title, or interest." (Alchian & Demsetz 1973 p. 17) The 
recognition of the importance of property rights has led to a more or less 
separate branch in the neo-institutional, and the law and economics tradition, 
known as the property rights approach (see also Demsetz 1967). What is 
important here for the rest of the book, is that differences in the definition of 
property rights (on land) lead to differences in economic outcomes, of which 
transaction costs are a part. 
To recapitulate, the new institutional economists (e.g. Coase 1937; Williamson 
1975; Alchian & Demsetz 1973), unlike most old institutional economists, 
embraced some core ideas of neo-classical economics, like the principle of 
marginalism and the idea of utility maximising individuals, but wanted to extend 
the applicability by considering how institutions, particularly property-rights 
structures, and transaction costs affect economic behaviour. They are not 
satisfied with the assumption of a perfectly and smoothly operating market with 
zero transaction costs. According to them this cannot be applied to real world 
situations. They want to see how economic behaviour is affected if transaction 
costs are not zero and how property rights affect economic actions. In the next 
section, I elaborate on the institutions, by focussing on transactions of property 
rights and the norms that govern those transactions: the governance structures. 
2.3 Governance structures and property rights: building upon and 
refining Coase's work 
John Commons introduced the transaction as the unit of analysis for economic 
research. "Transactions are the means, under operation of law and custom, of 
acquiring and alienating legal control of commodities, or legal control of the 
labor and management that will produce and deliver or exchange the 
commodities and services, forward to the ultimate consumers." (Commons 1931 
p. 657) The definition given here is slightly broader than the way the concept is 
often used within new institutional economics. Williamson states that a 
transaction "occurs when the property rights over a good or service is 
transferred" (Williamson 1996 p. 379, italics added by me). What is particularly 
interesting in Commons' description is the word (legal) 'control', which implies 
that the good or service does not need to be exchanged for attaining some 
degree of control. The application of zoning for instance, in this definition can be 
seen as a transaction, since it is a way of increasing control over the way land is 
used. In the narrow (neo-institutional) sense it would not be a transaction 
because there is no transfer of property rights, like for instance in the case of 
eminent domain or compulsory purchase. For applying transaction cost 
economics to planning and development, the broader definition is more suitable, 
since planning is about trying to control the way land is used (in the future). So, 
a transaction in this study should be regarded as a legal action to increase (or 
take) control over property rights. These transactions are executed - and hence 
control is exercised - through governance structures. Especially in chapter 7 
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and 8 we will see that the quest for control over land development, and 
especially the wish of public authorities to control, significantly affects (the 
incidence of) transaction costs. 
Governance structures 
A governance structure is "an institutional framework in which the integrity of a 
transaction, or related set of transactions, is decided." (Williamson 1996 p. 11). 
Governance structures are therefore institutional arrangements that structure 
transactions between individuals. In new institutional economics, there is a 
general distinction between institutional arrangements and the institutional 
environment. The former are (as already said) the governance structures 
(Williamson 1990a) that guide the way economic entities interact, whereas the 
institutional environment is described as the legal, social and political rules that 
determine the context within which economic activity takes place. Williamson 
(1990a) takes the institutional environment as a given. 
Another distinction that needs to be made here, is between organisations 
and institutions, which are often not precisely discussed. There has been a lot 
of debate within institutional research on how to deal with organisations. Are 
they institutions or should they be seen as something external - as agents - to 
those sets of rules? Some (Dequech 2005) argue for a broad concept of 
institutions that encompasses organisations, since organisations are also 
perceived as systems of rules. This coincides with Williamson's (1975 see also 
Coase, 1937) treatment of the firm or public bureaucracy (Williamson 1999), as 
a governance structure, or institutional arrangement, that is used as an 
alternative to the market. 
For the analysis, I distinguish, like Bromley (1989) and North (1990), 
between institutions and organisations, regarding organisations as the 'players' 
that act within the institutions, 'the rules of the game'. With this distinction, firms 
and government agencies are treated as organisations and hierarchical 
governance structures, like zoning, as institutions or institutional arrangements. 
However this distinction is analytical, since they are closely interrelated in 
practice. Organisations are also determined by a set of rules that govern 
interaction within them (Dequech 2005). Bromley (1989 p. 43) makes a 
distinction between the rules that govern the relationship between an 
organisation and the rest of the world and the rules that spell out the internal 
organisation. These comments could lead to the recognition that organisations 
are special (collective) agents and a special set of institutions at the same time 
(Dequech 2005). I am mainly concerned with the institutions or rules that guide 
interaction between (and not within) organisations: the governance structures19. 
In general, a distinction is made between market structures, hierarchical 
structures and a third form, which I call relational structures. These three ideal 
types will be distinguished below. 
19
 Although Alexander (1992; 2001a) has written some path-breaking articles that have 
introduced transaction cost economics into planning theory, he too easily applies Williamson's 
framework, in which no distinction is being made between organisations and institutions, to 
public land use planning. Alexander regards public land use planning, like e.g. the firm, as 
hierarchical organisation. But zoning for instance, does not govern internal relations within one 
organisation, but relations between citizens, and between citizens and the state. 
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• Market 
Markets have been the subject of many articles and books and hence 
numerous definitions circulate in economics as in the social sciences in general. 
Although neo-classical economists cannot understand markets satisfactorily 
(see e.g. Coase 1988), due to a lack of attention for institutions and an 
overemphasis on explaining prices, it does not mean they have no definition of 
them. However these definitions are often not institutional, and regard the 
market as an assembly of buyers and sellers. Hirschman (1982 p. 1473) for 
instance describes markets as a "large number of price-taking anonymous 
buyers and sellers supplied with perfect information...function without any 
prolonged human or social contract between the parties. Under perfect 
competition there is no room for bargaining, negotiation, remonstration or 
mutual adjustment and the various operators that contract together need not 
enter into recurrent or continuing relationships as a result of which they would 
get to know each other well." 
Coase (1988 p. 7) focuses like most institutional economists on the 
institutional nature of markets: "Markets are institutions that exist to facilitate 
exchange, that is, they exist in order to reduce the cost of carrying out 
exchange transactions." Hodgson uses a similar definition: "[...] markets involve 
multiple exchanges, multiple buyers and multiple sellers, and thereby a degree 
of competition. A market is an institution in which a significant number of 
commodities of a particular, reasonably well-defined type are regularly 
exchanged." (Hodgson 2002 p. 44) What is not apparent in Coase's definition, 
and gets more attention in Hodgson's description, is the element of competition, 
which Hirschman emphasises as well. In a classical market, or thick market as 
Williamson (1996 p. 378) calls it, with very many buyers and sellers, there will 
be full competition. In cases of full competition, it is the price, which brings 
demand and supply in equilibrium, and therewith governs the way people 
transact. Individual buyers and sellers have very little influence on these market 
prices. A think market is a form of governance that leaves no room for building 
continuing or recurring relationships by which people get to know each other 
well, since it is the price mechanism that governs. The transactions between the 
two transacting parties, and the outcome, are not dependent on relationships, 
previous transactions or the identity of the actors. 
This pure market form, in which personal contacts, identity or experience 
do not exist, is rare. The actions of individuals are embedded (Granovetter, 
1985) in cultural peculiarities. In addition, in many cases there are not multiple 
sellers, but oligopolies or monopolies. What makes pure markets almost non-
existent in the case of land exchanges and land use planning is the nature of 
the good 'land'. This becomes clear when we look at a part of Hodgson's 
definition, in which he deals with the type and number of goods that are 
exchanged in 'the market'. He says that in the market a significant number of 
commodities of a particular, reasonably well-defined type are regularly 
exchanged." (Hodgson 2002 p. 44) So, goods are clearly defined and regularly 
exchanged. But in the case of land, the word commodity, hardly applies, since 
every piece of land is unique and immobile, which makes it almost irreplaceable 
by other tracts of land. In addition, the number of buyers and sellers is often 
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limited, which leads to situations in which exchange is co-ordinated by other 
mechanisms than price, as Needham & De Kam (2004) show for the exchanges 
of land for affordable housing between municipalities and housing associations. 
It must be noted that there are also many other broader descriptions of 
markets, in which exchange can take many forms (Lindblom 2001). But for the 
sake of conceptual clarity, I prefer to use the relatively narrow description of the 
market, and I label exchanges by means other than the price mechanism, like 
for instance trust, as relational structures. Those latter governance structures 
will be dealt with after the market's traditional counterpart, hierarchy. 
• Hierarchy20 
Government agencies can and often do use authority (the second part of 
Williamson's definition) without incorporating the transaction. A good example is 
zoning, which is used by local authorities for various purposes (like e.g. 
internalising externalities) without their having to own the land. McGuinness 
(1991) gives a good definition of hierarchy (that comes closer to this conception 
than Williamson's), which he regards as "a class of governance whose 
distinguishing feature is that a resource owner accepts restrictions (often simply 
because he has to) on his sole rights to use his resources in whatever way he 
might choose. Within those bounds of some agreed domain, he allows his 
resources to be controlled by an authorized decision-making unit to which he 
might or might not belong." (Mcguinness 1991 p. 74-75, parenthesis mine) 
• Relational structures 
One of the main criticisms of transaction cost economics has long been the 
dichotomy that was set up between market and hierarchy (see e.g. Coase 1937; 
Williamson 1975). But since the eighties, new institutional economists as well as 
other disciplines began to appreciate the importance of long-term contracting, 
hybrid governance, relational contracting, network management and the like. In 
public administration, this category is usually captured under the heading 
'networks' or 'policy networks' (Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan 1999). However, the 
delineation of this category is far from clear, which can be shown by the 
following description: "When discussing networks, in the first instance at least, it 
is probably institutional arrangements like informal groups, mutual-aid 
organizations, small-scale and local institutional networks, cooperative forms of 
Since I distinguish between organisations and institutions, the firm (like Coase and 
Williamson do) will not be regarded as an alternative hierarchical governance structure for the 
market. In addition, the idea of the market and the firm as alternative structures comes from a 
field that mainly deals with mdustnal organisations. This becomes clear from Williamson's 
definition, when he argues that transactions are managed by hierarchies when "[...] they are 
placed under unified ownership (buyer and supplier are in the same enterpnse) and subject to 
administrative controls (an authonty relation, to include fiat) [...]" (Williamson 1996 p. 378). If the 
costs of using the market, and buying goods, become too high, it is likely that firms decide to 
make the goods themselves. This became known as the 'make or buy' decision. This is trade-
off is hardly possible when it comes to land use decisions, since in general land cannot be 
made if it cannot be bought. Although the Dutch may think differently about this. As some say: 
"God made the world, and the Dutch made Holland." (Paludi 2005). However, the 'make or buy' 
decision seems more applicable to serviced land in the Netherlands. Developers and housing 
associations choose between acquiring serviced land (which is often prepared for building by 
municipalities), or service land themselves. 
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social existence, self-help groups, and so on that come immediately to mind." 
(Thompson 2003). In this description, again, there is a mix of organisations and 
institutions. I am particularly interested in the relational arrangements between 
organisations. 
Coase has argued that firms, i.e. hierarchies, and markets are alternative 
modes of governance. This distinction was embraced by Williamson in 1975 
(Williamson 1975). In Granovetter's view (1985), the way Williamson (1975) and 
other institutional economists, discuss the market structure is too atomistic and 
therefore undersocialised, and the hierarchical structure is too structuralist and 
therefore oversocialised. In the market, there is only room for impersonal and 
short term exchanges, between actors that are independent of each other and 
pursue their own interest. In hierarchical structures, as assumed by for instance 
Williamson, actors are subjected to authority which they obey. Granovetter 
points to the difficulty of imposing authority through hierarchies and the 
deterministic view some have of the influence of hierarchies on individual 
action. The individual is not a puppet of those external social structures 
(Hodgson 2000). Both these under- and oversocialised accounts neglect 
ongoing structures of social relations, and the embeddedness of individual 
action in those relationships. These social relations are essential for the 
(economic) actions of both people and organisations (see Putnam 1993; 
Putnam 2000: chapter 19; Granovetter 1973) 
As a reaction against the critiques of the market-hierarchy distinction, it 
became popular to argue that the boundaries between them are fuzzy and 
indistinct. New ideas like 'quasi-markets', 'hybrid forms' (e.g. Williamson 1985) 
and 'internal markets' began to gain attention (Hodgson 2002). This is the result 
of the observation made by many that a lot of transactions do not take place 
through markets (North 1977), nor through hierarchies. In every exchange there 
is some implicit or explicit legal contract, leading to an exchange of property 
rights, but not all exchanges have the competitive and transient features that 
market exchanges have (Hodgson 1988), nor the features of imposed rules or 
authority which hierarchies have. Hodgson (2002) calls this third category non-
market or relational exchanges, others call it relational contracting (see e.g. 
Richardson 1972; Williamson 1985). An interesting example that I found in the 
pilot case (see also Buitelaar 2004), which preceded the cases in this study, is 
the informal agreement a Dutch municipality made with a large developer, 
which allowed the developer to develop every site in the inner city that was in 
the hands of the municipality. In the case studies also, in chapter 4, 5 and 6, we 
will see interesting relational exchanges. 
Hodgson argues that the existence of a third category should not imply 
that we do not need to conceptualise markets and hierarchies; the distinction 
between them is not blurred. Rather, there is (at least) one third distinct 
category: relational structures. But although markets, hierarchies and relational 
contracting are distinct governance structures, they can nevertheless co-exist 
next to each other, as we will see in the case studies. 
Governance structures vary in their capacity to deal with the given 
circumstances (Williamson 1985). According to Hayek (1945; 1991), it is the 
market structure and its price mechanism that is most efficient in bringing about 
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economic order. He regards co-operation between actors in this way as 
spontaneous. Barnard (1938) argues the opposite: that intended and induced 
co-operation through hierarchical structures is the most efficient mode of 
organising transactions. Williamson (1990b) argues that either can be most 
efficient in terms of transaction costs, depending on the nature of the 
transaction. 
2.4 How do transaction costs emerge? Transaction dimensions and 
economic behaviour 
Arrow (1969 p. 48) defines transaction costs as the "costs of running the 
economic system". These costs have to be distinguished from the production 
costs which are the main concern of neo-classical economics (Williamson 
1985). "Transaction costs refer to all costs other than the costs of physical 
production [...]" (Lai 1994 p. 84). Transaction costs emerge because we do not 
have perfect rationality and complete information as is assumed in many neo-
classical models. Instead, there is bounded rationality, incomplete information 
and opportunism. Transaction costs are the costs that are made to increase the 
information available to us and to reduce uncertainty. For instance, before we 
buy a car we try to get information about prices, quality and service. Therefore, 
we compare different brands and different dealers. Those activities cost time, 
money and effort, in other words: transaction costs. 
Although the concept 'transaction costs' suggests that only the costs 
around a transaction are involved, it is often (as we also saw in Coase's early 
treatment of the concept) used more broadly. If the costs of transacting between 
supplier and demander are too high, one of those two might decide to 
incorporate the activity of the other by acquiring it from the other. For example, 
a car factory might decide to incorporate the activity of distributing cars, 
because the transaction costs of outsourcing are too high. This shift towards a 
hierarchical form of organisation is called vertical integration. The transaction 
costs might now be lower because there is no transaction. But instead ofthat, 
the organisation has the internal costs of co-ordinating the activity that has been 
incorporated. These costs are agency costs21, but are often also called 
transaction costs. Also other costs, like using zoning, or setting up planning 
agreements (like section 106 agreements in England), which are respectively 
hierarchical and non-market transactions, should be seen as transaction costs. 
The broader definition of the transaction, which has been articulated earlier, 
encompasses all these activities as well. 
Coase (1937) argues that a key feature of transactions is uncertainty. 
Uncertainty gives rise to the existence of and changes in organisations and 
institutions. He even says that "it seems improbable that a firm would emerge 
without the existence of uncertainty." (Coase 1937) Ultimately, hierarchy might 
be an answer to too high uncertainty and incompleteness of contracts. Coase 
also said that if there is a small number of exchange relations, in which buyer 
and seller become dependent on each other, this too might lead to a shift to 
hierarchical modes of governance. Williamson (1975) felt that this line of 
21
 If the agency costs of making a product are perceived high or too high a company might 
decide to hive off that activity. 
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reasoning needed to be further developed and refined. The issue of 
'uncertainty' and 'small numbers' were what he called properties of the market 
(or environmental factors). They had to be connected to the human factor. He 
put forward (p.4), two "elementary attributes of human decision-makers": 
opportunism and bounded rationality. 
Economic behaviour 
Bounded rationality is a concept that was introduced by another Nobel Prize 
winner, Herbert Simon (see e.g. Simon 1957). It acknowledges that people 
have limited ability to acquire and process all the information available. People's 
behaviour in this respect is "intendedly rational but only limited so" (Williamson 
1996 p. 377). So, as in most neo-classical models, the individual attempts to 
maximise utility, but finds it costly to do so and acknowledges his inability to 
anticipate all contingencies and adaptations thereto (Furubotn & Richter 1991). 
Bounded rationality in itself would not lead to many and high transaction 
costs, if everybody was completely trustworthy. The neo-classical approach 
takes self-interested behaviour as a behavioural assumption on which it builds 
its models. But self-interested behaviour is reliable and predictable, which would 
not cause many (transaction) costs (incurred for anticipating that behaviour). In 
reality, people sometimes purposefully mislead, deceive, or otherwise confuse 
others. This can be placed under the word opportunism, which Williamson 
describes as 'self-interest seeking with guile'. 
However, transaction costs would all be relatively low if, even with 
bounded rationality and opportunism, all transactions were similar and had the 
same characteristics. The behavioural assumptions need to be connected to an 
extended version of the dimensions that Coase gave to transactions. These 
transaction dimensions are interdependence, uncertainty and timing. 
Transaction dimensions 
* Interdependence 
The first of three transaction dimensions that have been identified by Williamson 
(1985) is asset specificity. Neo-classical theories assume that resources are 
infinitely redeployable and substitutable, which makes all transactions of the 
same good alike. But in reality, many transactions are not recurring and only 
take place between a limited number of buyers and sellers: this makes these 
people dependent on each other. Asset specificity could be described as: "a 
specialised investment that cannot be redeployed to alternative uses or by 
alternative users except at a loss of productive value." (Williamson 1996 p. 
377). These investments give rise to bilateral dependency as Williamson calls it, 
and will only be made if the contractors expect a decrease in production costs 
or an increase in revenue. Alexander (2001a) widens this transaction 
dimension, by labelling it as interdependence, in order to go beyond the 
application to industrial organisation and to make it applicable to public land use 
planning as well. In the broader concept of interdependence, the costs of 
organisational and interorganisational co-ordination are also included. A high 
level of asset-specificity or interdependence might give rise to hierarchical 
governance structures. 
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• Uncertainty 
One major source of uncertainty is information-impactedness, which refers to a 
lack of information and / or asymmetric information (Williamson 1975, Dixit 
1996) This could give one exchange partner an advantage over the other The 
advantage might be caused by non-observability of the others' action, or pre­
contract information Williamson adds non-innocent forms of behavioural 
uncertainty, like opportunism, to demonstrate that not all (and maybe most) 
mformation-asymmetnes or lack of information are caused by unintentional 
action of the exchange partners Some people consciously try to distort the 
transaction by disguising or manipulating information Another source, which is 
related to information-impactedness, is complexity, which is partly attributable to 
mterdependencies (the first dimension) The higher the uncertainty, the higher 
the need for uncertainty reduction, the higher the transaction costs 
• Timing22 
The last of the transaction dimensions is timing, which includes the duration and 
frequency of transactions This dimension is also related to the previous two In 
the perfect economic market, transactions are in pnnciple one-off and 
instantaneous exchanges However, in reality, many transactions are not non-
recurnng or as speedy as these mainstream models assume One reason might 
be asset-specificity or interdependence Looking at some empirical research 
(Buitelaar et al 2006), we see that municipalities m the Netherlands are often 
committed to the same housing associations and developers If these 
interchanges recur many times or continue to proceed for a relatively long time, 
other governance structures, than the market, become appropriate 
2.5 Relationship between transaction costs and institutions 
Williamson's theory is meant as a predictive theory (Williamson 1996 ρ 12) 
The predictive nature has become familiar under the heading discriminating 
alignment, which predicts how certain transactions will be organised or 
governed This hypothesis indicates that transactions that differ in their 
dimensions, combined with behavioural characteristics, are aligned with 
governance structures, which differ in their cost and competence, in such a way 
as to economise on transaction costs 
Discriminating alignment makes institutions (ι e governance structures) 
the dependent and transaction costs the independent variable But not only do 
institutions respond to (potential) transaction costs, they are subject to 
(transaction) costs as well Those are what North (1990, chapter 8) calls 
transformation costs These transformation costs (in combination with 
increasing returns) are a major factor behind institutional inertia and path 
dependency Coase and Williamson pay little attention to that When various 
governance structures are compared, it is also the costs of making or changing 
these structures that need to be considered 
What is also problematic in Williamson's work is that he takes the 
institutional environment as given The implicit assumption seems to be that 
Williamson uses frequency, but like Alexander (2001a), I prefer timing, because that 
encompasses both duration and frequency 
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governance structures are chosen rationally (albeit bounded) and independently 
from this environment, in order to economise on transaction costs. However, 
this institutional environment has an important influence on the potential 
governance structures at the micro-level and hence affect the transaction costs: 
"This overall structure shapes the cost of transacting at the individual contract 
level, and when economists talk about efficient markets, they have simply taken 
for granted an elaborate framework of constraints." (North 1990 p. 66) In 
planning practice for instance, it is very difficult, or even impossible, to respond 
to a high degree of interdependency by introducing hierarchical governance 
structures. The 'choice' of the governance structure and its governance capacity 
is strongly dependent on the institutional and spatial context (Buitelaar et al. 
2006). Land ownership, past relationships between parties, planning cultures 
and planning legislation are just a few of the aspects of the institutional 
environment within which governance structures are situated and chosen. Old 
institutional economics pays far more attention to the wider institutional context, 
i.e. the social, cultural and political power relationships, and their constitutive 
effects on the actions of agents (Hodgson 2000), than Williamson's new 
institutional economics. Hodgson introduces two concepts, cumulative 
downward and upward causation, which show much resemblance to the ideas 
behind Giddens' duality of structure (Giddens 1984). Individuals create and 
change institutions (upward causation), just as institutions mould and constrain 
individuals (downward causation). Therefore, institutions do not have a once-
for-all influence, but are continuously constructed and reconstructed in an 
ongoing process of interaction (Granovetter 1985 p. 486). 
Williamson emphasises the ability of actors individually and atomistically 
to shape governance structures so as to maximise their utility. Granovetter 
(1985) labels this emphasis on voluntaristic design and the lack of attention for 
social structures as undersocialisation. On the other hand, there is also a 
danger of structural determinism, which Granovetter describes as 
oversocialisation. Structures may influence the actions of agents; it does not 
mean that they determine their behaviour. 
The problem however with duality of structure is that it conflates agents 
and structures entirely (Hodgson 2004). In Giddens' view, "structure.... is 
internal to actors." (Hodgson 2004 p. 33) But this neglects the fact that there 
can be structures at different levels. There are some structures that are not 
constructed by the present actors, but for instance exist at higher (or different) 
structural levels or by virtue of past generations of actors. To give an example, 
the real estate market, or the structure of building provision (Ball 1998), can be 
influenced relatively little by the actions of individual stakeholders in a project. 
The use of governance structures and the related transaction costs are 
embedded in an institutional context. This context could also be seen as the 
'culture' within which actions are taken, if culture is defined as "the sum of and 
the interrelationships among institutions." (Neale 1994) These institutions can 
be and often are a mixture of both formal and informal institutions. In (new) 
economic sociology (Granovetter 1985; Gallon 1998; Abolafia 1998) and old 
institutional economics (e.g. Hodgson 2004)23, much more attention has been 
23
 New economic sociology and old institutional economics have so many similarities that it is 
surprising to see how little co-operation takes place between them (Velthuis 1999). 
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given to the relationship between culture and economic actions. Recently, this 
combination of sociology and economics has also gained ground in property 
research (Guy & Henneberry 2000; Guy, Henneberry & Rowley 2002). This 
book, in line with those just mentioned, links the actions in the development 
projects to the other (i.e. higer) level structures. 
Therefore, I make a distinction between different institutional levels, 
following the distinction made by Alexander (2005) for institutional analysis in 
planning research. These are specified and related to each other in figure 2.1. 
Alexander makes a distinction between macro, meso and micro institutions. At 
each level we find both for and formal institions. Micro level institutions are the 
rules that shape the interaction between individuals and organisations. In this 
research, these are Williamson's govemance structures. Their construction and 
use leads to transaction costs in the development process. These governance 
structures are however not constructed out of an infinite range of alternatives. 
The focus is particularly on how formal institutions are constructed. There are 
institutions at the meso level that limit the possibilities. These meso level 
institutions form the rules of the game that different actors face when entering 
into development practices. This level includes "[...] incentives and constraints 
in the form of laws, regulations and resources to develop and implement 
policies, programs, projects and plans." (Alexander 2005 p. 214). Examples are 
planning and building laws, financial incentives (like the Planning Delivery 
Grants in England), land policy practices, et cetera. This meso-level constrains 
(or enables) the actions in the development process to some extent, but (as 
said before) it does not determine or dictate them. There is a lot of room for 
agents to manoeuvre. In addition, the way agents act is often embedded -
though again not determined - in a system of social and cultural norms and 
values, which I define as the macro level institutions24. 
24
 Obviously, the macro and the meso level are also interrelated, but this relationship gets less 
attention in this study. Therefore, the arrow is dashed. 
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Figure 2.1 Conceptual framework of institutions and transaction costs 
Macro institutions 
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It needs to be noted that the terms macro, meso and micro are only used for the 
sake of labelling, and structuring the text. There are also significant 
disadvantages of using them, like any other distinction. For instance, the 
different levels are separated from each other arbitrarily; in practice the 
boundaries are blurred and the levels largely conflated. In addition, the 
headings macro, meso and micro imply a top-down hierarchy, while the 
relationship between the institutional layers is reciprocal (and therefore all 
arrows in figure 2.1 should also point in the reverse direction). However, in this 
study I am mainly interested in how transaction costs in the development 
process are produced, and therefore how the interplay between agents and 
institutions at different levels affect the actions, and the transaction costs that 
result from that, at the micro level. In Hodgson's terms, the emphasis is 
therefore more on 'cumulative downward causation' than on 'upward causation'. 
The conceptual framework just presented is not yet completely applicable 
for the empirical field of planning and development. In the next chapter, the right 
part of figure 2.1 - starting from the meso level down to transaction costs - will 
be discussed by operationalising it for land use decisions. After the 
operationalisation, it will be applied to the case studies in the chapter four, five 
and six, followed by a comparison in chapter 7. Four important elements of the 
institutional macro level are derived from the case studies and additional 
literature, which will be elaborated by additional empirical research in chapter 8. 
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Operationalising institutions and transaction costs 
This chapter deals with the operationalisation of these concepts for the 
empirical study. In the empirical research, the central question that was posed 
in chapter 1 has been addressed: how are the different institutional levels and 
transaction costs interrelated under different circumstances, and how does this 
affect the existence, size and incidence of transaction costs in the development 
process? To answer this we need an analytical framework that can be applied 
to identify institutions and transaction costs in land development, under different 
circumstances, that is on different sites, in different cities, in different countries. 
In other words, it is a framework that has general applicability for democratic 
systems of land use decision-making. In this chapter the focus is particularly at 
the micro level, which means that the concepts of governance structures and 
transaction costs are operationalised. But the relation with the meso level will 
also be made (for instance in figure 3.1), since meso-institutions limit the 
options at the micro level. First, the concept of user rights regimes is introduced 
as a specific governance structure. Also a method for identifying transaction 
costs is unfolded, especially for those costs that are related to the creation and 
the use of the user rights regime. Furthermore, the choices for the empirical 
research are set out and explained. 
This approach followed in this study differs slightly from earlier 
approaches, most notably by Ernest Alexander. His approach is normative, 
while I want to use a more analytical and explanatory^ perspective. After 
Williamson (e.g. 1999), Alexander uses the term discriminating alignment, 
which means that transactions and their dimensions (interdependence, 
uncertainty and timing) are aligned with alternative governance structures. In 
the case of what are called idiosyncratic transactions, with their high 
interdependence, much uncertainty, repetition and long duration, firms or public 
bureaux (i.e. hierarchy) are the appropriate forms of governance. Alexander 
uses transaction cost theory normatively, since it provides prescriptions for 
institutional design. I want to analyse development processes and the 
institutional arrangements within these processes, identify transaction costs, 
their size and distribution and find explanations. That makes this approach more 
analytical and explanatory. What makes the methodology of 'discriminating 
alignment' less suitable is the narrow demarcation of the transaction (and its 
dimensions), that is, as an exchange of property rights, as explained in the 
previous chapter. The transaction, as the unit of analysis, is defined more 
Explanatory in this sense means trying to explain the existence, size and distribution of 
transaction costs. It does not mean transaction-cost minimising explanations for institutions and 
institutional change, as is often done in new institutional economics (see e.g. Demsetz 1967; 
Williamson 1985). I regard the indication of (the minimisation of) transaction costs and 
efficiency as driving forces behind institutional change as too functionalistic and based on the 
assumption of rational acting individuals (see also Buitelaar 2004). As others (Ball 1998; David 
& Han 2004) have said, the em pineal validity of this explanatory version of transaction costs 
economics is to be questioned. Other approaches like sociological mstitutionalism and 
discursive mstitutionalism (e.g. Hajer 1995) seem more valuable on this point (Buitelaar, 
Lagendijk & Jacobs 2006). In the latter, explanations for institutional change are found in 
changes in discourse. 
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broadly in this study. The dimensions interdependency, uncertainty and timing 
are primarily related to the narrow definition ,and are therefore less easily 
applicable to an empirical study that seeks to identify transactions in land 
development and land use planning. 
3.1 User rights regimes as particular governance structures26 
After Alexander (after e.g. Williamson 1996), I use the transaction as the unit of 
analysis, since it is a ubiquitous, concrete and well-defined unit (Alexander 
2001a p. 48). However, in the way in which Alexander uses it, this unit is not 
sufficient to cover the whole range of institutional arrangements through which 
land use is changed. I use Commons' broader definition of a transaction which 
is directed to acquiring legal control over property rights; this is broader than 
acquiring control by obtaining the property rights. In chapter two I defined, in 
line with Commons, the transaction as a legal action to increase (or take) 
control over property rights. Governance structures have been defined as "an 
institutional frameworks in which the integrity of a transaction, or related set of 
transactions, is decided." (Williamson 1996 p. 11). Governance structures are 
the means to increase or change control over property rights. 
With regard to land use and land use decisions, it is the right to use, 
rather than the question who has the right to 'full ownership', that is central27. 
Other parts of the bundle of property rights, like the right to income or the right 
to transfer are less important (or are purely instrumental) for land use planning, 
although they are very much related to the right to use. When we apply the 
three governance structures (market, hierarchy and relational structures) to land 
use planning issues, we examine how they are used to deal with changes in 
land use by changing the ownership or the content of user rights. This needs to 
be explained. If someone wants to change the use of the land on which he 
owns the user rights, he can usually do that by exercising his rights. But 
governance is about adjusting, influencing and regulating the actions of other 
owners of user rights. Suppose that a person (or an agency) wants to change or 
influence the use of land of which he does not own the user rights. He can do 
this either by acquiring the user rights or by taking actions that change the 
content of the user rights. The three governance structures can be applied to do 
both. 
Applied to land use, we can distinguish a market in user rights. In market 
forms of governance, someone buys the whole bundle of property rights on a 
piece of land, or just the user rights or part of the user rights. People can 'buy 
their way out of an externality problem' by buying (parts of) user rights in order 
to prevent externalities. This idea is based on the work of Coase (1960). For 
example, a factory is next to a forest. The factory emits toxic gasses that are 
harmful to the forest. The owner of the forest and the owner of the factory can 
take account of these externalities through exchange of a part of the user rights. 
The question is: how much is a 'clean' forest environment worth, in terms of 
A large part of this section is denved from Buitelaar (2003). 
27
 The bundle of nghts consists of the nght to use (usus), the right to income (usus fmctus) and 
the right to transfer (abusus) (De Alessi 1991 ). "It is the bundle of rights that society recognizes 
as ownership" (Jacobs 1998 p. x). 
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money, to the forest owner, and how much is a full emission, through which the 
factory can produce maximally, worth to the factory owner? If the forest owner is 
prepared to compensate the factory owner for polluting the air to a lesser 
extent, e.g. by compensating the factory owner for closing down a part of the 
factory, he actually buys a part of the user rights of the factory owner. Through 
this transaction the forest owner decides partly about the use of the land of the 
factory owner28. Obviously, if the forest owner buys the whole right to use the 
land on which the factory is built, or the whole bundle of property rights (with the 
use rights included), he decides about the full use of it. There is an important 
difference between transacting a part of the user rights and transacting all the 
user rights or the whole bundle. The difference is that buying parts of the user 
rights (like the forest owner did) changes the content of user rights (of the 
factory owner). Buying all the user rights or the whole bundle of property rights 
does not change the content of the user rights but the ownership of the user 
rights29. 
When hierarchy is applied to the governance of land use, land use 
planning by a public agency is the main form (Alexander 1992; 2001a). As the 
definition of McGuinness (1991 see also chapter 2) shows, in hierarchical forms 
of governance, it is someone or something else than the owner of the user 
rights that decides about the attenuation or transfer of the user rights on a 
piece of land. The best known example of attenuation of user rights is zoning. 
Expropriation goes further; now the content of the user rights (and the other 
rights too) is not attenuated, but the user rights together with the rest of the 
rights within a bundle of rights are transferred. The user rights are not changed, 
but the ownership is; for zoning the opposite is true. 
Good examples of relational contracting in the case of land use, are 
public-public, private-private or public-private partnerships, which are voluntarily 
entered into. Another example is the agreements developers and planning 
authorities reach about public facilities (like section 106 agreements in 
England). Such partnerships and agreements can be bilateral as well as 
multilateral, and between neighbouring property owners as well as between 
other stakeholders (like the municipality) and the property owners. Relations are 
not only used for changing the content of the user rights, but also for changing 
the ownership of the user rights. Needham & De Kam (2004) show that Dutch 
housing associations do not only acquire their land 'through the market', but 
also with (often below the market price) the help of municipalities. Another 
example of relational forms of governance directed to changing the ownership 
2e
 It must be noted here that there is a fine line between market and relational structures. Given 
the definition of markets in chapter 2, as being structures that facilitate transitory, nonrecurring 
and non-relational exchanges, it must be said that most (or almost every) exchanges of parts of 
the user rights are not market exchanges. If we look at the example of the factory, it is unlikely 
in the case of land that people who enter into exchanges have no relationship, since they are 
often neighbours. 
29
 It must be noted that pure markets as defined in chapter 2 do not or rarely exist, since 
exchanges are generally relational to some degree, especially in the case of exchanges 
between neighbours. 
30
 If we start from absolute ownership, a landowner is entitled to do with his property whatever 
he wants "...from a parcel's horizontal boundaries, ever upward to the heavens and ever 
downward to the depths." (Ellickson 1993 p. 1363). Every action by the government that 
restricts the exercise of this pnnciple must be seen as an attenuation of property nghts. 
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of user rights is land readjustment on a voluntary basis by neighbouring 
property owners. There are also combinations in which both the content and the 
transfer of user rights is arranged. In the Dutch case we will see such an 
example of what is called a development agreement. 
In (almost) every democratic country there are rules from both public law 
and private law regarding land exchange and land use . In terms of chapter 2, 
these could be seen as the rules of the game at the meso level. Private law 
consists of the general rules that are set up to facilitate exchange (not only with 
regard to land) between citizens. Under private law we find, among other things, 
property law and contract law. Examples of applications of these private rules 
are development agreements (see chapter 4), restrictive covenants (see 
chapter 6) and easements (chapter 5 and 6). Public law comprises the rules 
that arrange the relationship between the citizen and the state and between 
government agencies, like national planning acts or acts on compulsory 
purchase. These general laws get local application, for instance in the case of 
zoning, development control, expropriation et cetera. In every development 
process, these public and private law rules are created and / or used differently. 
The site-specific application that concerns the right to use a particular piece of 
land is what I call the user rights regime for that land. This will be the core 
object of the transaction-cost analysis. 
Figure 3.1: User rights regime (combination of Buitelaar 2003 and Segeren, 
Needham & Groen, 2005) 
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3.2 A transaction-cost analysis of the development process: a 
methodology 
Transaction costs is a broad concept that needs to be further specified. First, 
there are the costs of acquiring information, like a comparison of brands. In the 
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case of land use planning, it can be for example a research into residential 
preferences. These transaction costs are called information costs. 
Uncertainty can also be (and often is) reduced by using institutions. 
Property rights on land, for instance, means that there are rights and 
consequently (see Bromley, 1991) duties with respect to a particular piece of 
land. Those reduce uncertainty about what can and cannot be done with that 
land, and by whom. North (1990a: 3) defines institutions as: "[...] the rules of the 
game in a society or, more formally, [...] the humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interaction." Institutions are created or changed, after which they 
are used31. The creation and use (see for this distinction Furubotn & Richter, 
1991: 8) of institutions involves costs: transaction costs, or more specifically 
institutional costs. 
The advantage of this more dynamic and less deterministic view on 
institutions is that the 'duality of structure' (Giddens 1984; Healey & Barrett 
1990), i.e. the difficulty of separating structure and agency when it comes to 
explaining social behaviour, is incorporated. The word 'creating' shows that 
institutions are "humanly devised constraints" (North 1990 p. 3), i.e. social 
constructions, and 'using' (or acting within) institutions shows that on the other 
hand institutions "shape human interaction" (North 1990 p. 3). With this 
approach it is not necessary, and even inappropriate, to distinguish between the 
transaction costs that are caused by agencies using the institutions and the 
transaction costs that are caused by the agencies when they make these 
institutions: these are interwoven. 
In figure 3.2, I have summarised the different costs of the development 
process in order to specify the concept of transaction costs. This study focuses 
on the costs of creating and using institutions, more specifically the user rights 
regimes. The costs of acquiring information independent of the institutional 
arrangements, if there are any, are what I call the information costs. 
Figure 3.2: Specifying the costs of the development process 
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Transaction costs are rarely measured (Furubotn & Richter 1991). If they are at 
all quantified, they are usually put as a non-specified item on an account, like 
for example 'administrative costs'. In addition, as we will see in the coming 
31
 Sometimes creation and use coincide. For instance, with designing the Town & Country 
Planning Act in the UK in 1947, the development plan as an institution was created. If the local 
government makes a development plan it uses the Town & Country Planning Act and at the 
same time creates local rules that have to be taken into account when planning permission is 
decided upon. 
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chapters, many transaction costs are only indirectly related to the development 
process. Therefore, transaction costs are not measured in this study. Here, I 
(see also Buitelaar 2004) put forward a methodology for identifying transaction 
costs. 
To identify transaction costs and particularly the costs that can be 
attributed to a user rights regime, the development process forms an 
appropriate time frame, since it is within this process that a user rights regime is 
created and used. Healey (1992 p. 36) defines land development processes as: 
"[...] the transformation of the physical form, bundle of rights, and material and 
symbolic value of land and buildings from one state to another, through the 
effort of agents with interests and purposes in acquiring and using resources, 
operating rules and applying and developing ideas and values." The 
development process can be regarded as a sort of production process32: on a 
particular location the built environment is changed, i.e. produced. The 
production process in a supply chain has been approached from a neo-
institutional economic perspective (see e.g. Williamson 1975; 1985). The 
development process of the built environment can also be analysed from a 
transaction-cost perspective. Healey's definition also shows that creating and 
using institutions is an integral part of the transformation process of one land 
use to another. 
It is important to distinguish transaction costs from production costs. I use 
the model of the neo-classical market as point of reference to make the 
distinction. The difference, it is often argued, between neo-classical economics 
and new institutional economics is the lack of attention for institutions and 
transaction costs in the former (e.g. Eggertsson 1990; North 1990). A neo-
classical market is assumed to function smoothly and without friction. "Property 
rights are perfectly and costlessly specified and information is likewise costless 
to acquire" (North 1990 p. 11)33. This leads to a situation where there are only 
production costs and no transaction costs. So, if we want to carry out a 
transaction-cost analysis, we must ask the question: would the costs that we 
find also be made in a neo-classical development process? If the answer is 
'yes', those are production costs, if the answer is 'no' they are transaction costs. 
This sounds too simple, but it will become clear that it is a very useful way to 
approach all the activities in the development process. I will give an illustration. 
The costs that contribute directly to building a house are the production costs, 
those costs would also have to be made in a frictionless neo-classical 'world'. 
The other costs are the transaction costs, which have to be made because of 
the acquisition of information, or the creation and use of institutions. To give an 
example, the acquisition of land would also be an activity that is needed in a 
Although the analogy with the production process is made, I do not intend to focus on capital 
flows and their determining role in the development process, and human interaction in general, 
as in many Marxist production-based models of the development process (Gore & Nicholson 
1991 ; Healey 1991 ). In addition, production-based models hardly take account of the role of 
institutions. The analogy simply emphasises the supply side of development (see also Van Der 
Krabben 1995). 
33
 North (1990 p. 17) argues that although hardly any economist believes that the behavioural 
assumptions reflect human behaviour, they do build many of their models upon those 
assumptions. 
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neo-classical 'market'34: if you want to build a house you need land. So, the 
price of land is a production cost. But negotiation and contract-making around 
the acquisition of land would not have existed in a frictionless market, and are 
therefore transaction costs. Another example is the making of a building plan. A 
design is a necessary activity in the production process of a house or a housing 
block. The deliberation about the design between the municipality and the 
developer, in order for the developer to get planning permission, is part of the 
transaction costs, as are the costs of the negotiation between the developer and 
the architect. I focus on the transaction costs (and their size) that are the result 
of the creation and use of the user rights regimes35. User rights regimes play an 
important role on several occasions in the development processes. I distinguish 
four moments, which can be found in table 3.1. These four categories have not 
been chosen randomly. A pilot case study, other empirical research (like 
Verhage 2002) and the first experiences with the cases that can be found in this 
book have shown that it is these four moments / stages in the development 
process where the user rights regime is created and / or used. I argue that the 
approach is generally applicable to most Western countries. The countries must 
at least have the institution of 'private property', surrounded by rules from the 
property rights regime, often supplemented with rules (under public law) that 
regulate land use. 
The first category is land exchange, which deals with the transfer of 
property rights, more specifically user rights, over a piece of land. Before land is 
transformed from one land use in another, it is often exchanged, for instance 
from a farmer to a developer or from a local authority to a housing association. 
There can be several exchanges of the same piece of land. The second 
moment / stage in the development process where the user rights regime is 
involved is the making of a land use or zoning plan. In most (but not all) local 
authorities in Europe and the US, local land use plans are made to indicate and 
prescribe conditions for the location and nature of land use development. These 
conditions demarcate the boundaries of the user rights. Obviously, costs are 
involved with this. Thirdly, the category 'agreement' has been identified. 
Agreements can be both statutory (like the section 106 agreement in England) 
and non-statutory like restrictive covenants or public-private partnerships. 
These agreements can be used (and often are) to mutually agree upon the 
demarcation of the user rights. The last category in table 3.1 is 'planning 
permission' (or building permit), which could be seen as using the user rights 
regime. Here planning applications are judged more (in the Netherlands) or less 
(in England) on the basis of the user rights regime. This exercise also involves 
time, money and efforts. 
34
 It should be noted that because a price has to be paid for a piece of land (like any other good) 
it suggests that there is an institution like private property, while a neo-classical market is 
supposed to be 'institutionless'. 
351 must add to this that the change and use of institutions do not only give rise to the 
transaction costs, but can also increase the production costs. For instance, the application of 
some environmental act might require soil decontamination. These costs are production costs, 
but do not exist in a neo-classical market. So, transaction costs are the costs (other than the 
production costs) that would not exist in a neo-classical market, not being the costs of the 
physical production of the built environment. I will give no further attention to the latter costs. 
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Table 3.1: Moments / stages in the development process where 
the user rights regime is created and/or used 
1. Land exchange 
2. Making land use or zoning plan / building ordinance etc. (i.e. 
regulations of land use) 
3. Agreement (between e.g. developer and municipality) 
4. Planning permission 
Assumptions have been made also about what kind of variables within each of 
the four categories might give rise to transaction costs. Those have been 
addressed in table 3.2. These factors are neither meant as hypotheses that will 
be either proven or rejected in the end, nor exhaustive, but are intended to aid 
and guide the empirical research. Here again, a pilot case, knowledge from 
secondary sources and the first experiences in the case study research have 
led to this list of variables. The four moments / stages do not only involve costs 
on themselves but influence the duration of the development process as a 
whole, and the costs related. These related costs include the interest costs that 
rise with a longer duration. 
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Table 3.2: Possible tansacuon-cost influencing factors «nth creating and using the 
user rights regimes (see also Buitelaar 2004) 
Moments / stages in the 
development process where 
the user rights regime is 
created and / or used 
1. Land exchange 
2. Making land use or 
zoning plan / building 
ordinance etc. (i.e. 
regulations of land use) 
3. Agreement (between e.g. 
developer and municipality) 
4. Planning permission 
Possible transaction-cost influencing factors 
- number of parties involved and the number of parcels 
exchanged 
- conflict of interest 
- information about future possibilities 
- delineation (assignment) of rights 
- and the information of the delineation of rights: land 
registry or not 
- use of hierarchical means (e.g. compulsory purchase, 
pre-emption rights) 
- stakeholder participation 
- appeal 
- number of parties involved 
- conflict of interest 
- structure of the plan: legally binding - indicative 
- structure of the procedure: administrative - political 
- number of parties involved 
- conflict of interest 
- structure of agreement / contract: detailed - flexible 
- yes, no, or conditional 
- number of parties involved 
- conflict of interest 
- possibility of negotiation (planning gain) 
- possibility of appeal and the actual use of it 
- structure of the procedure: administrative - political 
- structure of the permission: conditional -
unconditional 
Land exchanges are facilitated by rules from the user rights regime. Using these 
institutions involves costs. The costs might further be determined by how rights 
are delineated, the information about that, knowledge about future possibilities, 
the number of parties that want to acquire the land and whether or not 
hierarchical measures like compulsory purchase can be or are used. 
Factors related to the plan-making stage (if there is a plan) that generate 
transaction costs could be the structure of the plan-making procedure and the 
plan, stakeholder participation, the number of stakeholders, conflict between 
them and appeal possibilities and use. 
In some development processes, agreements like restrictive covenants 
or (the British) planning agreements are signed among different parties to 
influence or determine the exercise of the user rights. Again, for the size of the 
transaction costs, the number of parties and their conflicts will be important, as 
well as the structure of the agreement (detailed versus broad). 
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The last category is the planning permission. Not every system (as we 
will see) has a land use plan and planning permission. But if it does, it is 
important to know whether it is a political or administrative procedure, whether 
the permission is conditional or unconditional, if there is room for negotiation or 
appeal, how many parties are involved and whether their interests conflict. It 
should be clear that the empirical analysis does not include an analysis of the 
costs of creating the relevant acts (at the meso-level). This is considered part of 
the institutional context or environment. 
3.3 The empirical research 
The framework that has been built in chapter 2 and particularly chapter 3, has 
been applied to different case studies in different countries. Case study 
research is an appropriate method for conceptually complex and empirically 
intensive studies. The relationship between institutions, and between institutions 
and transaction costs is complex, due to many types of institutions at different 
levels, and with loops between them. In addition, transaction costs are often 
numerous, divers and non-transparent. This requires a labour-intensive method. 
Cases in several countries have been chosen, because the assumption 
is that the relationships that I want to reveal differ under different circumstances, 
as the central question also indicates. For that reason, comparing them in 
different countries is most interesting, since the meso level institutions - public 
and private law with regard to land use - can differ significantly between 
countries. In the case of planning law, each site has its own site-specific 
application, but that does not mean that country-specific limitations are not 
important. The differences between different sites within one country might be 
great, but the differences between national legislation, and institutional context 
in general, could make the differences between sites (in different countries) 
even greater. 
Another choice I have made is for one type of development processes, 
namely the development of a small housing site. I have done that for several 
reasons. The reason for choosing one type of development process is that this 
reduces the number of variables. If one wants to compare different kinds of 
projects with different property rights regimes and different spatial planning 
regimes, it becomes more complex and probably impracticable (Buitelaar 2003). 
That is why I have chosen to keep the output of the development processes (a 
small housing site) constant. Therefore, different housing projects in different 
countries with similar number of houses, similar housing densities, and similar 
division of social and commercial housing et cetera have been chosen. 
Obviously, there will still be differences between different sites. But as Verhage 
(2001 p. 36) argues: "However, without trivialising these differences, we can 
also argue that we see much the same. Although the details are different, we 
are walking on a sidewalk. We are looking at buildings situated in gardens. 
Along the road are parking places, and if we look up we see street lighting. 
Although we may tend to focus on the differences, a lot of the things we see are 
the same as they are in our own country. To notice these similarities we need a 
certain level of abstraction." 
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Transaction costs, as already said, are often numerous. Large housing 
sites are often complex and therefore involve many transaction costs. 
Therefore, I have chosen to compare small housing sites. An additional difficulty 
is that transaction costs are often indirect and therefore hard to indicate. An 
example is a local authority that employs a consultant for drawing a land use 
plan, who might decide to buy the expertise of an urban designer or a lawyer. 
With all these parties involved and the related costs, it becomes difficult to track 
down all these (indirect) transaction costs. To get a comprehensive picture of 
all the transaction costs and to compare as many cases as possible, smaller 
sites (around 100 houses) are more suitable. 
The cases are 'Marialaan' in Nijmegen (The Netherlands), 'Wapping 
Wharf in Bristol (England) and Montebello in Houston (Texas, USA). The 
countries or states have been chosen for the differences in meso level 
institutions, primarily for the differences in planning system. The Dutch system 
is based on the principle of legal certainty, with a prominent role for the legally 
binding bestemmingsplan. In the English system, discretion plays a much 
greater role, and therefore the development plans (and since the system 
change in 2004 the Local Development Frameworks), have a less prominent 
and indicative role. In Texas, cities are not obliged to have zoning ordinances 
and plans, and Houston is one of the few that decided not to adopt those. 
Houston has no zoning and it is generally considered as the city with a market-
based planning system. Houston however is not the free market city it is often 
claimed to be (Larson 1995)36. Many other planning regulations are in place 
and legal certainty is an important element of those rules. In short, the role of 
the plan (or lack thereof) and the balance between certainty and flexibility are 
quite different in the three countries. The assumption is that this affects the 
choice of user rights regimes and the transaction costs related to them. This 
'choice' is not only dependent on the meso level institutions, but is also 
embedded in social and cultural structures at the macro level. Again, it must be 
noted that the institutional distinction and the labels (macro, meso and micro) 
are analytical and arbitrary. The main macro level institutions are identified 
(empirically) from the case studies and additional literature. This is done at the 
end of chapter 7 and elaborated empirically in chapter 8. 
The projects - Marialaan, Wapping Wharf and Montebello - have been 
chosen for practical reasons. Important considerations were the access to the 
information, they had to be recently completed and it had to be apartment 
complexes / condominiums of around 100 units to make them comparable. 
They are not meant to represent the way development is carried out in each 
country, although they are not peculiar in their country. The cases have their 
own development and their own site-specific peculiarities. 
In the different cases, both content analysis and interviews (see appendix 
A) have been used to acquire primary information about the sequence of the 
events, the involvement of stakeholders and especially about the way the user 
36
 In that sense El Paso (in Texas near the border with Mexico) would be a better example of a 
market system, but due to the absence of building regulations, subdivision and infrastructure 
requirements, residential conditions, infrastructure and sewerage are poor (Larson 1995). That 
makes this case difficult to compare to other cases, in which more or less the same result is 
produced with different institutional arrangements. 
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rights regimes was created and used. I have paid particular attention to the two 
most important parties in the development process, namely: the developer and 
the municipality. Content analysis looked at policy documents, land use plans, 
agreements, planning permissions / building permits and correspondence 
between stakeholders, most notably between the municipality and the 
developer. These documents were provided both by files from local authorities 
and by files from the developer or the architect. The interviews were held with 
the responsible agents from the side of the developer and case officers within 
the local authorities. The first step was the reconstruction of the process in 
order to get an overview of the sequence of events. The next step was to trace 
the determinants behind the transaction costs that can be attributed to the user 
rights regime. It should be noted that the exposition of the information is not 
exhaustive, since it has not always been possible to obtain all the necessary 
sources, for reasons such as confidentiality and incompleteness of files. The 
additional empirical research for chapter β, directed to explore the 
embeddedness of transaction costs in macro level structures, is based on policy 
documents, secondary literature, and interviews with practitioners in strategic 
and management positions, and with academics (see also appendix A). 
The next three chapters are empirical, each covering one country. The 
sequence of the chapters is the same as the sequence in which the case 
studies have been carried out. For every chapter the same structure applies. 
First, a brief introduction is given about some basic features of the property 
rights and planning regime. Then a description is given of the development 
process in the particular case. Finally, a transaction-cost analysis of each of the 
development processes is made. After this is done for each country, an 
aggregated analysis and comparison is made in chapter 7. 
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4 
Nijmegen: the quest for control in corporatist tradition 
In this chapter, I describe the Dutch case study (section 4.2), which is a housing 
site in the city of Nijmegen. This case could be seen as typical for the way the 
Dutch carry out development projects. There is an active involvement by the 
municipality and it took over 8 years to deliver the output. The main reason that 
it took so long was a lot of deliberation within the municipality and between the 
municipality and the developer. In the section (4.3) after the description of the 
development process, a transaction cost analysis will be made of the user rights 
regime. But before that, a general picture needs to be sketched (section 4.1) of 
the legal system in general, of the property and planning systems in particular, 
of the way Dutch municipalities are involved in land development and the kind 
of tools they have for that. 
4.1 Dutch planning and property law 
Neither property nor planning law are designed and applied in a vacuum, but 
are part of a wider legal and administrative context. Newman & Thornley (see 
e.g. 1996), following Zweigert & Kötz (1987), distinguish between various legal 
families so as to indicate different legal styles of groups of countries. The 
Netherlands is considered as being part of what is called the Napoleonic family. 
This family, to which France, Belgium, Spain, Portugal and Italy also belong, 
has a tendency to use abstract legal norms (often formulated in a constitution) 
and to have legal debates about them, more than is the case in the British 
family which is more pragmatic, based on a case by case (evolutionary) 
approach. There is an inclination in the Napoleonic family to think things 
through in advance, mainly to set up a clear system that provides legal 
certainty. This has also become known as the 'rule of law' (see e.g. Moroni 
2005). The abstract legal norms are translated into a system of rules, both in 
private law (like the civil code) and in public law (like a national planning act). 
We will see examples of the first when property law is discussed and examples 
of the latter when the national planning act and the tools for land acquisition 
(like compulsory purchase and pre-emption rights) are discussed. 
What distinguishes the Netherlands from other countries, also those in 
the Napoleonic family, is the state structure and especially the relationship 
between the different layers of this structure. The state structure consists of 
three layers, the municipal, the provincial and the national level. The Dutch see 
their system as a 'decentralised unitary state'. This combines features of 
German local autonomy and French centralism (Faludi 2005). In the case of 
planning, legally the centre of gravity is at the local level, which has the only 
plan which is legally binding, the bestemmingsplan. The plans at the provincial 
and national level are strategic indicative plans, with very few legally binding 
elements. However, there are some ways37 in which the higher tiers of 
govemment can intervene in the local level. In addition, financially, the centre of 
37
 For instance, the municipal bestemmingsplan has to be approved by the province. Another 
example is the possibility that provinces and the central govemment have is give a directive if 
the local planning policy is not in accordance with the national or provincial policy. 
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gravity is at the central level. 80 percent of municipal funding comes from 
central government. This has led to a 'fused system' (Newman & Thomley 
1996), in which responsibilities (and power) are divided among the levels and 
agencies of government, which makes it difficult (though not impossible) for 
agencies on each level to autonomously decide and carry out their own 
policies38. 
Because the core of this book is about the way rules with regard to land 
use are created and applied, we need a good understanding of the way 
property and statehood are defined in the Dutch context. Booth (2002a) makes 
an interesting comparison between the origins of law in continental Europe and 
English law. As we will see in the next chapter, English property law is based on 
the two foundations beneficium and feudum, while European systems are build 
on two concepts from Roman law, namely dominium and imperium. 
Dominium: property rights 
Dominium represents the exclusive right of the owner to the current use and the 
future development of a thing. This is also known as absolute ownership. This 
contrasts with feudal systems, in which the existence of multiple interests in a 
piece of land is a key feature. Absolute ownership is central in Dutch property 
law. Although property is not defined in the Constitution, while expropriation is, it 
is defined by law, in the civil code. Two of the most important phrases that 
demonstrate the exclusive beneficial enjoyment of property are: 'property is the 
most encompassing right a person can have on a thing' (Section 1, part 1, book 
5 BW, civil code), and about the use of property: 'the owner is free to use his 
property, with exclusion of others, as long as this use is not incompatible with 
rights of others, and pays attention to legislation and justified restrictions based 
on unwritten law' (Section 1, part 2, book 5 BW, civil code). 
Although property is defined and protected in law, legal ownership of land 
never had the same symbolic value as it has in many other countries, like the 
US (Jacobs 1998). The process in which land ownership became subordinate 
and instrumental to societal values has been called the socialisation of 
ownership (Van Den Bergh 1979; Teijmant 1988). The value of land ownership 
is more instrumental than ideological, since it is treated as a policy variable to 
carry out spatial objectives. Land acquisition by the state is generally 
acknowledged, as well as government restrictions on the way landowners use 
their property. The fundamental discussions which are held in the US on the 
question when restrictions should be seen as 'regulatory taking' are largely 
absent in the Netherlands. 
Imperium: planning law39 
The sole and undisputed right to property nests within a system that gives the 
state the right to intervene in the landowners' rights for the benefit of the general 
This is different from the English situation where the central government and local authorities 
seem to have more of a principal-agent relationship. 
39
 At the moment of writing this, the WRO is being revised. The new situation is not yet clear. 
But what is clear already is that the initially intended fundamental revision has become far less 
fundamental. 
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public, based on an idea of imperium. Imperium refers to the right of the state to 
govern individual actions. In Dutch public law, the state provides different 
government layers, and especially the local level, with all sorts of tools that can 
be applied to influence land use. 
The core of the Dutch planning system is formed by the planning act 
(Wet op de Ruimtelijke Ordering, abbreviated as WRO) in conjunction with the 
housing act (Woningwet). The Dutch development control system is known as a 
limited-imperative system, which is quite similar to the French system (Booth 
1996), and which is based on the rule of law tradition. 'Limited' means there is a 
limited and known number of conditions (based on section 44 of the housing 
act) to which a building application must comply. Imperative means that these 
conditions are legally binding. If an application meets these conditions, 
permission has to be granted, and if it does not, the municipality is required to 
reject it. However in the latter case, the municipality can use various 
exemptions to deviate from the stipulated conditions. The housing act says that 
a building application can only be and should be rejected if it does not meet the 
conditions set in the national building code, the local building ordinance, the 
land use plan (bestemmingsplan), the monument act, and a review by the 
municipal design committee. 
The bestemmingsplan, which is close to a zoning plan, is especially 
important in the light of this research. It is made at the local level by 
municipalities, which have discretion to decide whether they want a broad plan, 
a detailed plan, or a plan that is initially broad but will be further specified within 
a prescribed time frame (section 11 WRO). In many cases (especially when 
housing is concerned), in order to keep control, municipalities decide to make 
detailed plans. Often applications from developers do not fit in these tight plans. 
In these situations the municipality should reject the application, unless it wants 
to grant an exemption from the existing plan. There are various types of 
exemptions. There are 'in-plan' exemptions, which means that the particular 
bestemmingsplan can prescribe under which circumstances and conditions the 
municipality can deviate from it. Another type is temporary exemptions that 
allow for departures from the plan for a five year period, and a possible 
extension of another five years (section 17 WRO). The most famous section in 
the WRO is section 19, which has three subsections. Section 19.1 is widely 
used to allow major developments to proceed without having to change the 
bestemmingsplan immediately. Although the procedure is not fast, it is shorter 
and more efficient than the procedure for making a new plan. Section 19.2 is 
used for a series of activities and functions that are enumerated by the province 
in which the locality is situated. And finally there is section 19.3 that can be 
used for the very small cases. 
Although the system is designed to provide legal certainty for both 
civilians and government agencies, practice shows a more pragmatic picture. 
Because bestemmingsplannen are inert to change, they are generally not 
changed in order to plan in advance, but more to confirm already (informally) 
approved development. Municipalities are obliged by law to renew a plan after 
ten years, but because there is no sanction for not doing this, the country is 
covered by many plans that are way over ten years old. The advantage for local 
authorities is that new private development initiatives often do not fit in those 
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older plans (see also the Marialaan); this is an advantage because otherwise 
the authorities might have to grant permission whether they like it or not. If the 
application is not in line with the conditions, which is more likely with older 
plans, the developer asks the local authority to deviate from its own legal 
regime. This gives the municipality an important power position in relation to the 
developer. In order to facilitate the development and change the (user rights) 
regime, local authorities can then impose conditions to the developer. This is an 
important practice for the municipalities to achieve their goals when they do not 
own the land themselves. 
Land policy and public tools for acquiring land 
For many years now the Dutch celebrate the motto that "who owns the land, 
builds." (Overwater 2002) In the Netherlands, land development (i.e. producing 
serviced building plots) and property development are often separated due to a 
dominant role on the land market by municipalities. In many countries both 
activities are carried out by real estate developers. Active land policy as a 
means to achieve policy ambitions is an important feature of planning practice 
in the Netherlands (Needham, Kruyt & Koenders 1993). As we will see, this is 
quite different from practice in Bristol and Houston, as in England and the US in 
general. Although public land acquisition is under pressure, in 2000, 
municipalities still possessed the majority of the land for development, namely 
64% of the Vinex locations and 68% of the other locations (Korthals Altes & 
Groetelaers 2000). 
Active land policy involves land assembly and land development by the 
municipality, after which it often sells off the land for property development to 
private developers or housing associations. This tradition has persevered for 
over some decades now (De Kam 1996 p. 222). After World War II, a massive 
programme for subsidised housing had to be implemented, for which the 
government took the initiative. The result of this programme is that the 
Netherlands now has the highest percentage of social housing in Western 
Europe. Active land policy by municipalities was necessary to implement this 
programme. 
Nowadays, the percentage of social housing is decreasing and the 
number of subsidised houses built annually is far less than it used to be in the 
sixties and the seventies. However, active land policy has retained much of its 
importance. One could say that after World War II, the institutionalised practice 
of active land policy has always been supported by a hegemonic discourse, i.e. 
active state involvement in the production of space, despite the emergence of 
other discourses, like privatisation, since the eighties as in many other 
countries. Municipalities stick to active land policy primarily for two reasons. The 
first reason is the grip which this gives to the municipality on spatial 
development. In general, the planning system, as laid out in the Dutch spatial 
planning act (WRO) and building act, does not provide sufficient means to 
achieve the ambitions of the local government. In a way, it is a negative system 
that prohibits some land uses and hence allows others. To implement policy 
and to achieve the ambitions, a more active strategy is needed. 
This is named after the national policy memorandum that was published in 1993 and which 
designated various big sites for development in near or in urban areas. 
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The second reason is the financial benefit the municipality can have from 
this active policy, which it uses because of its limited range of options (due to 
the centralised financial system) to levy taxes or otherwise increase income. 
With active land policy, the financial profits in the development process can be 
collected by the municipality, instead of 'leaking away' to developers and 
housing associations. In addition to getting the income, the municipalities can 
recoup plan costs and the costs of services like public space, social housing 
and infrastructure. Unlike the English planning system with its planning 
obligations or the American growth management with its concurrency (a 'pay-
as-you-grow' strategy), the Dutch formal system is not capable of recouping the 
above mentioned costs. Again, in the Dutch system certain land uses can only 
be prohibited, nothing can be imposed. It is for these two reasons that 
municipalities use active land policy. After the land has been developed, it is 
often sold off with conditions on future land use. This can give municipalities far-
reaching control over development. 
Beside privately acquiring land and in that way acting as a 'normal' 
market participant, local governments can use public hierarchical tools in cases 
where land owners do not want to sell voluntarily. The first is compulsory 
purchase, as we know it in many other countries. Expropriation does not occur 
much, because the procedure is time- and money-consuming. The tool is 
mainly used as a threat behind 'voluntary' land transfers. Another tool that helps 
to reproduce active land policy as a convention is the use of pre-emption rights, 
which is regulated in the Wet Voorkeursrecht Gemeenten (WVG, which can be 
literally translated as Municipal Pre-emption rights Act). This act gives the 
municipality the right to the first refusal of acquisition of a piece of land in a 
designated area, in case of a proposed transaction by the initial landowner. 
When the landowner wants to sell his land and the municipality has imposed a 
pre-emption right, the land owner is obliged to offer the land first to the 
municipality. In the next section, we will see in action some of the instruments 
just mentioned. 
4.2 The Marialaan case: small but complex 
The Marialaan project (more precisely stage 1 ) is an urban renewal project in 
the western part of the city of Nijmegen, a city in the east of the Netherlands 
(near the German border), which has around 160,000 inhabitants41. The project 
was completed in 2003, and includes 96 apartments, 1550 m2 commercial 
space and a parking garage underneath. Before the land was converted into the 
current land use, it was in two parcels, one occupied by a gas station and the 
other by a builders' merchant. 
41
 It is the tenth city in the Netherlands (on 1 January 2005). 
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Figure 4.1: The Manalaan project 
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The Manalaan project is part of an area that became known in municipal circles 
as the MVK triangle, which is the area between the Marialaan, Koekoekstraat 
and Voorstadslaan (see figure 4.1). The official project start was in 1994. A 
developer (called KDO) together with an association of retailers in that area 
commissioned a 'development perspective' to explore the potential for 
redevelopment of the MVK triangle. The municipality endorsed the main points 
of this document and agreed to co-operate actively in redeveloping the area. 
This decision was also informed by a shopping survey that was commissioned 
by the municipality a year before the development perspective (in 1993), which 
stated that the retail structure was one-sided, meaning too many big retailers 
(like supermarkets). In addition, the particular site was run down, while at the 
same time the area around it had become part of an urban renewal scheme. 
When the municipality showed willingness to co-operate, KDO decided to 
start negotiations with the landowners. KDO signed a provisional sales contract 
for the northern part, with the owner of the site (T&L vastgoed42) in 1995. But it 
was clear that a long and difficult negotiation trajectory had to be followed to 
close the contract. Therefore, early on in the process the triangle was split into 
two parts (and hence two projects), the part south of the Kievitstraat - the 
Marialaan project - and the area north of it. The Marialaan project itself was 
further divided in two stages. This chapter will be about stage 1, the area that 
was previously occupied by a builders' merchant and a gas station. Stage 2 is 
east of stage 1, which is also part of the area south of the Kievitstraat. A car 
repair and a pharmaceutical producer occupied that area. Currently, this area is 
being redeveloped. 
In 1995, the land of the gas station was acquired by KDO. The land was 
seriously contaminated and had to be cleansed. When land is contaminated, a 
decontamination plan has to be made, which has to be based on a soil report.. 
The plan and the report were made by December 1996 and approved by the 
4 2
 It was the owner of the land on which two supermarkets and one big clothing store operated. 
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province in June 1997, after which the cleansing works could start. Those 
were accomplished in 2001 and KDO paid 122,000 Euro for the 
decontamination. 
The acquisition of the builders' merchant by KDO proved not to be 
feasible. Initially, the municipality stated that KDO was responsible for the land 
acquisitions. But when KDO said this was not possible, the municipality made 
some calculations, early in 1995. On the basis of a residual land price method, 
a cost-effective development was possible if 450,000 euro maximum was paid 
for the land. However, the value of the land under its existing land use (as a 
builders' merchant) was higher than under the proposed land use. This made 
land acquisition unprofitable and hence impossible for KDO. Therefore, the 
municipality of Nijmegen decided to buy the land. It arranged with the owner to 
exchange the location for another location (both plots appraised at a value of 
730,000 euro each) without additional payment. The old plot was slightly 
contaminated, but not as much as the site of the gas station. Both the 
decontamination plan and the decontamination itself were paid for by the initial 
landowner. In July 2001 the site was cleared. 
Eventually, the negotiations with the owner of the northern side of the 
MVK triangle (T&L Vastgoed) ran aground. Some of the stakeholders (KDO and 
the municipality) said that the price that the landowner asked was exceptionally 
high. The municipality tried in vain to mediate and to rebuild trust between the 
parties. But KDO decided to stop the negotiations and devote its attention 
exclusively to the Manalaan project. It has taken a long time since then, but in 
January 2004 another developer was able to buy the land outside the Marialaan 
project. One of the reasons that the acquisition was successful later, was the 
positive spin-off from the first stage of the Marialaan project. The houses there 
were sold quickly. 
Parallel with the land acquisitions for the Marialaan project (stage 1), 
around 1995, the municipal requirements for development - the planning brief -
were being made. On the basis of the development perspective, the 
municipality set (together with the developer) the (design) conditions under 
which it was willing to co-operate and change the existing legally binding land 
use plan. The existing plan had to be changed because developer KDO 
proposed to build houses, while the plan only allowed retail, car repair and 
traffic. In the initial conditions, a reservation was made for 57 apartments. After 
the conditions were approved by both parties, they jointly selected an architect 
who was asked draw a provisional design taking into account the conditions that 
the municipality enumerated. The municipality agreed to bring a new 
bestemmingsplan into procedure when the provisional design had been 
approved. Soon after the start, due to a lack of progress in acquiring the rest of 
the area, it was decided that the bestemmingsplan would cover only the first 
stage of the MVK triangle: the Marialaan project. 
In December 1995, some first sketches were made to start the 
discussion. A year later in December 1996, a first draft design was finished and 
subjected to discussion by a working group consisting of people from various 
municipal departments (like public space, traffic and transport, building and 
Above a certain size of contaminated land (25 m3) the province becomes the appropnate 
public agency to decide. 
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housing, strategic policy and water engineering) and some representatives of 
KDO. It took some time to come up with a draft design, after the conditions had 
been approved, because initially the municipality also involved a housing 
association to see whether a proportion could be build as social housing. After 
various calculations, all parties decided that was not feasible and the housing 
association withdrew. In addition, the existing composition of the neighbourhood 
- the majority of the people had low incomes - led to the decision that it would 
be good to have higher income groups as well. 
The working group debated the various draft designs until January 1998, 
when the (definite) draft design was handed to the design committee 
(welstandscommissie) for review. A month later a public meeting was held in 
which the neighbourhood was informed about the joint plan of the municipality 
and the developer. There were two major objections against the scheme. One 
was about the height and the volume of the structure. The people living on the 
Voorstadslaan - which is straight opposite the building - would loose a lot of 
sun light in their gardens. The other problem that was raised in that meeting 
was the lack of parking space in the plan and the problems which that could 
cause for the neighbourhood. In May that year the architect drew a new design 
in which some of the floors at the side of the Voorstadslaan were taken off and 
parking garage was included to deal with the parking issue. Obviously, these 
changes raised costs and cut income. To cover this, the prices per apartment 
were increased. 
A new draft design with fewer storeys and a parking garage was yet 
again sent out for public consultation. The reactions were moderately positive. A 
third (definite) draft design was made to account for some minor comments. 
This was the 'real' final version, which was satisfactory for all stakeholders and 
would form the basis for the bestemmingsplan procedure. This document was 
subjected to formal public consultation in March 1999. It was adopted by the 
municipal council in December 1999 and approved by the province in March 
2000, which made a total of 1 year for the bestemmingsplan procedure. During 
this formal procedure there was not much objection from the neighbourhood. 
Otherwise it could have taken a lot longer. 
When the bestemmingsplan was brought into procedure, the department 
of project management officially had to commission a plan for the public space 
(at a price of 120,000 euro) to the department of city maintenance. At the same 
time, KDO had to elaborate its plans in more detail so as to prepare for applying 
a building application, after the bestemmingsplan was approved. 
Parallel (starting as of December 1995) to the various sketches, designs and 
plans, a discussion started about a joint land servicing account44, and more 
particularly about the division of costs between the developer and the 
municipality. This has been a process which took approximately 4 years, until 
November 1999, when an intention agreement was signed by both parties. 
They decided to make such an agreement because in the preceding years not 
much, or only slow, progress had been made and because they both felt the 
need for something more tangible to fall back on. At the same time some 
44
 A land servicing account contains all the costs and benefits of producing serviced building 
plots. 
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changes had to be made to the initial calculations because of the addition of the 
earlier mentioned parking garage and the decrease of the number of units. In 
August 2000, a development agreement or exchange contract was signed in 
which both parties, in line with the intention agreement, exchanged building land 
-from the municipality to the developer- and land for public space - from 
developer to the municipality - with each other. The developer had to pay the 
municipality 349,000 Euro, which comprised the land price - 730,000 Euro - of 
the parcel of the builders' merchant that the municipality had previously 
acquired, plus process costs made by the planning department and the 
municipal land agency of 130,000 Euro, plus the costs of the soil research of 
2300 Euro, plus the costs of the notary of 1900 Euro, minus a national urban 
renewal subsidy of 515,000 Euro that the municipality used for this project. 
After the building had been constructed, all apartments were quickly 
occupied. It took longer before all the commercial space were let. The 
Marialaan project served and still serves as a catalyst for redeveloping 
adjacent run-down areas. 
4.3 Transaction-cost analysis of the Marialaan 
Nijmegen, like most municipalities in the Netherlands, reserves a sum of money 
for the transaction costs, or VTA as it is called45, it expects to make. When 
municipalities make a land servicing account (grondexploitatie), they generally 
(Van Hoek 2004; Nijland 2005) reserve for their own transaction costs around 
25% of the costs of preparing the land for building . In the Nijmegen case this 
included the costs of running the bestemmingsplan procedure up to the 
approval of the plan by the province, because the plan had to be changed to 
make development possible. It does not include testing the application for the 
building permit. In the case of the Marialaan, the municipality decided to recoup 
130,000 Euro by including it in the land price the developer had to pay to the 
municipality. In the last project calculation (in the file) of the property specialists 
of the municipality, the real process costs were calculated as 166,000 Euro. But 
because an agreement with the developer had already been made, these 
additional 36,000 Euro were borne by the city. When we look at table 4.2, these 
costs consist of the costs associated with the acquisition of land from the 
builders' merchant, preparing a design that was suitable for the 
bestemmingsplan procedure, negotiation and deliberation before the decision to 
make an intention agreement, costs of setting op the intention agreement, 
making the development agreement and land exchange contract, and the 
formal procedure of the bestemmingsplan. More specifically there are various 
disciplines involved, whose work is part of the VTA costs: the costs are the 
man-hours of civil engineers, the environmental costs (both research and 
mediation itself), urban designers, legal department (for the formal procedure), 
city maintenance department (for the public space), and the costs made by the 
municipal land department (project management, planning & control, land 
acquisitions and financial managers). 
45
 In the Netherlands, there are many abbreviation to indicate those costs, like VAT, VTU, V&T 
et cetera. 
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Beside the transaction costs that were 'imposed' by the requirements of 
the municipality, the developer obviously also made its own costs. On the 
building account of the developer (see table 4.1 ) there are only some marginal 
items that can be seen as transaction costs, like the costs that had to be paid to 
external parties such as the fees to the city and the consultancy costs. In 
addition, there are costs that have been indicated as unanticipated costs. 
Although those can also be seen as production costs, in the sense that they 
have been used for physical works, they have been made because there was 
no complete certainty in advance, which makes them transaction costs 
Table 4.1: Transaction costs on the balance sheet of the developer 
fees planning permission 
general advice 
legal advice 
cost calculations 
unanticipated costs 
Total 
134,000 
10,000 
5,500 
3,400 
14,700 
167,600 
In table 4.2 we can see the activities that are associated with creating and using 
the user rights regime. In many cases, like the preparation of the plan and the 
preparation of the agreement, events evolved simultaneously. 
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Table 4.2: Transaction costs at the Manalaan 
1. Land exchange 
Acquisition of land of the 
builders' merchant 
Acquisition of the gas 
station 
Sale of the apartments 
Around six months 
Few months 
- Establishing 
apartment rights: 
4,100 euro 
- Notary costs: 57,000 
euro 
- Brokerage: 112,000 
Euro 
Municipality 
Developer 
Developer 
2. Land use or zoning pfa 
Preparing a design that 
was suitable for the 
bestemmingsplan 
procedure 
Bestemmingsplan 
procedure 
η 
From the start in 
November 1994 till 
October 1998 
1 year (March 1999-
March 2000) 
Developer and municipality 
(but because of recoupment 
mainly the developer) 
Primarily by the municipality, 
but recouped from the 
developer (130,000 euro) 
3. Agmement 
Negotiation and 
deliberation before the 
decision to make an 
intention agreement 
Intention agreement 
Development 
agreement and land 
exchange contract 
From the start in 
November 1994 till 
March 1999 
From first to final version 
8 months 
From first to final version 
9 months 
Municipality and developer 
(large part of the municipal 
costs is recouped from 
developer) 
Municipality and developer 
(large part of the municipal 
costs is recouped from 
developer) 
Municipality and developer 
(large part of the municipal 
costs is recouped from 
developer) 
4. Planning permission 
Demolition permission 
Preparation for planning 
permission 
Planning permission 
Inspection 
Consultancy hired by 
KDO: 19,000 euro 
13 weeks 
Costs: 3,200 euro for 
municipality 
fees: 134,000 euro 
Part of the 3,200 and 
134,000 euro 
Municipality and developer 
Developer mainly 
Municipality, but more than 
covered by the developer 
through the fees 
Municipality, but more than 
covered by the developer 
through the fees 
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1 Land exchange 
What is typical for the way Dutch municipalities pursue land policy is their active 
involvement from the very beginning of the development process. What is rare 
in most other countries but fairly common in Holland is the financial contribution 
which the municipality made (of 1360 euro, against a contribution of 910 euro 
by the developer) to the development perspective (in 1994) that was made to 
asses the development potential of the site. 
The parcels of the first stage of the MVK triangle - of the gas station and 
the builders' merchant - were relatively easy to acquire. KDO acquired the gas 
station within a couple of months and the municipality did the same for the land 
owned by the builders' merchant, when it became clear (which was early on) 
that the developer could not do this profitably. The nature of the property rights 
on the land, in terms of demarcation and clarity, did not cause a lot of extra 
costs. 
Selling the apartments by KDO was also a straight-forward activity. The 
main costs that were made were the 'default' costs of every development that is 
sold by a developer such as, the costs of establishing apartment rights of 4,100 
euro, the notary costs of 57,000 euro, but also marketing costs (50,000 Euro) 
and brokerage (112,000 Euro). The costs of the apartment rights, the notary 
costs and brokerage should be seen as costs related to the user rights regime. 
Their relationship with the user rights regime is clear and direct. But there are 
also costs that are more indirect. 
One of the indirect costs that could be identified are the costs that 
resulted from the difficulty of acquiring the land of the northern part of the MVK 
triangle. Compulsory purchase is difficult and costly. In addition, expropriation 
must be based on a planning regime that supports it, which was not yet the 
case, since at that time the bestemmingsplan still designated the area for 
another land use. Therefore, the developer and the city decided to split the area 
in pieces. This probably almost doubled the process costs, because two land 
use plans had to be made, two development agreements have to be negotiated, 
and so on. 
Another more indirect cost of the way the city dealt with the land 
acquisition was the 'choice' to find a replacement site for the builders' merchant 
elsewhere in the city. One could argue that the costs of actively facilitating this 
are a result, on one hand, of the fact that the municipality pursued an active 
land policy (which is a way of using the user rights regime) and on the other 
hand did not (and could not) use expropriation. This is understandable because 
of the difficulty with and the limitations on compulsory purchase. However, it is 
part of the way the user rights regime is used and created. 
It needs to be said that the transaction costs of land exchange from the 
municipality to the developer and vice versa could also be put under the 'land 
exchange' heading, but since it is linked to a development agreement, in which 
the municipality included several requirements for the developer as well, it is 
classified under the agreement part (number 3). 
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2 Land use or zoning plan 
Because the bestemmingsplan had to be changed in order to allow houses to 
be built, the municipality could take the opportunity to be closely involved in 
determining the conditions under which development could occur. This led to an 
extensive process of deliberation between the developer and the city of 
Nijmegen. However, because of its position, the municipality was able, to a 
large extent, to require the developer to pay the process costs that the 
municipality paid during the process. 
It is difficult to distinguish between the minimum costs of a design and 
the actual costs of making (and discussing) the design, and hence there is mix 
of production and transaction costs. In addition it is difficult, or even impossible, 
to distinguish between the costs that were made to draw and discuss the plans 
and the costs that were made to sign an agreement / contract over this plan 
(category 3). It took four years from the development perspective in November 
1994 until the draft design in October 1998. This was mainly used for discussion 
and deliberation between municipal agencies, the municipality and the 
developer and for public consultation. Various designs and various calculations 
were made to support those plans. Together, the city of Nijmegen estimates its 
own process costs (including the costs of discussing the design and preparing 
the agreements) at round 166,000 Euro. But again it needs to be said that 
although this consists primarily of transaction costs, in the strict sense some of 
the costs should been seen as production costs. 
Then there is the time that was used for the formal procedure that 
belongs to the bestemmingsplan. In the existing legislation the maximum 
number of weeks for a bestemmingsplan, before it has become irreversible, is 
110 weeks, so just over two years. In this case it took nearly a year from the 
moment it was subjected to formal public consultation (since there had been 
some informal meetings in the neighbourhood before) to the moment that it 
became irreversible. 
Nijmegen has around 600 bestemmingsplannen at the moment, many of 
them are so-called 'postage stamp plans'. These are very small plans, that 
include only few plots. The bestemmingsplan for the Marialaan, which 
previously counted only two relatively small parcels, is one those plans. 
Because the acquisition of the northern part of the MVK triangle was laborious, 
the municipality decided to include in the new bestemmingsplan only the first 
stage of the Marialaan project. It was too risky to include to the whole MVK 
triangle, since changing a plan later due to a change of views or other cause, 
leads to an extensive revision procedure. Bestemmingsplannen are fairly rigid 
and inert to changes, which on one hand leads to legal certainty but on the 
other hand leads to inflexible plans that are not appropriate for anticipating 
future changes. Something else that is important here, are the fees which the 
municipality can levy when a developer takes the initiative that requires 
changing the plan or granting an exemption. If the municipality decides to 
change the plan in advance of new development it cannot recover the costs by 
fees. This can only be done when somebody requests a change. This practice 
is a disincentive for the municipality to change existing planning regimes. The 
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municipality prefers to wait for another to take the initiative, for then it can get 
that other party to pay the transaction costs 
Changing bestemmingsplannen (or granting exemptions) is a money-
and time-consuming activity In Nijmegen there have been some expenments to 
make bestemmingsplannen for housing more flexible by making them broader, 
but the need and wish for (legal) certainty prevailed, which reinforced the 
practice of making detailed customised plans, instead of bigger flexible plans to 
anticipate the future Recently the municipality has decided to bnng the 600 
plans down to 20 bigger plans The old, small and detailed plans have become 
an obstacle to anticipating developments It is uncertain whether the city will 
succeed in doing that and break with the convention of making small postage 
plans to facilitate development initiatives 
3 Agreement 
The agreements - the intention and the development agreement - that have 
been signed, have taken many years The deliberations together with the 
building drawings started in 1994 and were finalised by a contract in August 
2000 The agreements were the result of two conditions First, the land use plan 
had to be changed As already mentioned, this gives a major resource to 
municipalities who can decide under which conditions, which can be both 
spatial, procedural and financial, it wishes to co-operate Other examples (in the 
city of Arnhem) of this practice can be found in Buitelaar et al (2006) But this 
will be discussed in more detail later on 
Secondly, because the developer was not able to acquire the land from 
the builders' merchant, the municipality acquired the plot This made KDO even 
more dependent on the municipality In addition, the developer needed to 
exchange land for public uses with building land Therefore there was a high 
level of interdependence between the parties, and the developer was 
particularly dependent on the city of Nijmegen This gave the municipality the 
advantage to impose requirements on the developer to cover the transaction 
costs that were made by the city 
4 Planning permission 
It is difficult to assess the costs of the planning permission itself, because the 
actual costs that municipality makes for leading the application through the 
various departments need not be the same as the building fees it charges for 
doing so Regular building permissions cost the municipality approximately 
3200 Euro (at 2006 price level)47 on average The fee however is 1,45 % of the 
total investment costs, which m this project means a total of 134 000 Euro of 
building fees When the costs rise, the fee rises, while the costs of using the 
planning system do not rise at the same pace It is plausible to assume that the 
costs of using this system for reviewing the plan of one house are not 
Building fees are different from the fees mentioned earlier that need to be paid for changing 
the bestemmingsplan or granting and exemption 
47
 This amount consists of 17 hours (building engineer) + 3 hours (review for conformance with 
bestemmingsplan) + 21 hours (inspections), multiplied by 73 Euro per hour, makes 2993 Euro 
Together with 100 Euro for the fire department and 100 Euro for the environmental department, 
the total amount comes at 3193 Euro (information provided by Kemperman and Alberts) 
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significantly higher than the costs for reviewing a plan of 100 houses. The 
system is based on solidarity, which means that the bigger developments pay 
for the smaller, because covering the real costs of the smaller developments 
would mean higher fees than the building or investment costs. In 2006, the 
annual report of the building and housing department showed that it had more 
benefits from the building fees (3,962,461 Euro) than costs (3,488,804 Euro). 
These amounts include other permissions related to building, which also applies 
to the Marialaan case. Beside the costs of the building permission, some other 
permissions had to be applied for (and granted), like the permission for 
demolishing the existing structures on the site. 
To recapitulate, most transaction costs with regard to the user rights regime 
were made in the earlier and more informal stages of the development process. 
Much time and money was spent on land acquisition and deliberation between 
the developer and the municipality before the plan entered the formal 
bestemmingsplan and planning permission stages. The municipality was 
involved significantly from the early stages and therefore bore many transaction 
costs. It was however able to cream off some of the benefits from the developer 
to cover for the transaction costs that the city of Nijmegen made during the 
process. 
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5 
Bristol: planning in uncertainty 
In this chapter, the English case study is analysed This is a housing site in the 
heart of the city of Bnstol, called Wappmg Wharf Before going into the 
development process of Wappmg Wharf, some key features of the English 
spatial planning and property rights regime are discussed After the description 
of the development process, a transaction cost analysis of the user nghts 
regime will be made 
5.1 English planning and property law 
Booth (2002a ρ 154) argues that the way spatial planning is earned out in a 
country is intimately linked to the ideas about pnvate property nghts When we 
compare the way the English think about property with the way the Dutch do, 
we get a better understanding of the differences between the spatial planning 
regimes in both countnes So first a very bnef overview of English land law will 
be given, after which the spatial planning regime, in particular development 
control, will be set out more extensively 
Land law4B 
English law makes a distinction between personal and real property Real 
property refers to immovable, and personal property to movable goods Realty, 
as real property is also called, can be divided in corporeal hereditaments and 
incorporeal hereditaments The first category regards inhentable things that can 
be physically possessed like land and buildings Incorporeal hereditaments are 
inhentable nghts which cannot be possessed like easements, profits and 
restnctive covenants 
Since the Norman conquest in 1066 and the introduction of feudalism, 
the Crown technically owns all the land in England This means that an 
individual cannot own the land but can only own an estate in land Starting with 
the sovereign at the top, a complex feudal pyramid of land estates and tenures 
was created, based on the concepts of feudum and beneficium (see also 
chapter 4) This is also called the doctrine of estates and the doctrine of 
tenures The doctrine of tenure deals with the conditions on which land is held, 
whereas the doctrine of estates deals with the length of time for which land is 
held Both have many subdivisions The most important subdivision of estates 
is between freehold (which again can be subdivided in four categones) and 
leasehold (ι e less than freehold) The duration of a freehold is unlimited, while 
the duration of leasehold is fixed 
In 1925, property law in England was significantly changed by the Law 
and Property Act, among other acts, which aimed (among others things) at 
reducing the number of tenures and estates Although this was achieved to a 
certain extent, the feudal ongms of English land law are still clearly visible 
Fragmentation of ownership and the high number of leasehold interests that can 
rest on the land make land assembly a difficult, time-consuming and expensive 
process, since all must be acquired piecemeal Failure to acquire all may 
4 8
 This section is based on Haley (2004) 
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frustrate the whole process (Williams & Wood 1994). Moreover, in a study on 
ownership constraints for urban regeneration, in which 84 regeneration sites 
were analysed, the division of ownership rights was the most prevalent 
constraint (Adams et al. 2002). The Bristol example also shows some of these 
difficulties. 
Planning law49 
Planning law adapts to land law, which makes it interesting to start with a brief 
comparison of land law in the Netherlands and England in order to understand 
the differences in planning law. We have to compare the feudal origins of the 
British property rights regime with the ideas of absolute ownership in the 
Netherlands, based on Roman law. In England, the feudal and common law 
tradition have led to a situation in which property rights have not been clearly 
codified and defined. The result has been that the planning was associated with 
resolving private disputes over property rights. In some sense, notwithstanding 
the progression made since the Law of Property Acts 1921-25, property rights 
are still less clearly defined than for example in France (Booth 2002a p. 168) 
and in the Netherlands. Although the Town and Country Planning Act of 1947 
tried to make a clearer distinction between the private and the public interest, by 
nationalising development rights, development control is still often used to 
resolve private disputes (Booth 2002a). Cullingworth & Nadin (2002) say that 
internalising externalities is the basic feature of the English planning system, 
which is also characterised by the term 'land use management'(Nadin et al. 
1997). This seems to be more modest than the ambitions of the Dutch who 
prefer a comprehensive and integrated approach. 
With regard to the relationship between property rights and spatial 
planning, there is another major difference between the Netherlands and 
England. In the Netherlands, the law on property is more or less based on 
absolute ownership. A restriction by the state, e.g. by designating a certain type 
of land use, is seen as an attenuation of the right to use property. The state is 
legitimised to do this; in England, there is no doctrine of imperium. The right to 
future development has been separated from the right to use, by the earlier 
mentioned nationalisation of development rights. Granting a planning 
permission in England is seen as giving the right to future development50 (Booth 
2002b), which seems to go back to the concept of beneficium.. 
The differences in the relationship between property rights and spatial 
planning in the Netherlands and in England can also be traced when we go 
more deeply into the development control systems of both. Generally, in 
England there is more emphasis on discretion and flexibility, while in the 
Netherlands (and most of the rest of continental Europe) there is more attention 
4
 It must be noted that after the case study was carried out the law has been changed by the 
adoption of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004. In this chapter, the reform of the 
English planning system is not taken into account. 
50
 Theoretically, I argue that there is no nationalisation of development rights. A right is a right 
when the owner of the nght can exercise it. This is not the case with development nghts, 
because the state can only grant them to the owner of the nght to use and not exercise it itself. 
Therefore, from a theoretical perspective, planning conditions in England are, just like in other 
countnes, an attenuation of the right to use property. 
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to the protection of property rights and legal certainty (Booth 1996; Cullingworth 
& Nadin 2002). 
The Netherlands have a limited-imperative regime. This means that there 
is a limited and known number of conditions (Section 44 Woningwet, Housing 
Act) which a planning application must satisfy, while in England there are 
'material considerations' (in or outside the development plan) that have to be 
taken into account after a planning application has been submitted (Section 70 
and 72 Town and Country Planning Act). Although this is not, due to policy 
guidelines and jurisprudence, as open-ended as it might seem at first sight, it 
nevertheless gives local planning authorities a lot of flexibility. 
In addition, the conditions in the Netherlands are imperative, which 
means that if the application fits within the conditions, planning permission has 
to be granted to the applicant. There are no other conditions which can be 
raised if one wants to get planning permission (Van Buuren, Backes & De Gier 
1999). In England "almost all permissions are conditional" (Cullingworth & Nadin 
2002 p. 135), as granting planning permission is seen as the state giving the 
applicant a right to future development. The assumption seems to be that if you 
give something that the other really wants, you are allowed to ask something in 
retum, i.e. impose conditions. In the Netherlands, conditions cannot be imposed 
on a planning permission. Planning permission is regarded as executing the 
decision made previously (e.g. in the land use plan) to restrict the right to 
develop / use land. The principle is: if the state wants to restrict someone's right 
to use land, you must make that explicit in advance. 
Next to the 'planning conditions', England has the concept of 'planning 
obligations'. Dutch law does not allow obligations to be imposed with regard to 
land use within the WRO (see also Overwater 2002 p. 62), only prohibitions. 
The concept that is related to planning obligations is 'planning gain'. This means 
that the local authority grants permission only if the developer pays for related 
works, like infrastructure and open spaces. The agreement between the 
developer and the local authority is reached 'voluntarily'. This implies that the 
applicant cannot appeal against 'planning obligations', while he can appeal 
against 'planning conditions'51. 
The basic principles of the British planning system, set out in the Town 
and Country Planning Act 1947 and retained in subsequent legislation, are 
development control, development plans and central government supervision 
(Newman & Thomley 1996 p. 42)52. 
Development plan 
Since the early nineties the development plan, and hence a more plan-led 
approach, gained importance after some decades of project-led development 
(Newman & Thomley 1996 p. 42; Cullingworth & Nadin 2002 p. 98). "The 
project-led approach gave confused signals to landowners and developers 
51
 It should be noted that section 106B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 "[...] 
provides for a right of a appeal to the Secretary of State when a local planning authonty fails to 
determine an application for the discharge or modification of a planning obligation within the 
prescribed period for so doing, or determines that a planning obligation shall continue to have 
effect without modification" (Moore 2002 p. 365). 
52
 For detailed, but nevertheless accessible, accounts of English planning law see Duxbury 
(2002) and Moore (2002). 
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seeking to establish the value of their assets, while those concerned with 
environmental quality questioned the accountability of regulatory decisions 
made on an ad hoc basis" (Healey, Purdue & Ennis 1995 p. 7). In Section 54A 
of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as amended by the Planning and 
Compensation Act 1991) the development plan became the primary 
consideration in decisions about planning permission. 
In Britain there are three types of development plans at the local level 
and they relate to the different tiers of local government53. In Britain, a two-tier 
system was established in 1963 for London, in 1972 for Scotland and in 1973 
for the rest of England and Wales. One tier is the county council, which makes 
the structure plan, and the other tier is the district council that makes the local 
plan. In 1986 the Thatcher government decided to streamline local government 
in London and some other metropolitan areas. In these areas we find the third 
type of development plan, namely the unitary development plan, which is 
mandatory for the metropolitan district councils, the London boroughs, and 
some other authorities, most of which are urban. The unitary development plan 
has two parts, one akin to the structure plan and the other to the local plan. 
Although much of the two-tier system remains across Britain, between 1995 and 
1997 a number of non-metropolitan unitary authorities has been established. 
These unitary councils make a structure plan and a local plan. Bristol became 
one of these non-metropolitan unitary councils on 1 April 1996 (Bristol City 
Council, 1997). 
A structure plan is actually not a 'plan' but a written statement and key 
diagram with a general view on development. It has a 15-year horizon. The 
local plans have a time horizon of approximately ten years. They must be in 
general conformity with the structure plan and national and regional guidance. 
Before adoption, plans are subject to extensive publicity, consultation and a 
period for formal objection (European Commission 2000 p. 23). 
Local plans are mandatory (since 1992) and area-wide (i.e. covering the 
whole district, or administrative area of a city). The decision on development 
control must accord with the development plan unless material considerations 
indicate otherwise (Section 54A, Town and Country Planning Act 1990). If an 
applicant wants to submit an application which is in conflict with the 
development plan, he "would need to produce convincing reasons to 
demonstrate why the plan should not prevail" (Planning Policy Guidance 1). 
After the case study was carried out (and after the Wapping Wharf had 
been developed), the system for the development plan in England has changed 
as a result of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004. Whilst national 
planning guidance remains largely unchanged, with the introduction of Planning 
Policy Statements to replace Planning Policy Guidance notes, arrangements in 
the lower tiers of government are very different. Regional spatial strategies are 
required to be produced at a regional level and structure plans will be abolished, 
but it is at the local level that the main changes will occur. The new system has 
been designed to "streamline the local planning process and promote a 
proactive, positive approach to managing development" (Planning Policy 
Statement 12). The development plan will consist of a regional spatial strategy 
53
 See for an overview of the local government structure and the associated development plans 
Cullmgworth & Nadin (2002 p. 60-61 in combination with 99-100). 
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and development plan documents, the latter setting the local development 
framework (LDF). Various plans and policies will be included in the LDF, 
including, for example, a core strategy, a statement of community involvement, 
action area plans, a proposals map, and any other supplementary planning 
documents. The latter might be most useful in development control, since they 
may include design guidance or master plans for a particular site. The new act 
retains the spirit of Section 54A (Town and Country Planning Act 1990) in that 
the development plan remains the essential framework for development control 
decisions in a plan-led system (Section 38(6), Planning and Compulsory 
Purchase Act, 2004). 
Development control 
Central to development control is the definition of development. In section 55 of 
the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 development means "the carrying out 
of building, engineering, mining or other operations in, on, over or under land, or 
the making of any material change in the use of any buildings or other land." 
For carrying out development a planning permission is required54. A planning 
application must consist of a number of documents, namely an application form, 
a number of plans with varying levels of detail, a fee, and in some cases an 
environmental impact statement. In addition, as theoretically anyone can apply 
for planning permission, "[...] an applicant for planning permission shall give 
requisite notice of the application to any person (other than the applicant) who 
on the prescribed date is an owner of the land to which the application relates, 
or a tenant [...]" (Section 65 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990). 
Development control has been separated from controls on building, pollution 
and transport. 
As has been said before, the local plan (and its replacement under the 
new act) is the primary consideration in the control of development. The local 
planning authority has to take account also of other material considerations, 
which include op received from publicity and consultation, environmental impact 
assessment, site characteristics, design and layout, access and parking 
arrangements. All the material considerations must be relevant to planning. The 
courts have come forward with an open-ended definition: "any consideration 
which relates to the use and development of land is capable of being a planning 
consideration." (Moore 2002) This can include social and financial factors as 
well. 
Sometimes, certain goals in planning cannot be achieved by imposing 
planning conditions. Then, planning obligations may provide a solution. With the 
adoption of the Planning and Compensation Act in 1991, a new section 106 
(and 106A and 106B) was inserted in the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. 
The power to enter into a planning agreement was then replaced by the power 
to enter into a planning obligation (Moore 2002 p. 355)55, which does not 
54
 There are (minor) developments that are not subject to planning permission: the permitted 
developments. The Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) Order 1995 
enumerates 33 classes of development that do not need approval from the local planning 
authority or the Secretary of State. 
55
 For more details about the development of planning obligations see Moore (2002 p. 355-362) 
and Duxbury (2002 p. 325-331) 
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necessarily have to be agreed upon in a planning agreement. This law enables 
any person with an interest in land in the area of the local planning authority to 
enter into a planning obligation, which might be either given as a unilateral 
undertaking from the applicant or agreed by the local planning authority. These 
obligations run with the land. The obligations can be both restrictive as well as 
positive. Section 106 says that an obligation may restrict the development or 
use in some specified way; require specified operations to be carried out in, on, 
under or over land; require the land to be used in some specified way; or 
require a sum or sums to be paid to the authority on a specified date or dates or 
periodically. There is a specific requirement that the payments have to relate to 
the land itself or the development that is carried out (Moore 2002 p. 363). 
Although planning conditions are often an appropriate means to achieve certain 
objectives, local planning authorities often prefer to negotiate an obligation 
(Healey, Purdue & Ennis 1995 p. 75). One reason planning officers give for this 
choice is the expectation that obligations are less likely to be broken than 
imposed conditions. 
The role of central government 
Central government plays an important role in British land use planning. The 
roles of the central government in development control are multiple (Newman & 
Thornley 1996 p. 42). First, it makes legislation and issues national planning 
policy guidances56 (PPGs) (now being systematically replaced by Planning 
Policy Statements (PPSs)), regional planning guidances (RPGs) and minerals 
planning guidances (MPGs)57. This has been done (since 2002) by the Office of 
the Deputy of the Prime Minister (ODPM), and before that by the Department 
for Transport, Local Government and the Regions (DTLR) (Cullingworth & 
Nadin 2002 p. 45), and previously by the Department of the Environment 
(DoE)58. The PPGs are important considerations in development control 
decisions because central government is the level where applicants can appeal 
against development control decisions. 
This is the second role of central government in development control. 
The Secretaries of State (ministers responsible for planning) have extensive 
formal powers. An unsuccessful planning applicant can (and this often done, 
see chart on p. 137 of Cullingworth & Nadin 2002) go to an appeal to the 
Secretary of State (Cullingworth & Nadin 2002 p. 136-139). This type of appeal 
is possible only on policy grounds, for points of law the applicant must go to 
court (European Commission 2000). Appeals to the Secretary of State are 
allowed when planning permission is refused, against planning conditions, when 
the local planning authority has failed to make a decision within the prescribed 
period, and on enforcement notices. There is no right of appeal from third 
parties. Almost all appeals are dealt with by the Planning Inspectorate 
(executive agency of the ODPM). Matters of major importance (approximately 
1 % of all the appeals) are dealt with by the Secretary of State (actually the 
These guidances are general, not location-specific. 
"Central government also publishes circulars that are primarily used to explain the legislation. 
In recent years, the content of many circulars has been replaced by PPGs (and PPSs) 
5e
 And the name changed once again, at the moment of writing the ODPM was changed into 
Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) 
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senior civil servants in the department, but in reality often taken on political 
grounds, e g decisions on new or expanded airports) The Secretary of State 
and the inspectors are allowed to reverse (both granting and refusing) the 
decision by the local authonty, and add, delete or modify conditions 
Planning applications can also be called-in59 by the Secretary of State 
This can be done when the development is more than 150 houses or 10,000 m2 
of retail floorspace, when the land is owned by the local planning authority or if 
the development because of its scale or location would significantly prejudice 
the implementation of the development plan (European Commission 2000 ρ 
79) Therefore, planning in England is more centralised than in the Netherlands 
and the US 
5.2 Wapping Wharf: a contentious development 
Wappmg Wharf is part of an area in Bnstol called Harbourside, which covers 27 
hectares of former dock and industrial land in the centre of the city For a long 
time hardly any regeneration took place in Harbourside, until in 1989 Lloyds 
TSB Bank built its headquarters on the north side of the dock after buying land 
from Imperial Tobacco and demolishing huge unused bonded warehouses 
Bristol City Council, in granting permission, thought that this would act as a 
catalyst for further regeneration (Bnstol City Council, 1998) At least it prompted 
a shift in planning policy from passive to active involvement of the local 
authonty The local authonty started to co-operate with the landowners, 
developers and the national government Since the early nineties large amounts 
of money have been secured for the redevelopment of the Harbourside 
Wapping Wharf was the first major housing scheme in Harbourside 
(Bristol City Council, 1998), although the first dockside housing scheme was at 
Baltic Wharf, just to the west Until 1828 Wapping Wharf was an undeveloped 
greenfield site Since 1886 the site had been used as railway sidings and was 
used as such until 1998 In the last years before development, it was also used 
as a car park 
The city council, the pnncipal land owners (British Gas, British Railways, 
JT Group and Lloyds TSB) and the Bnstol Chamber of Commerce and Initiative 
united in 1993 as the Harbourside Sponsors Group This group was set up to 
start the regeneration of Harbourside that was to be commercially viable and in 
line with the objectives of the different participants in the group 
The Harbourside Sponsors Group appointed a development facilitator, 
Dnvers Jonas, (property consultants) to facilitate the process of prepanng a 
development framework for the whole of Harbourside To create the 
development framework three architects (Bruges Tozer, Alec French and 
Ferguson Mann), together called the Concept Planning Group (CPG), were 
appointed In March 1994, the development framework was approved by the 
council's Planning and Development Committee and agreed by all sponsors in 
the 'Harbourside Accord' In the development framework, Wapping Wharf was 
indicated (see figure 5 1) 
Section 77 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 provides the Secretary of State with 
the power to call in applications for his own determination instead of the local planning authonty 
This power is seldom used, only for some matters of more than local importance 
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Figure 5.1: Harbourside Bristol 
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On behalf of the CPG, Bruges Tozer gave special attention to Spike Island, the 
area south of Floating Harbour60, and Wapping Wharf. The other two architects 
focused on Canon's Marsh, north of Floating Harbour. 
The approval of the development framework led to the preparation and 
adoption, after a period of public consultation, of the Bristol Harbourside 
Planning Brief in June 1995. In this planning brief, Wapping Wharf was 
earmarked for residential development of approximately 140 units in the Bristol 
Harbourside Development Project Planning Brief. The Harbourside planning 
brief of the LPA in 1995 followed the development framework. The Royal Town 
Planning Institute (Allinson & Askew 1996 p. 76) defines a development or 
planning brief as "A summary statement of the author's policy position on 
development matters relating to a site and / or premises." It is a site-specific 
non-statutory policy document that must not be seen as the substitute for a 
statutory plan, but as a more detailed elaboration complementary to the local 
plan. 
The 1995 planning brief formed a supplementary guidance to the local 
plan that was, at the moment of adoption of the planning brief, in the public 
inquiry stage. The local plan was adopted in December 1997. This Bristol Local 
Plan had been adopted after a process of over five years of consultations, 
public inquiries and modifications (Bristol City Council, 1997: 14)61. This plan 
was the first area-wide plan for the city of Bristol in twenty years. 
In the local plan, Harbourside is proposed as a "major regeneration area" 
of the city centre. The content of the proposal is: "development for a new office 
This is the canal that flows through the Harbourside area. 
61
 It has been prepared under the rules of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and PPG 
12. There are few statutory phases in the process of the local plan. This is found to be 
inappropriate due to the variations m planning issues and the degree of support to plan 
proposals (see PPG 12). 
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quarter, major leisure/tourist facilities and ancillary shopping for housing, in a 
mixed use form" (Bristol City Council, 1997: 225). There is also room reserved 
in the plans for new housing, particularly in Wapping Wharf (and Canon's 
Marsh). Wapping Wharf is seen as an "attractive waterside 'urban village'" (Ibid: 
226). 
In July 1998, a new planning brief (called Bristol Harbourside 
Regeneration Planning Brief) was approved by the Planning, Transport and 
Development Committee of the Bristol City Council. This planning brief gave 
supplementary guidance to the local plan of December 1997 and was directed 
to implementation of the regeneration policy. Wapping Wharf was still 
earmarked as a housing site. 
The land in the whole Harbourside was in several ownerships (see above). The 
City Council, British Railways Board (owned most of the land at Spike Island), 
and British Gas (owned some of the land at Canon's Marsh) combined their 
land ownerships for one integrated development, selling it off to various parties 
around 1996. After the adoption of the development framework (in 1994) and 
the planning brief (in 1995), Bruges Tozer together with Alec French (as part of 
the CPG) approached Beaufort (which was a subsidiary of the Barclay group) 
as a possible developer. Bruges Tozer thought Beaufort, in combination with 
itself as member of the Concept Planning Group, would be most likely to 
receive a planning permission. Beaufort was relatively new to Bristol; it had only 
done greenfield developments in the area until then, but had much experience 
with up-market redevelopment in London, Birmingham and other provincial 
regions (Lambert & Boddy 2002)63. Bruges Tozer drafted various alternatives. 
With a rough sketch, Beaufort (and Bruges Tozer) went into the bidding process 
for the land in 1996. Their bid did not win, because Beaufort did not put enough 
money in it. There was another developer with whom the city council went 
along, but after a while the city council decided that the scheme was not good 
enough and that the developer did not have enough credibility. So it went out for 
a competition again a year later in 1997. This time Beaufort did win with more or 
less the same scheme, but more money. This was then 'approved' by the 
Property and Finance department of the City Council and Beaufort bought the 
land in September 1997 from British Rail Property. 
Beaufort then entered the stage of seeking planning permission. Before 
Beaufort submitted the application, it held several meetings with the residents 
and the planning officers. Two meetings were held (in October 1997) with the 
residents and two with the planning officers (in September and October 1997). 
There was also a preliminary investigation of the level of soil contamination, 
which showed that there was little contamination, for the site had only been 
used as a transfer point of coals from the ships to the train. 
At the moment of the research the name of Beaufort had turned into Crosby Special Projects. 
63
 Lambert & Boddy (2002) note that Beaufort and many other big national developers 
undertake these city centre redevelopment projects to diversify their portfolio, where their 
traditional emphasis was on greenfield land and suburban housing. This is mainly driven by the 
government's brownfield land target. 
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In October 1997, a preliminary application was submitted to the local 
planning authority. Between this application and the application for full planning 
permission (in January 1998) there was one meeting with the residents (in 
October 1997) and one with the planning officers (in November 1997). The 
planning officers were reluctant to get into a discussion about the scheme. This 
is a general problem, for local planning authorities are short-staffed related to 
the number of planning applications they have to deal with (see also Allinson & 
Askew, 1996). 
After the submission for the full planning permission there was one 
meeting (in January 1998) with the residents and three with the planning 
officers (in April, July and August 1998). There have also been discussions 
about conditions and a draft Section 106 agreement. The officers were keen to 
grant planning permission, so they recommended it for approval. 
There was concerted opposition against the scheme. The people who 
live and lived on Cumberland Road are very articulate84. The residents 
particularly opposed the number of storeys and the obscuring effect it would 
have on the waterside. After this meeting, changes were made to the proposal 
and more detail was added to it. According to Bruges Tozer, there was a 
constant pressure on them as architects from two sides: the opposition against 
the number of storeys by the residents on the one hand and on the other hand 
the requirement of the developer to keep the number of dwellings as high as 
possible to increase the profits. The developer kept pressure on Bruges Tozer 
to disguise the height of the buildings by manipulating the drawings. All the 
alterations to the scheme were fairly cosmetic. The residents accused Beaufort 
/ Bruges Tozer of this. The period between the preliminary and full planning 
application was short. The developer was "massively overconfident"65 that they 
were providing the best scheme for the residents on Cumberland Road66. There 
was not enough time to work on further detail of the scheme in order to give it a 
more friendly appearance and the application as submitted gave the 
appearance of very sharp cut blocks made by the computer. The developer was 
more interested in the economics of the scheme (maximising the benefits and 
minimising the costs) than in its design. 
As a result of the consultations three major amendments were made to 
the scheme: one between the preliminary application and the full application, 
and two after the full application. Most amendments had to do with the height of 
the buildings and some with off-site works. 
In December 1998 the Planning Committee proposed rejection of the planning 
permission after a big lobby by the residents, mainly those living at the 
Cumberland Road. Finally both planning and building regulations permission 
were rejected. At the same time as the application for full planning permission 
(and building regulations), an application was submitted for the modification of 
the existing car park to provide access to the site. This permission was granted 
in June 1998. Beaufort went to an appeal against the rejection of the scheme; 
although it withdrew from this later. The threat of an appeal had probably been 
Nigel Honer says that this is because many of them work in the media industry. 
65
 quote from Nigel Honer. 
66
 This is the road adjacent to the site (see figure 5.1 ) where most of the opposition came from 
and where the impact of the scheme would be the most. 
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used to keep the pressure on the local planning authority to grant the 
permission. 
At the same time, different architects were employed (Feilden Clegg) to 
make a new plan in a more participatory way. This was done to show the 
people that Beaufort wanted to make a new start that was not cosmetic. 
Beaufort employed an independent chairman (Jeff Bishop) to chair four 
meetings (in January, February, March and April 1999) with all interest groups 
involved called 'Reaching agreement on Wapping Wharf. This public 
consultation is probably the main reason why this scheme was approved and 
granted planning permission67. With this public consultation there were few or 
no political reasons left for refusing the permission. However, it did not mean 
that there were no objections.68. 
In May 1999 Beaufort, together with British Rail Property submitted a full 
planning application (together with a fee cheque enclosed of £ 9.500,- and an 
environmental assessment69). It also submitted an application (for a 
Conservation Area Consent) to demolish a building and a brick wall in order to 
let the development proceed70. After the application was submitted four sets of 
amendments were made (in July, August and October). Only the third set, 
because of the nature and scale of the changes, led to new public consultation. 
This led to complaints from the residents of nearby dwellings. One of the 
residents even called the process chosen by the local planning authority an 
"underhand way". 
In October 1999 the Planning, Transport and Development (Central) 
Area Sub-Committee assembled and recommended that the permission (also 
the Conservation Area Consent) should be granted, subject to conditions and a 
section 106 agreement, and this was finalised in November 1999. Permission 
was granted for the erection of five buildings varying in height between three 
and six storeys, comprising nine dwellings, 105 apartments and a cafe. In 
addition 113 car parking spaces needed to be provided and landscape and 
quayside works had to be carried out. The main elements of the planning 
permission and the section 106 agreement are to be found in box 1 
Nigel Honer thinks that the people are now worse off because of the very modem (un-British) 
architecture. That was the reason why the building proved to be difficult to sell. He does not 
think that this scheme has contnbuted to making that part of Bristol a better urban space (see 
also the book by Tony Aldous called "Bristol's Twentieth Century Buildings''). The developer 
may not have maximised profits because the scheme was difficult to sell and because of the 
long process. 
68
 A petition was handed in to the committee to protest against the development on Wapping 
Wharf because it would deprive "the whole community" of a much valued inner city view. It was 
signed by 1375 signatones! Another 15 letters of objection were sent. 
69
 The Environmental Assessment has been cnticised heavily by the Environmental Health 
Department, especially the noise assessment (derived from con'espondence between the city of 
Bristol and the developer). 
70
 More precisely this consent comprised the demolition of a single storey building to the east of 
the existing toilet block and demolition of the northern boundary wall to the SS Great Britain car 
park. 
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Sox 1 The content of the planning pennission and section 106 agreement at Wappmg Wharf 
Planning permission 
The planning permission, which was granted 16 November 1999, allowed the building of 114 
houses, 113 parking spaces and a cafe under certain conditions Many conditions are both 
procedural and substantive These conditions prescnbe both which activities should be earned out 
by the developer and the procedural requirements, like 50 percent occupation of the dwellings, 
attached to that The most important conditions are (not literally quoted) 
no dwelling shall be occupied until the road and footpath that give access to the site are 
constructed according to the approved plan, 
no more than 50% of the dwellings shall be occupied until the quayside works are earned out 
as approved, 
no more than 50% of the dwellings shall be occupied until an off-site cycle and footpath (see 
also section 106 agreement) is constructed, 
no more than 50% of the dwellings shall be occupied until further details about the car parking 
are submitted and approved by the local planning authonty, 
detailed drawings at a large scale (of a list of elements given in the decision notice) shall be 
submitted and approved before any work is commenced on the relevant part of the 
development, 
samples of the materials used (of a list of elements given in the decision notice) shall be 
submitted and approved before any work is commenced on the relevant part of the 
development, 
no more than 50% of the dwellings shall be occupied until details of a scheme of external 
lighting and seating has been submitted, 
before works are earned out, measurers to minimise dust and noise shall be submitted , 
before any residential accommodation is occupied the car parking and garaging areas need to 
be completed, 
no more than 50% of the dwellings shall be occupied until details of the amenity/play areas 
have been submitted, 
an archaeological watching bnef shall be conducted dunng all ground work operations to 
record any archaeological features and deposits which may be encountered This work shall 
be undertaken by an archaeologist to be approved by the local planning authonty (but paid by 
the developer), 
the soft landscaping shall be earned out no later than the first planting season, 
no more than 50% of the dwellings shall be occupied until the hard landscaping works are 
completed 
Section 106 agreement 
Most important planning obligations (literally quoted) 
"Off site junction improvements to the Gas Ferry Road/Cumberland Road Junction subject to 
detailed design and technical approval by the City Council of the Off Site Landscape Works 
shown on Drawing No 904/109 attached to this Agreement" 
"The Developer shall construct a footpath/cycleway link on the Yellow Land in accordance 
with details to be agreed with the Council in order to provide a link under the Cumberland 
Road to the Chocolate Path" 
Thirty three planning conditions were attached to the planning permission All 
these conditions have to be 'discharged in writing' by the local planning 
authority to the developer once they have been implemented The developer 
must show that he has complied with the conditions satisfactonly At the 
moment of the empmcal research (Spring 2004), not all of the conditions had 
been discharged such as, for example 5 u, which relates to a cycle-footpath 
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connection along the railway track, which is off-site. But the railway company 
(which was the owner of that piece of land) did not allow the developer to carry 
out the works. To resolve the issue the local planning authority has agreed with 
the railway company that the local planning authority can develop the path, and 
they have been given a right of access for 1 pound and the developer pays for 
these works to the local planning authority. Although the condition said that no 
more than 50 % of the new dwellings could be occupied before that time, the 
local planning authority knew what was going on and wanted to solve the 
problem, instead of enforcing the condition. 
It might also happen that while executing a planning permission, one or 
more conditions prove to be unnecessary or unreasonable. Then, the applicant 
must apply for changing or deleting the condition71. At Wapping Wharf two 
conditions, relating to noise mitigation measures, were deleted because they 
were found to be excessive measures for the problem at hand. To support the 
application, a consultant had to be employed to do a noise assessment and 
write a report about it. The buildings were finished in November 2001, but the 
discharging of all the conditions took some more years. The same counts for 
the sale of all the apartments. At the moment of the empirical research, there 
were still two apartments unsold. 
5.3 Transaction-cost analysis of Wapping Wharf 
In this section the transaction costs associated with the user rights regime are 
of central concern. In table 5.1, an overview of the important transaction costs 
related to the creation and use of the user rights regime at Wapping Wharf is 
given. In the following subsections these elements are elaborated. 
1. Lend exchange 
Acquisition of the site by 
Beaufort 
Attempt by Bristol City 
Council to acquire land 
for an electronic bus 
Sale of the apartments 
Two bidding procedures 
in 1996 and 1997 + 
employing agents and 
solicitors 
Has taken a long time 
(years), but both parties 
could not agree on the 
price. 
Mainly the developer 
(employing agents and 
solicitors) and to a lesser 
extent the joint land owners 
(so also Bristol City 
Council) who issued the 
bidding procdure 
Bristol City Council 
Developer 
2. Lend use or zoning plan 
Planning brief 1995 few months Bristol City Council 
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 This is an application under the provisions of section 73 of the Town and Country Planning 
Act 1990. 
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Making the local plan 
1997 (vision on the city 
until 2001) 
Planning brief 1998 
1992-1997, five years 
few months 
mainly the Bristol City 
Council and to a much 
lesser extent developer 
(lobby work) 
Bristol City Council 
13. Agreement 
Negotiation around the 
section 106 agreement 
The period between the 
submission of the 
planning application and 
granting the planning 
permission: seven 
months 
Mainly by the developer and 
to a lesser extent the Bristol 
City Council 
4. Planning permission 
Preparation planning 
application (and an 
Environmental 
Assessment) 
Planning permission 
(negotiation and 
modifications proposal) 
Discharging conditions 
(and realising planning 
obligations) 
Building regulation 
approval72 
Since the land 
acquisition in 1997 until 
the application in May 
1999 (rejected once) + a 
fee of £9500,-
Seven months after 
application 
Some quickly, others 
took / take years 
Mainly developer 
Both developer and Bristol 
City Council 
Mainly developer who has 
to comply with the conditions 
satisfactorily and to a lesser 
extent Bristol City Council 
that has to discharge the 
conditions by writing 
Both developer and Bristol 
City Council 
1 Land exchange 
There were several moments in the development process where land 
acquisition, or an attempt to acquire land, played an important role. The first 
moment was when Beaufort acquired the land for development. Beaufort 
bought the land from British Rail Property in 1997 after a fairly long (and 
transaction-cost consuming) bidding procedure. First in 1996 it did not bid 
enough money to acquire the site, but in 1997 when the joint land owners of the 
Harbourside issued a new bidding procedure, Beaufort offered enough to buy 
the land from the railway company. Beaufort acquires land only for development 
and does not have a land bank. Therefore Beaufort has a close network of 
agents and all sorts of other contacts that identify land for them. This network is 
crucial for their strategy to buy land for development which can be 'turned 
around' quickly. 
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 A building regulation approval is given by a different set of people called Building Inspectors 
who work separately from the planners. This concerns details of the buildings to make sure that 
they comply with the building regulations - mainly to do with health and safety, fire, etc in 
accordance with a set of (very complex) standards. 
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Usually when Beaufort acquires land it takes some time (3-4 weeks) for 
the solicitors to sort out what it is specifically that someone buys. Because of 
previous developments, certain pieces of a site may be left unused (e.g. 
because the shape), and those are difficult to sell. These pieces may just 
remain there 'unowned' and later when a site is sold again it may happen that 
nobody knows who the landowner is. This was the case with a small piece of 
land just off site at Wapping Wharf that was needed for the required off-site 
cycle / footpath along the railway track. Almost all the land was owned by British 
Rail Property, except for one piece underneath a bridge (junction with the 
Cumberland Road, see figure 5.1). Because ofthat, the condition relating to the 
foot and cycle path has not yet been discharged (see above). 
A particular piece of land can have an enormous history attached to it. 
Solicitors have to sort out whether there is a chance that an owner or someone 
with a legitimate interest might show up and claim a certain right over that land. 
Another project of Beaufort in Bristol is Redland. After that site had been 
developed, the neighbours (adjoining owners) came along to say that there was 
a right of access at the back of the buildings. They provided evidence for this 
claim by showing a document from the Land Registry. Beaufort was lucky not to 
have built on the particular part, so that it was not too difficult to provide that 
access. But it shows that even though solicitors carry out extensive 
investigations, it does not mean that everything is completely clear. The 
uncertainty caused by unclear registration of land can lead to significant 
transaction costs. 
Another moment in the development process of Wapping Wharf, where 
there was an attempt to acquire land, was when the local planning authority 
wanted to buy land from the railway company for the operation of the Bristol 
Electric Bus (BER). This is a flywheel powered bus that is supposed to run up 
and down the waterside between Wapping Wharf and the Museum of Bristol 
(see figure 6.1 ). In the end it proved to be impossible to make the bus work. The 
Bristol City Council had tried to buy the land for the BER, but did not succeed. 
Compulsory purchase has not been used because it is very complex and takes 
a long time. In Bristol, compulsory purchase has recently only been applied to 
the extension of the main shopping centre in the middle of the city. If the local 
authority cannot acquire the land amicably it usually retreats or tries to find 
different solutions to achieve its purposes. One might be 'a public right of way', 
which is an easement on a piece of land. 
More generally, because there is no legally binding land use plan, 
different ways have to be sought by developers (and other applicants) to 
increase their certainty about what is allowed to happen on a particular piece of 
land in the future. Oxley (2004 p. 212) says: "[...] a lack of clarity in the planning 
system, a large degree of discretionary power by the planning authorities and 
much room for negotiation may be seen to increase uncertainty and impose 
additional costs on development." Before a developer or any other person who 
wants to develop land, buys a plot, he wants to be fairly sure that after buying 
that land he can develop it. As the local plan, or informal documents like 
planning briefs, are not legally binding and the guidance is often very general 
and open to interpretation (especially compared to the bestemmingsplan), not 
much certainty is provided in advance. In the Netherlands, a land use plan is 
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legally binding and if an application fits within the plan it has to be granted. If it 
does not, an exemption from ora revision of the plan is needed. In England, a 
developer might either buy the land, not knowing whether he will be able to 
build on it later, or try to get planning permission before he buys it. Because 
anyone can apply for a planning permission - not only the owner of a plot -
developers often first try to get planning permission before they buy the land for 
development. Obviously, the permission can be used only if they have the land. 
Land can be acquired in various ways. This can be either in a one-to-one 
negotiation, a bidding procedure against other developers, or an auction. In 
case of an auction, the sale date is fixed and therefore there is little time to try to 
acquire planning permission. It might also happen that if planning permission 
has been granted to a developer, the initial landowner may decide not to sell the 
land because the permission granted might have given the land a great 
development potential, from which the landowner wants to benefit. Therefore, 
especially for the bigger sites, a developer might decide to take out an option on 
the land in order to secure his right to buy it until he has been able to acquire 
the permission. 
2 Land use or zoning plan 
The Bristol Local Plan of 1997 is the primary material consideration for 
determining planning applications. This plan covers the whole city and therefore 
serves as the primary consideration for the whole of Bristol. The plan-making 
process took over five years from the first consultations till the adoption of the 
plan in December 1997. 
The planning briefs of 1995 and 1998 are not statutory documents, but 
are nevertheless important documents for further delineation of the spatial 
policy of the city council and therewith provide some certainty for potential 
developers. They are supplementary (and more detailed) guidance to the Bristol 
Local Plan. 
3 Agreement 
Unlike the agreements in the Dutch case which were agreements under private 
law, the section 106 agreement is an agreement under public law, namely 
Section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act of 1990. The section 106 
agreement is closely related to the planning permission. In this particular case 
the planning permission was subject to the Section 106 agreement. After the 
planning application has been submitted, not only the planning permission is 
discussed but also the content of the Section 106 agreement. In this case, the 
local planning authority wanted the developer to carry out some off-site works 
for the benefit of the community. 
A transaction-cost issue which is important for the developer is the lack 
of knowledge in advance of the content of the planning obligations. There is 
usually uncertainty about which obligations the local planning authority requires. 
Although 89 percent of local planning authorities have an affordable housing 
policy written down in the local plan, a common complaint among developers is 
that policy changes a lot, which leads to an inconsistent message (Crook et al. 
2002 p. 17-18). This might lead to more negotiations and hence to higher 
transaction costs. 
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4 Planning permission 
Altogether, the whole planning permission process has taken a relatively long 
time as the permission was rejected initially. One could say that the main 
reason for the rejection, and therewith the rise in transaction costs, was the 
attitude of Beaufort towards involvement of the public. In addition, "Bristol has 
more than its fair share of influential conservation groups."73 Local knowledge 
and a good relationship with both planning officers and the community are 
important and can help to keep transaction costs down. On the other hand, 
initial investments are needed to build this knowledge and these networks. 
Another transaction-cost raising factor that was mentioned74 is the local 
guidance. The local guidance is usually non-quantified (the number of storeys, 
densities or number of dwellings are not specified) and is written in general 
words, without much detail and without any maps and drawings. The Lloyds 
building (the circle- and crescent-shaped building on the north side of Floating 
Harbour) which is five storeys high, was taken as the point of reference for the 
rest of Harbourside. But five storeys of an office building equate to seven 
storeys of a residential building. The lack of illustrations and maps, more 
generally the lack of precision in the terms used, is regarded as the reason that 
the content of the local guidance was not clear. 
The preparation of the application had already started before the land 
acquisition in September 1997, and it took until May 1999 before the planning 
permission was finally granted. Between the rejection of the first scheme and 
the application for the scheme that was approved, Beaufort set up an interactive 
plan-making process. This improved the chances of Beaufort for getting 
planning permission the second time. After the permission has been granted, 
there is still some uncertainty left. Almost every permission is conditional. These 
conditions have to be discharged in writing by the local planning authority. So 
after the permission has been granted there is still some discretionary power for 
the local authorities to control the content of the proposed development. 
Planning conditions are also often used to postpone some decisions, until the 
developer provides more details. 
The income that local authorities get from central government has been 
made dependent (among other things) on the speed of processing planning 
application. The higher the number of planning decisions made within either 
eight or thirteen weeks, the higher the grants (i.e. Planning Delivery Grants) the 
local authority receives. Therefore, local planning authorities try to handle the 
applications quickly. This speeding up of the planning application procedure 
should speed up the whole process. But in practice, because many applications 
are too complex to be decided upon within eight weeks, they are either refused 
or conditions are imposed, covering for instance design, to be sorted out in a 
later stage. The rule also limits negotiations during the passage of a planning 
application, since planning officers do not have time to ask for better designs 
etc. More attention to the working of the Planning Delivery Grants will be paid in 
chapter 8. 
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 Interview with Ian Thomas. 
74
 Interview with Nigel Honer. 
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In the case of Wapping Wharf, after the planning permission had been 
given, there was a lot of correspondence on the imposed conditions and how to 
get them discharged. Some issues may cause serious negotiation. For 
instance, the street lighting and the fence between the project and the existing 
housing (at Cumberland Road) have led to discussion and correspondence. 
This might also be an important reason why Beaufort had to employ many 
different agents and consultants. If they wanted to change a certain type of 
material, they employed an external consultant who is an expert in that 
particular field to deliver the necessary expertise and to persuade the local 
planning authority of the necessity. 
Another issue that is interesting from the perspective of transaction costs 
is the wording of the conditions. Many conditions are broadly written, which 
might cause contention between the applicant and the local planning authority. 
Recently this seems to have improved. In the case of the Wapping Wharf two 
conditions have not yet been discharged. One is about the car park that had to 
be developed. Beaufort said that they were required to construct it and not to 
provide it. The local planning authority had a different opinion. A mistake that 
the local planning authority made is that the conditions and the section 106 
agreement are not consistent. But the wording is not exactly the same. The 
local planning authority does not want to push the conflict too far and hesitated 
whether it wanted the car park at all. The problem was that the people working 
for both Beaufort and the local planning authority were not the same as the 
ones that were there when the agreement was signed and the planning 
permission granted. The other condition that has not yet been discharged is the 
cycle- and footpath condition, because no-one could find who owned of the land 
(under the Cumberland Road). This emphasises the importance of clarity of 
planning conditions and section 106 agreements. 
Although the city of Bristol was involved from the very beginning, it was not as 
closely involved in the preparatory work of the developer as the city of 
Nijmegen. Its involvement was greatest during the review of the planning 
application and the negotiations about the section 106 agreement, and 
afterwards in inspecting the site and discharging the conditions. Clarity and 
certainty, and sometimes the lack thereof, seem to be key words in the way the 
development process of Wapping Wharf proceeded. Bristol's local plan provides 
only limited guidance to developers, but on the other hand also gives a lot of 
flexibility. I had assumed that once a planning permission had been granted, the 
developer would know exactly what to do. But then still there were some, 
although slightly smaller, decisions to be made on design and material issues. 
Opposite from these discretionary practices is the way the City of Houston deals 
with applications for development. 
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Houston: planning in the city that does not plan? 
This chapter starts with an exploration section 6.1 of the relation between 
property rights and public planning in the US, and especially the tools of the 
latter -zoning and subdivision rules - that play an important role in American 
planning practices. After this, the focus is on Houston, which is known for its 
atypical regulatory practice (section 6.2). This is followed (in section 6.3), as in 
the previous two chapters, by a description of the development process of a 
housing site - Montebello - and a transaction cost analysis thereof (section 
6.4). 
6.1 Planning in the US: social conflict over property rights 
As in the Netherlands, and hence unlike England, in the US the concept of both 
dominium and imperium has an important position in written legislation, more 
specifically in the constitution. The United States do not have a national land 
law, which defines the reach of private property. For land use planning and 
property rights in land, the most important part of federal law is to be found in 
the last clause of the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution dating from 1791, 
also known as the taking clause, which is phrased as: "nor shall private property 
be deprived for public use, without just compensation." This phrase has had an 
enormous effect for planning and the restriction of private property rights at the 
local level. In addition, it has been the subject of much discussion and 
controversy in and outside the court room. In the beginning the meaning was 
clear (Jacobs 1998), because a taking was seen as physical claim on land for 
public purposes, like schools, parks, roads et cetera. But public regulation of 
private property went further in the beginning of the twentieth century than it had 
gone before, most significantly after local zoning was validated by the US 
Supreme Court in 1926. This in combination with arguably one of the most 
famous and important cases for planning - Pennsylvania Coal Company v. 
Mahon in 1922 - led to the notion that public regulation can go as far as to 
constitute a taking. In this case, a state statute prohibited the underground 
mining of a coal company when it would cause subsidence of overlying 
property. The judge concluded that the costs imposed on the coal company 
exceeded the conveyed benefits for the homeowners, which made it a taking of 
rights from the coal company. These kinds of takings have become known as 
regulatory takings. 
Apart from this federal jurisprudence, most land use regulations are 
established and implemented at the state and the local level. When the three 
countries are compared to each other, the USA (which is typical for federal 
states) is most decentralised with regard to land use planning, England is most 
centralised and the Netherlands has an intermediary position with its concept of 
the 'decentralised unitary state'. Nevertheless, subdivision regulations have 
become widespread throughout the whole US, zoning regulations likewise, 
except for one big city Houston (Texas). 
Zoning: the number one tool in the US 
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Zoning is one of the most (and probably the most) important planning tools in 
the United States. Before zoning was introduced, there were basic building 
regulations and nuisance rules to solve problems of health, safety and 
nuisance. They from differ from zoning in that zoning is that zoning can be 
applied differently within a city depending on the particular location, and 
secondly that zoning is directed to control future development instead of 
existing problems (Cullingworth 1997 p. 59-60). 
New York City is regarded as the first city that adopted a comprehensive 
zoning ordinance in 1916. In 1924, the federal Advisory Committee on Building 
Codes and Zoning, appointed by the Secretary of State, drafted a Standard 
State Zoning Enabling Act, which was intended as model for the state zoning 
ordinances. As the limits of public intervention were unclear, it was found 
necessary by the Secretary of State to carefully draft a universal act that is in 
accordance with the Constitution. This would allow states to make ordinances 
that were not likely to be judged unjust by the courts. This proved to be a great 
success. In 1926, 42 states had adopted a zoning ordinance, based on this 
federal act. 
The Euclid case in 1926, in which the Supreme Court dealt with the 
zoning ordinance in the village of Euclid, has actually given zoning its 
constitutionality as a tool to discriminate between locations. This case had a 
significant impact on the applicability of zoning. Zoning was no longer just an 
upgraded nuisance rule, but could be used to separate uses from each other, 
particularly industry, shops and apartments from single-family dwellings. "[...] 
many businesses and most apartments would never have been found to be 
nuisances in the common law. In upholding zoning laws, the state and federal 
courts jettisoned the nuisance analogy, though not without some agonising 
about what we now call exclusionary zoning." (Fischel 2004 p. 52) Critical 
reviews of zoning emphasise that zoning can often be exclusionary and is used 
to serve particular interests, i.e. that of single family households living in the 
urban fringe. "[...] zoning is an exercise in monopoly power for the benefit of 
local homeowners." (Fischel 1978 p. 66). Two empirical illustrations that are 
given by Fischel are the observation that zoning tends to exclude the uses that 
add no or very little value on neighbouring properties and the statement that 
zoning tends to restrict the supply of new housing in metropolitan areas. 
In spite of much critique (e.g. Ellickson 1973; Siegan 1970), zoning has 
remained the dominant mode to regulate land use. All fifty states have passed 
legislation that enables local authorities to impose zoning controls, most of them 
based on the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act that was issued in 1924 
(Cullingworth 1997). Traditional zoning, also called Euclidian zoning, which 
designates and often separates land uses, has been supplemented and 
sometimes even replaced by new forms that have emerged under labels as 
design-based, performance, overlay and incentive zoning. Although all these 
forms are planning tools, that serve an instrumental purpose, they also have a 
symbolic value. This has become particularly clear in the discussions on the 
adoption of zoning in Houston (see section 6.2), which are generally held in an 
emotional and ideological fashion (Buitelaar forthcoming). 
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Subdivision as second best 
Subdivision regulations are rules for minimum lot sizes, building lines and 
parking availability. Originally, the alm of this power was to divide a tract of land 
into two or more parcels in order to facilitate the establishment of clear titles and 
hence to simplify land transactions (Cullingworth 1997 p. 73). One could say 
that it was introduced to reduce transaction costs. But from the early 20th 
century onwards its applicability as a planning tool has significantly broadened. 
According to Ben-Joseph (2003 p. 15) three general goals can be distinguished 
for the imposition of such subdivision regulations nowadays: "preventing 
premature partial subdivisions which are poorly linked to the broader 
community; preventing poor quality substandard subdivisions with inadequate 
pubic facilities and infrastructure; reducing uncertainty and risk to the investor, 
buyer and the community." 
Seidel (1978) points to the fact that these goals have had negative 
impacts as well. He mentions two important factors. The first is the exclusionary 
impact of subdivision regulations. The desire for high-quality subdivisions often 
automatically leads, although not necessarily intentionally, to the exclusion of 
lower incomes. The second factor that is raised by Seidel, and which is 
interesting in the context of this research, is the increase of costs due to a 
prolonged approval process, to which I come back in chapter 8. 
The procedures for subdivision approval are still mainly based on the 
standards that were established by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) in 
the late 1930s and early 1940s. The process has three stages: the pre-
application stage, conditional approval - or preliminary plat stage - and the 
stage of final plat approval. The plat review in the Houston case followed these 
stages as well. 
6.2 Houston: no zoning, but not unregulated 
Neuman argues: "Houston's brand of planless planning without zoning makes it 
an urban planning canary, ideal for examining the government intervention 
versus free market debate" (2003a). The non-zoning tradition of Houston does 
not stand alone, it is part of broader political and economic structure of the 'free 
enterprise city' as Houston is called by Feagin (1988). This indicates an urban 
regime in which the local government has strong ties with the business 
community and tries to facilitate as much initiatives from the private sector as 
possible, in order to foster economic and physical growth. Exercising private 
property rights without much public regulation has always been a key feature of 
urban development in Houston. There have been several attempts to introduce 
zoning, but they all failed. Three referenda (in 1948, 1962 and 1993) were held 
in which the Houstonians could vote for the adoption of a zoning ordinance. The 
last election was a narrow victory for the advocates of non-zoning; they won 52 
percent against 48 percent75. 
The attitudes towards the lack of zoning are mixed. Especially the 
middle-income homeowners favour zoning because they expect that zoning 
prevents negative externalities and maintains property values. Others see the 
75
 See for a more elaborate exposition of the discussion on the adoption of zoning in Houston 
Buitelaar (forthcoming). 
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lack of zoning as a freedom that should promote creativity. A Steering 
Committee on housing76, that wrote the report Housing Strategies for Houston: 
Expanding Opportunities, says about the absence of zoning: "Unconstrained by 
conventional zoning regulations, Houston has a unique opportunity that no other 
American city has; it can undertake effective planning not trumped or 
compromised by existing zoning." (p. 8) Siegan (1970) argues that Houston 
shows that an unplanned and unzoned city of the size of Houston77, is a good 
example of how the market can distribute physical space efficiently. 
That Houston has no zoning does not mean that development is 
unregulated (Fischel 1985 p. 233). Although Houston does not have a 
comprehensive zoning ordinance (nor has Harris County of which Houston is a 
part), it does have subdivision controls and a building code. Moreover, Houston 
has adopted ordinances dealing with signs, setbacks, pornography and the like 
that would typically appear in a zoning ordinance (Babcock & Siemon 1985 p. 
263-264). One could even say that to some extent it is more the label zoning 
that is rejected than what it is used for in most cases (Buitelaar forthcoming). 
Therefore, Larson (1995 p. 181-182) argues that Siegan's claim of Houston as 
a free market in land use is incorrect. Despite the lack of a zoning ordinance, 
there are other statutory governmental land use regulations, of which the 
standard subdivision regulations are the most important. "Given this fact, the 
example hardly proves his (i.e. Siegan) claim that land use planning is irrelevant 
to urban geography, affordability, or quality of life" (Larson 1995 p. 182, 
parenthesis mine). 
Nor does non-zoning imply that the planning department is not involved 
in city planning. The planning style of the Planning & Development department 
has evolved around three principal factors (Neuman 2003a). The first is large 
development projects mainly downtown. The second is infrastructure-led 
development, which means investments in the seaport, George Bush 
Intercontinental Airport, and light rail. And the third is neighbourhood planning, 
initiatives to facilitate home-owners' associations that use deed restrictions, a 
sort of private zoning, to control real property. 
Siegan (1970 p. 73) explains that Houston has had a city planning 
department, since 1940, that operates comparable to many other planning 
departments in other large cities. According to Siegan (1970 p. 77) the main 
effort of the planning department is directed towards the enforcement of the 
countless number of privately drafted restrictive covenants. This started in 1965 
when Texan legislature was passed to allow the councils to get involved in the 
enforcement of residential restrictive covenants entered into privately. 
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 In 2002, the Houston chapter of the Amencan Institute of Architects launched an ambitious 
plan to help Houston with its housing policy and the great challenges / problems it faces until 
2025 Together with the Houston City Council, the business community, non-profit community-
based organizations and others, they appointed a steering committee to lead that process (see 
www housmghouston org) 
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 To assess the effects of zoning on vanous issues, Houston has been compared several times 
(Siegan 1972, Reiser 1981, Berry 2001) tb Dallas, a zoned (at least the suburban parts), but in 
other respects comparable city 
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Land use regulations in Houston 
The Department of Planning and Development regulates land development for 
Houston and its extraterntonal junsdiction (ETJ)78 As Houston is not a zoned 
city, the city governs development only by codes that address how land can be 
subdivided, and the regulations to which land use must comply in terms of for 
instance landscaping, parking, health and safety et cetera In the absence of 
zoning, there are also regulations that have been established to regulate 
specific land uses For instance, Houston has a motel / hotel ordinance, 
hazardous enterprises ordinance, historic preservation ordinance, manufactured 
homes and recreational vehicles ordinance and a tower ordinance However, 
these regulations apply to the whole Houston territory and its extraterntonal belt, 
and are not location-specific Private deed restrictions are the only devices that 
can regulate land use for specifically one location I come back this later 
For all development, a subdivision plat needs to be submitted that 
indicates how the land will be subdivided There are three platting categones, of 
which plat III is for the bigger commercial developments (like the case study in 
section 6 3), when the creation of a street or dedication of an easement is 
proposed This process is longer and more complicated since a so-called 'joint 
referral process' is required, in which the abandonment of the existing 
easements has to be arranged (see for more details 6 3) 
If land is already platted, replattmg is required, to further subdivide the 
existing subdivision plat The plat will be reviewed by looking whether it abides 
by all the regulations that are set out in chapter 42 of the code of ordinances, 
the city's land development ordinance The plat must be prepared by a licensed 
surveyor, land planner and / or engineer and must be signed by a licensed 
surveyor or engineer 
The Planning Commission79 decides if a plat will be approved or 
disapproved, plats can be rejected twice A plat cannot be rejected when it 
meets the requirements of chapter 42, it then has to be approved by reason of 
that, which is similar to the Dutch limited-imperative system as discussed in 
chapter 4 Neither can the Commission reject a plat if the Commission 
disagrees with the intended land use Other issues related to the development, 
like sewerage, water supply and drainage, are dealt with by the department of 
Public Works and Engineering and do not need to be approved by the 
Commission The Commission is required (by law) to make the decision within 
30 days, if it fails to do so, the plat will be automatically approved The 
Department of Planning and Development will advise the Commission on 
approval 
A replat might require a public heanng before the Planning Commision 
decides When the land is platted for single-family housing, and a replat is 
considered, people who live within 200 feet of the replat or within the ongmal 
In Texas, the Local Government Code gives cities the authonty to change their boundanes by 
annexation or disannexation of adjacent temtones Houston has a five-mile band around its 
boundary, in which the city has limited authonty over property One of these authorities is the 
imposition of chapter 42 of the city's Code of Ordinances, which relates to development and 
subdivision of land 
79
 The Planning Commission is a board with 25 members that is appointed by the Mayor and 
approved by the City Council Besides approving subdivision plats, it also studies development 
issue and on the basis of that makes recommendations to the City Council 
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plat will be notified of the public hearing. If no variances from chapter 42 are 
required, the Commission must approve the replat. In case the plat does not 
meet the requirements of chapter 42, the Planning Commission has some 
discretionary authority to grant a variance. The applicant must document 
'reasonable hardship' to support the variance, which would usually mean that 
he must prove that the land would be undevelopable without the variance. 
People living within 250 feet of the plat will be notified of proposed variances 
and get a chance to deliver input on how the variance could affect 
neighborhood properties. 
After a (re-)plat is submitted and approved, a property owner must apply 
for a building permit. This is done by submitting a site plan, which is required for 
all buildings that are built within the city. This requirement also applies to the 
remodeling of buildings when this remodeling changes the footprint of the 
structure. The plan will be reviewed on conformity with the building code 
(chapter 10) and other related codes. The site plan must include parking 
(chapter 26), landscaping (chapter 33), building lines and setbacks. During the 
review, plans are also checked for water and wastewater capacity (chapter 47), 
drainage and infrastructure (chapter 44). The reviews are carried out by the 
Department of Public Works and Engineering's Code Enforcement Division80. 
Deed restrictions81 in Houston82 
The most important legal restrictions for land use control are restrictive 
covenants, which are private agreements among property owners as to how the 
land may be used. The City of Houston describes (in the Deed Restnctions 
Compliance Notice) deed restrictions as: "[...] written agreements that restrict or 
limit the use or activities that may take place on a property in a subdivision." 
The restrictions appear in the real property records of the county of 
Harris in which the property is located, and they run with the land in order to 
restrict future owners accordingly. The most common use of deed restrictions is 
between neighbouring land owners of residential property on various aspects of 
land use, like the type of use, the number of structures, lot size, living space, 
height, setback, maintenance, and number of occupants. There are limits to the 
kind of conditions can be imposed. For instance, racially exclusionary conditions 
are not legally enforceable. Until 1948 they were widely used, until the US 
Supreme Court declared them unenforceable in the case Shelly v. Kraemer. 
In Harris County, over 10,000 deed restricted plats are recorded and 
registered with the county of which two-third for residences, covering many 
more - more than 10,000 - properties. Developers of subdivisions often set up 
deed restrictions and impose them, through the property transaction, on the first 
residents. To draw up restrictive covenants in developed areas is more 
complicated and costly, since all property owners need to accept the change 
voluntarily (Mcdonald 1995). After the covenants have been established they 
are usually monitored and overseen by the neighbourhood residents, although 
Until October 2004 this division was part of the Department of Planning and Development. 
Over the years it has bounced between both departments. 
8 1
 In the literature restnctive covenants, deed restnctions and deed covenants are used 
interchangeably. 
8 2
 This section draws to some extent on Berry (2001). 
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sometimes developers take the initiative to install homeowner associations to 
do this. The covenants are usually renewed automatically, mostly every 20 to 
30 years, unless a majority votes against this. Creating or modifying deed 
restrictions can be a labour-intensive exercise, as usually much time has to be 
spent on gathering neighbourhood support (www.houstontx.gov/planning). 
In conjunction with the widespread use of deed restrictions, Houston has 
many neighbourhoods that organize themselves around those deed restrictions. 
It is famous for its master-planned communities63, moreover no metropolitan 
area in the country has more master-planned communities than Houston 
(www.window.state.tx.us). Master-planned communities are privately planned 
and managed sites (which can be enormous) with many facilities (like schools, 
malls, leisure etc.) and hence different land uses. It is argued that this is largely 
due to the lack of zoning, people feel the need to regulate themselves within a 
community. To support this, the City of Houston has set up the Neighborhood 
Technical Assistance Center (NTAC), to help neighbourhood-based 
organizations by providing information of various kinds and by providing 
training. In addition, the Planning and Development department has a deed 
restrictions development program, which assists neighbourhoods in creating, 
renewing or updating deed restrictions and educates them on the value of deed 
restrictions, in particularly keeping out commercial activities from residential 
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areas . 
Deed restrictions are widely used throughout the US. What makes 
Houston special is that they are not used in conjunction with zoning and that 
state legislation has been passed that allows the city to enforce the private 
agreements. After the rejection of zoning in the 1962 referendum there was 
pressure to enhance the power of the local government in another way (Berry, 
2001). As deed restrictions were the main instrument for land use regulation, it 
was found appropriate that the city got more influence in enforcing the 
covenants. In 1965 two new articles (974a-1 and 974a-2) were passed and 
included in the Texas legislature, referred to as the Restrictive Covenant 
Enforcement Acts. 
The first article provides cities without a zoning ordinance with the 
possibility to enforce private restrictive covenants. It also prescribes that no 
authority can interfere with these private agreements, unless at least one 
convenanter submits an official complaint to the city. The city of Houston 
restricted itself further, by adopting a city ordinance in which it is said that 
restrictions are only allowed to be enforced by the city when land use 
restrictions are violated, but not for violations of setback, number, or size 
restrictions. In practice, the city has been reluctant to use its enforcement 
powers; the homeowners associations have remained the primary enforcers85. 
974a-2 has had more practical consequences. Usually, granting or 
rejecting a building permit happens independently of deed restrictions. So 
although a restriction might be violated by a building permit, it is not a 
Interview Atef Sharkawy. 
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 It provides these services for free, under the Deed Restrictions Pro Bono Program, to 
neighborhoods that have properties with a value under $110,000,-
6 5
 In an interview with the legal department I was told that the deed restrictions enforcement 
team employs only four people. Enforcement occurs only on the basis of complaints. 
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consideration that is allowed to be taken into account. The situation in Houston, 
and Texas in general, is different from the rest of the US, as 974a-2 enables 
any city of more than 900,000 inhabitants to refuse a building permit if it violates 
a registered deed (Henderson 1987). 
In line with this, the City of Houston has issued (in 2004), a Deed 
Restriction Compliance Notice, in which it notifies all citizens of Houston that all 
building permits "will be verified for deed restrictions." In addition the notice 
informs citizens about the penalties that could be given as the result of non-
compliance: "You may not purchase a building permit without signing a sworn 
deed restriction affidavit stating that you are aware of and agree to abide deed 
restrictions pertaining to your project. If you knowingly or unknowingly sign the 
deed restriction affidavit under false pretences, you could be subject to 
municipal court citations, fines, and the removal of the structure or violating 
portion thereof." When people apply for a building permit, a deed restrictions 
affidavit has to be filled out in which the owner (or his agent) affirms that there 
are no deed restrictions, or none that will be violated by the requested permit, 
on the property. 
6.3 Houston city planning in practice: Montebello 
Montebello is a luxury condominium complex of 30 stories near Post Oak 
Boulevard and ring way 610, which is Southwest of downtown Houston (see 
figure 6.1 for the location). 
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Figure 6.1: Location Montebello in the Gallerìa area 
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It consists of 112 units, 268 parking spaces underneath (which is rare in 
Houston) the building, all kinds of luxurious facilities, a swimming pool, a fitness 
area etc. It has been developed by Interfin Companies who completed the 
building in the summer of 2004. Montebello was not the only building in this 
development by Interfin; an almost identical building (Villa d'Esté) was built, as 
well as an Italian style shopping center, and a hotel that was under construction 
at the moment of writing. 
Post Oak Boulevard and Montebello are part of the Galleria area86 - also 
called Uptown Houston - which is mainly a large business / office area that has 
attracted many new developments, sometimes at the expense of downtown. To 
guarantee and protect the high standards (i.e. the high property values) of Post 
Oak Boulevard and retain the same clientele (including George Bush sr.), the 
Uptown Houston Association was founded in 1975.87 The association was 
founded to serve mainly business interests, or as it is said in the website 
(www.uptown-houston.com): "to address the challenges facing the area's 
growth. The Uptown Houston Association strives to coordinate area-wide 
86
 The Gallerìa area is put forward as being one of the earliest and clearest examples of an 
edge city in Garreau's (1988) famous book "Edge aty: life on the new frontier". 
87
 This was done by Gerald Mines, who developed (among others) the Gallerìa (a big shopping 
mall) and the Williams Tower, which is the highest office tower in the world (275 meters) outside 
a central business district. Currently, John Breeding runs the Association as executive director 
(interview Suzy Hartgrove). 
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planning, to focus on the implementation of area improvements and to serve as 
a forum for area business interests." Since residential functions and retail 
entered the area, the Uptown Houston Association (UHA) can be seen more as 
an urban association with the goal to beautify the area. All the properties pay a 
fee on a yearly basis. The UHA takes care of, for instance, traffic measures 
beyond those of the city, it interacts with the government, it organises security, it 
promotes the area and so on. 
Almost ten years ago, the association has got itself the status of a TIRZ 
(Tax Increment Reinvestment Zone). This is a program of the state of Texas 
that allows the area to get a portion of the property tax that is levied after a new 
development is completed. Then the Uptown Houston Association can issue 
bonds, which it has done so far at a total of 15 million dollar, and it will be able 
to issue an enormous amount of 100 million dollar in the next 15 years. With 
that money, the Uptown Houston Association has upgraded the area with 
design stainless steel traffic light poles, stainless steel arches above the streets, 
more exclusive landscaping, and all sorts of amenities. The offices, the housing 
and retail are therefore at the higher end of the market. 
The development process of Montebello can be divided into several stages 
which follow roughly the same sequence as described by a chart (see figure 
6.2) that was published by the taskforce for building permits (that was appointed 
by the mayor). In this chart, we also see an indication of the general duration for 
each step. Due to site-specific features, the phasing of Uptown Park and the 
situation on the real estate market at the time the land was bought, this is not a 
completely accurate time estimate for Montebello. Nevertheless, the total time 
of around three years is close to the time spent on the development process of 
Montebello. 
Figure 6.2: 
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Before the land was bought, Houston was recovering from a major crisis in the 
nineteen eighties, due to two simultaneous and interrelated events. One was 
the crash of the oil industry; in 1982 the price of oil was $ 0,40 per gallon and in 
1984 it was $ 0,08. Due to booming oil prices before 1982, the city too was 
booming and so was the real estate market, which led to many buildings being 
built in the seventies and early eighties. So when the oil industry fell down, other 
sectors like the property sector did too. It was even worse for the property 
sector for it was in the middle of a boom, and all of a sudden - as one of the 
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interviewees said - "there was no-one there any more to buy the property ." It 
took ten years (from 1984-1994) to get out of that depression. 
The land (24 acres), on which Villa d'Esté, Montebello, the hotel and the 
shopping centre were built (see figure 6.1), was bought in 1992 from the US 
government. The property was put into a special government real estate entity 
called RTC (Resolution Trust Corporation), which receives assets - like real 
estate - that are part of savings and loans of people and organisations that went 
broke. Originally, the site was developed for single-family homes (30 large 
tracts of land). But, before Interfin came in, Superior Oil had bought and 
demolished the houses. It wanted to build office buildings, but the Houston 
economy was not receptive at that time. Then Superior Oil sold the land to a 
real estate speculator, who then got into troubles, after which the land ended up 
with the lender, after which it was passed on to the RTC. RTC wanted to 
dispose of the land in 1992, but not many were interested in buying land in 
Houston at that time. Interfin was very interested, as it was almost in the 
backyard of its office, and because it was relatively cheap for the location. This 
well-known edge city had prosperous times, and because of its very good 
accessibility would soon regain its potential. Interfin bought the land (relatively 
cheaply), knowing that there was enough development potential, as it was so 
close to the freeway and as it was part of Post Oak Boulevard, an area with a 
high status. What helped in this respect, was that Interfin was already familiar 
with the area, as Interfin had already built Four-Leaf Towers and Four Oaks 
Place: 6 office towers in total. 
After the transaction of the property title, a due diligence of 60 days 
started in order to allow environmental experts to investigate whether there was 
any soil contamination and to do a land survey. The experts also looked at (i.e. 
quickly scanned for) necessary elevations which are necessary in case the 
property is in a flood plain. No preliminary plat was submitted, as Interfin wanted 
to buy the land anyway89. The contract had already been signed, but if Interfin 
had found something unwanted or suspicious it could have walked away from 
the purchase, or renegotiated the price. Nothing special (although a small part 
of the site was on a floodplain) was found during the period that could break up 
the agreement. 
After the land was bought in1992, Interfin spent approximately two years 
planning and thinking what they wanted to do with it and to get the plat 
approved. A team of consultants came on board. Interfin took its time, since the 
market did not seem ready at that moment for high-rise condominiums. 
Years before Interfin bought the land it was a subdivided for single-family 
housing (30 tracts in total), and when Interfin bought the land it was still platted 
like that. It decided to subdivide (not knowing exactly what to do with it) the land 
in five pieces, in order to put condominiums, retail and hotel (for which building 
started in May 2005) on it. The piece on which Montebello was built, like the 
other four subdivisions, was subdivided as an 'unrestricted reserve', which 
means that it is " [...] a parcel of land that is not a lot, but is created within a 
Around 250,000 people left Houston in two years. 
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 Potential buyers of land are allowed to submit a preliminary application, when they consider 
buying land for purchase. In many cases the purchase is dependent on the result of the review 
of that application (see www.houstontx.gov). 
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subdivision plat for other than single-family residential use and is established to 
accommodate some purpose for which a division into lots is not suitable or 
appropnate " (p 2869 of chapter 42 of the Code of Ordinances) In addition, it 
wanted to lay out a street (now Uptown Park Boulevard) to connect the freeway 
to Post Oak Boulevard 
The whole Uptown Park site was platted as a class III plat, which is the 
category that usually applies to the bigger developments, since these are 
subdivisions that require or propose (1) the creation of any new street, or / and 
(2) the dedication of any easement for public water, wastewater collection or 
storm sewer lines, and / or (3) it regards a vacating plat90 All three 
requirements applied to the Uptown Park subdivision A class III plat requires a 
submittal in two sages, a preliminary and a final plat Objections from adjacent 
property owners should be made during this preliminary submittal process, but 
in this case there were no objections Interfin submitted the application after the 
land had been purchased After the preliminary plat is submitted it ideally takes 
nine days for the staff of the Planning and Development department has got the 
chance to review the plats and make recommendations to the Planning 
Commission The department reviews the plat for streets, lot sizes, set back 
lines, open space requirements, parking etc In case of a preliminary plat, and in 
case it meets the requirements of chapter 42, the preliminary plat will ideally be 
approved on day ten91 
Besides the review by the Department of Planning and Development, the 
plat was also sent to the department of Public Works and Engmeenng The 
department did two things at this stage First, it looked if there are any major 
impediments to the capacity of the public utilities such as water supply, 
wastewater collection and treatment, and storm drainage As the site comprises 
24 acres, the development was considered a major impediment The Planning 
and Development Commission takes the outcome of this review into 
consideration, by making reference to the Wastewater Capacity Reservation 
letter that needs to be obtained The Public Works department also reviews for 
easement abandonments Some easements can be abandoned simply by the 
replat, but in case of public utilities (ι e public rights of way), which was the 
case, a joint referral process is required The preliminary plat of Uptown Park 
was approved by the Planning and Development department subject to a joint 
referral process Then the final plat was submitted taking into account the 
comments that were tied to the approval of the preliminary plat The plat was 
then again reviewed by the two earlier mentioned departments and was 
approved and recorded in October 1992, subject (again) to the joint referral 
process The time for the platting procedure was around three months, which 
includes the preparation done by Interfin and its advisors 
The joint referral process is a process in which the joint referral 
committee of the City of Houston is requested to abandon or sell a street, alley, 
or easement that is owned by the City Interfin had to hire a civil engmeenng 
firm that surveyed the exsitmg roads and easements It calculated also the 
acreage that Interfin wanted to buy from the city In the calculation, following the 
new plan, Interfin also gave land back to the city, and this also had to be 
A vacating plat vacates all or a portion of previously platted property 
9 1
 Interview Suzy Hartgrove 
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included in the equation According to city charts, this process could take up to 
40 weeks, and that is the time spent on the joint referral process at Uptown 
Park 
Besides the provision and exchange of space for utilities on site, in the 
form of a joint referral, connection to and capacity of the City's utility network 
has to be bought, by paying impact fees The city uses a ratio of type and use 
for calculating how much utility capacity you have to buy when you want to build 
on your land It calculates how many square feet of for instance office building 
translates into how many gallons a day You have to buy that capacity from the 
sewage treatment plant, through Public Works and Engmeenng Superior Oil 
had already bought the capacity92 and the letter that confirms that it runs with 
the land The application for utility capacity is usually made simultaneously with 
the joint referral and platting process At Uptown Park, the platting, utility and 
joint referral process together took up to one year 
After the original (re)plat in 1992, the subdivision was replatted twice, in 
June 1994 and in November 2000 The first time, the reason was the chance 
Interfin had to acquire an additional piece of land to add onto the site in order to 
extend the retail centre On this new site there was a creek or bayou It was put 
in large concrete boxes underneath the ground This was Interfin's initiative and 
was not required by the city, although they could not have filled it up The bayou 
had no environmental quality (it was more like a drainage ditch) and boxing it in 
saved land They had to get permits to do it from the Harris county flood control 
Nowadays, storm review is done by the City of Houston in the same process as 
the water and wastewater capacity review The replat in November 2000 was 
made because the southern boundary of Montebello's subdivision had to be 
moved southwards in order to extend the parcel on which Montebello would be 
build 
After the platting and the utility /joint referral process (in 1993), the 
schematic designs were made to explore what the buildings should look like 
Around 1995 Uptown Park Boulevard was built as well as the conduit In 1996, 
Villa d'Esté was designed, which took around a year In 1997, Interfin started a 
pre-sale marketing program to sell some units on paper, before the construction 
started This was important since the banks were only prepared to pay up to 70 
percent of the costs, so 30 percent equity must come from the developers' own 
capital It took about one year to get the first 30 sales contracts that were 
necessary to show to the bank This took relatively long because the 
condominium market is a small market, and because people are not used to 
buying from paper Before this pre-sale programme, two to three million dollars 
had already been spent on consultants, advertising, marketing etc 
The construction of Villa d'Esté started in 1998 and it opened in the year 
2000 At the same time in 1998, the construction of the shopping centre started, 
which opened in 1999 The construction of Montebello started in May 2002 and 
it opened in June 2004 In Apnl 2005, 90 percent had been sold Although Villa 
d'Esté was an important part of the development in itself, it was also an 
important learning case and catalyst for Montebello Interfin implemented the 
It bought much more capacity than Interfin needed for its developments But it is possible to 
transfer The overcapacity now rests on a small piece of vacant land owned by Interfin This 
could well be used for (and transferred to) new developments that Interfin will carry out 
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program in stages, mainly due to the earlier mentioned depression. In addition, 
for this type of development (high-rise condominiums) Houston only has a small 
market and so the result was uncertain. Therefore it was decided to plan, build 
and sell Villa d'Esté first. Although the sale was not an instant success, after 
everything was sold the market went up again, which gave enough confidence 
for building Montebello. The design of Montebello went slightly faster (less than 
a year) than that of Villa d'Esté, since the designs of both buildings are almost 
identical. 
When Interfin applied for a building permit for Montebello, which was the 
last development before the hotel, the plat was already there, but as said before 
the boundary had to be shifted. After that it needed a team of architects and 
engineers to complete a set of drawings with which Interfin could go to the city 
again to apply for a building permit. After the city receives a building permit like 
that for Montebello, a '21-day clock' for commercial93 plan reviews starts, which 
is a target that the city imposes itself. After the application is received, a 
structural plan examiner is assigned by the Commercial Plan Review manager 
who oversees the review. The plan examiner explores the scope of the work, 
which division has to be involved in the review and the routing of the plan. The 
plan is reviewed, if all considerations are applicable, on issues like water, 
sewerage, storm water drainage, floodplain, parking, health and safety. 
When these elements have been checked and reviewed, the plan 
examiner collects all the reviews and puts the plan and the reviews in a library, 
awaiting review by the code enforcement division's (PWE) inspectors who 
examine the plan on structural, electrical, plumbing/drainage, HVAC94 and 
sprinkler codes. After this has been done, the plan examiner verifies all the 
approvals and prepares the application for permit issuance. After the applicant 
is granted permission, construction can begin as well as the on-site inspections 
for permit compliance. After the construction had been completed and carried 
out in line with the permit, a certificate of occupancy was issued. The 
application for Montebello was approved and the permit issued in June 2002. 
The 21-day target is not achievable for projects like Montebello, as it involves 
multiple condos - in this case 112 units - for which individual building permits 
are issued. For Montebello it took between four and five months before the 
permits came out of the review process and all the permits were issued. 
The use of Montebello is governed by deed restrictions and other criteria 
to maintain the standard that the developer had in mind in advance. This has 
done in a document called 'Custom Design Criteria' that was set up by Interfin 
before the residential units were sold. The restrictions relate to the use, 
alterations, decorations, maintenance et cetera of both residential units and the 
common areas . 
Every plan that is not a single-family home or duplex dwelling (which are processed through a 
residential plan review process) is regarded as a commercial plan review. 
94
 HVAC stands for heating, venting and air conditioning. 
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 The common areas are maintained and managed, and the restrictions are enforced by a 
property manager. 
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6.4 Transaction-cost analysis of Montebello 
Unlike the Dutch and the English case, Montebello was not developed within 
the framework of a land use or zoning plan, neither did the developer enter into 
an agreement with the City of Houston that defines the conditions (and 
obligations) under which development can take place (see also table 6.1 ). It is 
carried out within the regulations that are defined in the code of ordinances and 
that apply to all developments within and without the city boundaries. There is 
not much discretion for the local government to impose additional restrictions. 
Since the land use regulations are general and hardly vary according to the type 
of land use, there were very little - or no - costs involved in setting up the user 
rights regime of Montebello: the existing regime was used. 
Altogether the process of Montebello took around four years, which 
includes plan preparation by Interfin, plan review by the city, construction, land 
acquisition and so on. However, not all activities - like platting, joint referral and 
utilities - were exclusively dedicated to the development of Montebello but 
applied to the whole Uptown Park area that Inferin developed between 1992 
and 2005. 
Table 6.1: Transaction costs at Montebello 
1. Lend exchange 
Acquisition of land from 
RTC 
Sale of the apartments 
Few months (including 
due diligence) 
Developer 
Developer 
2. Land use or zoning plan 
Not applicable 
3. Agreement 
Not applicable 
4. Planning permission 
Subdivision plat 
Utilities (joint referral) 
Planning review 
Inspections 
3 months 
9 months + several 
months preparations by 
developer 
4-5 months 
$96,000,- building fee 
Municipality and to a lesser 
extent the developer 
Municipality and to a lesser 
extent the developer 
Municipality, recouped from 
developer 
Municipality 
1. Land exchange 
The acquisition of the 24 acres for Uptown Park went relatively smoothly. 
Interfin was very interested in the area because it had already developed many 
buildings there and knew the potential. At the same time RTC was happy to 
have a serious candidate in a period that many developers were reluctant to 
invest in real estate. Several months were spent on the exploration of the site. 
After the transaction of the property title, a due diligence of 60 days started in 
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order to allow environmental experts to investigate whether there was any soil 
contamination and to do a land survey, which includes an investigation of the 
property titles and the plat that run with the land The experts also looked at 
necessary elevations which are necessary in case the property is in a flood 
plain Only a small stnp close to Montebello was on the floodplam This stnp 
was elevated just before the construction started 
The sale of the apartments of Montebello benefited greatly from 
condominium complex Villa d'Esté, which had been developed and sold earlier 
It took several years before all the units of Villa d'Esté were sold since the 
condominium market in Houston is small and difficult But thereafter, it proved to 
be relatively attractive which increased the demand for Montebello There is a 
growing demand for this urban lifestyle, with numerous facilities in one building 
To keep up the standard, all these sorts of development are accompanied by 
restnctive covenants to prevent the users creating nuisance to each other 
4 Planning permission 
The stage where the user nghts regime is most prominently visible is the fourth 
- the planning or building permission stage - where development proposals are 
reviewed for compliance with the city's code of ordinances This is done in two 
stages, as we could also see in figure 6 2 First, there is a review of the 
subdivision plat in conjunction with the utilities (in the joint referral process) In 
the case of Uptown Park (comprising the condominiums, the shopping area and 
the hotel), this involved the whole plat It took over one year (including 
preparations by the developer) before the plat was approved and the joint 
referral process was completed In addition, because of changes in the 
circumstances, two minor replats were required that also took around a month 
each The fee that Interfin had to pay for the initial subdivision plat was around $ 
2500,-96 
The second stage is called the 'plan review' stage which is separate for 
each structure, which means that Montebello had its own plan review process 
This took around 4-5 months This is the internal review procedure of the City of 
Houston The preparation time spent by the developer is difficult to assess The 
plan for Montebello was relatively quickly and easily drawn, for its architecture is 
nearly identical to that of Villa d'Éste Interfin had to pay the city a fee of around 
$96,000,- for the building permit for Montebello 
Although Houston is not unregulated, it looks quite different from the other two 
cases The city is (only) involved in reviewing the proposals of the legally 
binding ordinances This happens in two stages The first was soon after the 
land acquisition by the developer in the platting and utility stage (see also figure 
6 1 ), while the other was just before the construction started, when the 
proposed structure was reviewed for compliance with building regulations In 
the next chapter, I will elaborate on the differences between the three case 
studies 
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 This amount includes the costs $1920,- ($80, per acre * 24 acres) for pre-application, and 
$550, for class 3 plats 
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7 
Comparing and explaining transaction costs: learning from the cases 
In the three chapters preceding this one, we have seen three development 
processes that developed along different lines, leading to differences in 
transaction costs. In this chapter a link is made between the transaction costs 
and the user rights regime. These user rights regimes are connected to other 
institutions. Therefore, to explain transaction costs we need to look how these 
user rights regimes, and the transaction costs associated with their creation and 
use, are embedded in a broader institutional context. 
7.1 The user rights regimes compared 
There is a difference between these cases in the length of the development 
process. A complicating factor is however that all three cases were part of a 
bigger project, and are therefore also dependent on factors that are external to 
the site itself. Looking at the partial developments - but taking into accounts 
activities that relate to the whole development, like land acquisition - there are 
still significant differences. Montebello had the fastest development process: it 
took approximately four years. The process started in 1992 with land 
acquisition, platting and a joint referral process for the whole Uptown Park site, 
after which the developer decided to phase the process and started with the 
plan preparation of Montebello as late as 2001. In 2004 the project was 
completed. Wapping Wharf took over six years- from the plan preparations for 
the land bid in 1995 till the structure was completed at the end of 2001. The 
Marialaan in Nijmegen was the lengthiest project of the three, with a total 
duration of over eight years. It started in 1994 with a joint development proposal 
of the developer and the municipality and ended - with the end of the 
construction stage - in 2002. 
Although we should be careful when drawing general conclusions from 
this, it is not surprising that the Dutch case had the longest and the Houstonian 
case the shortest span, if we look at the primary determinants of the length of 
the development process. The differences do not arise in the production 
process - like during the construction works - since this seems to be similar 
across these projects, but in the way the user rights regime is created and used. 
In Houston existing rules - i.e. the city ordinances - were applied, while in the 
Dutch case new site-specific rules had to be made. Most time in the Dutch case 
was spent in the informal process of deliberation and negotiation: that took 
several years altogether. 
Another difference between the three projects is the stage in which the 
transaction costs related to the user rights regime are made. In the Dutch case 
most costs were made in the early plan-making stage when the formal land use 
plan was prepared. In Bristol, the focus is later, at the (pre-) planning application 
stage simultaneously with the section 106 agreement, and even after the 
permission is granted, since the planning conditions required the submission of 
more detailed schemes in later stages. In Montebello, there was a clear split 
between the two most important stages. The first one was right after the land 
had been bought, when the developer wanted to get the development as a 
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whole - i.e. the footprint - approved. The second stage was at the end of the 
process, when the building application for each unit of Montebello was 
submitted and reviewed. 
Another important difference is the division of the costs between the 
developer and the local authority. The role of the local government was most 
prominent in the Dutch case, where the city of Nijmegen was involved from the 
very beginning, with the land acquisition, the various agreements, the schematic 
designs, and so on. Therefore, initially the municipality bore many transaction 
costs. It was however able to recover a large amount from the developer. In 
Houston all the costs of preparing the plans and acquiring the land were borne 
by the developer. The only costs that the city of Houston made were the internal 
costs of processing the applications and plats, of which it was able to recover a 
large portion from the developer. Wapping Wharf has again a middle position. 
Most costs were made by the developer, but the city was considerably more 
involved than its Houstonian counterpart. Especially after the planning 
application, the city of Bristol was involved in public consultation and 
negotiations about the designs and the planning obligations. 
In chapter three, I explained the choice for investigating the development 
process of three housing projects, containing around 100 units in the 
commercial sector, assuming that this would make the case studies 
comparable. However, this assumption might have been too simple since the 
projects proved to be quite different, not only in terms of the way the process 
was organised, but also with regard to the initial starting point - the nature and 
location of the site - and to events that occurred. Remediableness (see chapter 
2) is a difficult criterion forjudging the performance of various institutional 
arrangements in terms of transaction costs. Although all three projects have a 
comparable output - namely apartment blocks of around 100 non-subsidised 
units - there are too many other variables that make comparison extremely 
difficult. Examples of those variables are: the nature of the site, fragmentation of 
ownership, the nature of the stakeholders and external processes. 
In addition, transaction costs cannot just be attributed to institutions or 
governance structures, but are the result of interplay between these structures 
and the subjects. User rights regimes are created and used by agents and do 
not produce any transaction costs on their own. Comparing micro-institutions on 
their transaction costs, like the remediableness criterion suggests, becomes 
hence illusive. In addition, the room for manoeuvre is constrained by the rules of 
the game that are made at a higher level, the meso institutions. Rules with 
regard to land use and exchange, from both private and public law, limit the 
number of options at the site level. 
The cases have demonstrated very different ways in which user rights 
regimes are created and used. The table (table 3.2) I used in chapter 3, with 
possible transaction-cost generation factors, related to the creation and the use 
of the user rights regime, and which I have used as a guideline to analyse the 
case studies (table 7.1). In this chapter I will look at the relevance of these 
factors and the differences between the three case studies. 
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Table 7.1: Possible transaction-cosi generating factors with creating ami using the 
user rights regimes (see also Buitelaar 2004) 
Moments / stages in the 
development process where 
the user rights regime is 
created and / or used 
1. Land exchange 
2. Making land use or 
zoning plan / building 
ordinance etc. (i.e. 
regulations of land use) 
3. Agreement (between e.g. 
developer and municipality) 
4. Planning permission 
Possible transaction-cost generating factors 
- number of parties involved and the number of parcels 
exchanged 
- conflict of interest 
- information about future possibilities 
- delineation (assignment) of rights 
- and the information of the delineation of rights: land 
registry or not 
- use of hierarchical means (e.g. compulsory purchase, 
pre-emption rights) 
- stakeholder participation 
- appeal 
- number of parties involved 
- conflict of interest 
- structure of the plan: legally binding - indicative 
- structure of the procedure: administrative - political 
- number of parties involved 
- conflict of interest 
- structure of agreement / contract: detailed - flexible 
- yes, no, or conditional 
- number of parties involved 
- conflict of interest 
- possibility of negotiation (planning gain) 
- possibility of appeal and the actual use of it 
- structure of the procedure: administrative - political 
- structure of the permission: conditional -
unconditional 
1 Land exchange 
The way the land was acquired for the development in the three case studies 
differs on several points. In the case of Montebello and Whapping Warf there 
was only one owner from whom land had to be acquired, respectively RTC and 
British Rail. The Marialaan site embraced two parcels, one owned by a gas 
station and one by a builders' merchant. This made the land acquisition more 
complex and transaction-cost consuming. This was influenced also by the fact 
that there was a viable land use - i.e. the builders' merchant - at the Marialaan 
before the development of the site, while the land in the other cases was 
derelict and vacant. Therefore, the municipality of Nijmegen had to search for a 
new spot to relocate the builders' merchant, which led to additional transaction 
costs, in the form of acquisition costs. 
Reviewing the three cases, it also seems as if the chance of conflicts of 
interest increases when more landowners involved. The developer of the 
Marialaan could not come to an agreement for the Northern part of the MVK 
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triangle, which led to a re-delineation and subdivision of the project boundaries. 
But this fragmentation leads to an increase in the transaction costs since many 
activities (like producing a bestemmingsplan) have to be done twice. 
In all three cases, no hierarchical means to acquire land were used by 
the local authority. In Houston, this was not necessary since the developer was 
able to acquire the land easily. In addition, the city hardly ever uses 
expropriation, due its general reluctance to interfere with the individual freedom 
to do with the land whatever the landowner pleases to do. In the English case, it 
was not necessary for the initial land acquisition to use compulsory purchase 
because British Rail - the landowner - was one of the partners involved in the 
redevelopment of Harbourside. However, in order to acquire the land to operate 
the electric bus, it might have been helpful if expropriation had been applied. 
But it is complex and costly, and therefore it is rarely used in Bristol. The 
benefits of the electric bus did not seem to outweigh the costs of an induced 
land sale. This also counts for the Dutch case, where compulsory purchase 
would have been expensive and probably lengthy. It was possible to start with 
at least part of the development, using amicable acquisition. 
Before a developer buys land and property he wants to have a fair 
degree of certainty - to minimise development risks - about the future 
possibilities. These possibilities are constrained and demarcated by the land 
use regulations that are set by the local authority. Developers try to acquire as 
much information about what they will be allowed to develop. In the Houston 
case nearly everything is known in advance, since the code of ordinances 
includes almost all the regulations. To reduce uncertainty even more, one can 
decide to submit a preliminary plat, an opportunity Interfin did not use because it 
wanted to buy and develop the site anyway. For the Dutch site, it was clear that 
what the developer wanted to build was not possible under the existing user 
rights regime. But the municipality agreed to co-operate to change the regime, 
and to buy an additional piece of land, in order to accommodate housing 
development. However, the volume, density, number of units and many details 
were not completely worked out before the land was bought. The developer had 
to rely on the willingness of the city of Nijmegen. At Wapping Wharf, the user 
rights regime was less clear to the developer, except for the fact that the local 
plan has designated the land for housing. The local planning authority had a 
large degree of discretionary power to determine the content of the planning 
permission, the conditions, and the obligations. 
Looking at how the property rights were defined, from a private law 
perspective, there are not many differences between the cases that could give 
rise to transaction costs. The Netherlands, England and the US all have a 
system of land registry; the first two have national cadastres, while in the US 
property records are local matters. However, it seems as if the English case 
was a bit more complex and transaction-cost consuming, due to some 
uncertainties about ownership and the division of rights, something that could 
be explained by the feudal property rights tradition, which leads to a situation 
with multiple interests. Everything should be recorded but in practice this does 
not always seem to be the case. In addition, it is only since 1990 that access to 
information from the Land Registry was granted to the public. But still, details of 
prices remain confidential (Adams et al. 2002). 
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Applying transaction cost theory, one could say the land was acquired in all 
cases through relational governance structures. As already mentioned, 
expropriation, compulsory purchase or eminent domain were neither necessary 
nor used. But neither can we speak of market structures, in the classical sense 
of competitive markets with many buyers and sellers that have transient 
exchanges and no mutual relationships. In these cases, the land exchange was 
preceded by negotiation and building a relationship between the parties 
involved. The land acquisition - at least if land is acquired by private parties - is 
often informed by the information provided by the hierarchical structures in 
place, like land use plans or development ordinances. However, the choice for 
the governance structures is not a choice from an unlimited number of 
alternatives. First, this choice is constrained by the public and private rules that 
arrange land exchange. But also, the actions with regard to land acquisition are 
influenced by and embedded in the relationship with the initial landowner, past 
experiences (e.g. with the use of compulsory purchase), conventions and so on, 
which in their turn are embedded in social structures. Therefore, transaction 
costs cannot be voluntarily optimised or reduced freely, but are dependent on 
and influenced by institutions at different levels. I come back to this in section 
7.2 and chapter 8. 
2 Land use or zoning plan 
Houston is the city without a plan, and therefore, there were no transaction 
costs involved in making a land use or zoning plan. There are obviously costs 
involved in making the city's development ordinance, and other land use related 
ordinances. For instance, all the lobbying, public consultation, and referenda in 
1948, 1962 and 1993 - and before and after - have brought about many costs. 
However, these costs are dispersed among the thousands of developments that 
are carried out in the city. Something similar can be said about the local plan in 
England, which was made not only for Wapping Wharf but for the whole city. 
The planning briefs from 1995 and 1998 were more closely related to the 
development, since these were specific for to the whole Harbourside area. The 
local plan - if one takes into account that it is an indicative plan - was however a 
costly plan preceded by a lengthy process, and its validity is limited. The plan 
was finished in 1997, after a five year long process of discussions and public 
consultation, and it planned four years ahead until 2001. 
In the Dutch case, the land use plan had a much more prominent position 
than in the other two cases, since the new plan was made for the site and 
because it is legally binding. The plan procedure itself was a standard 
administrative procedure that took one year. The constraints for this procedure 
are set by the meso level institutions, especially the planning act (WRO). In this 
process, there are certain formalised moments for public consultation. There 
were not many objections, and that allowed the process to run relatively 
smoothly in that stage. The preparation of the formal plan before the procedure 
was complex and time-consuming. It took up to five years before it was ready to 
enter the bestemmingsplan procedure and to be formally agreed in the 
development agreement. This was a process that was intimately linked with 
drawing up and negotiating the intention and the development agreement. One 
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of the factors behind the length of the process was the close involvement of the 
municipality in the process from the very beginning. One consequence was that 
the municipality got involved in details and issues (e.g. the choice of the 
architect) that in many other countries are considered to be the task of the 
developer. This fits within a planning culture in which the state traditionally -
since the beginning of the twentieth century - plays a central role (see section 
7.2). The other way in which the involvement of the municipality affected the 
length of the process is the time that had to be spent to build and maintain a 
good relationship, to discuss and to negotiate the plans, which fits within the 
Dutch corporatist tradition (see also 7.2). The city used hierarchical governance 
structures (i.e. its power to change and determine the land use plan) as a stick 
in order to strengthen its control over the development. This was mainly 
directed to steer the content of the plans and to reduce the municipality's own 
financial involvement, and not so much to steer the length of the development 
process or to control the total project costs. This is related to the attitude of the 
Dutch municipalities towards transaction costs in general. The difference in 
attitude of local authorities (in the three countries) towards transaction costs is 
also something which is embedded in a planning and development culture, and 
will also be discussed in section 7.2 and chapter 8. 
3 Agreement 
Once again there were no agreements signed between the developer and the 
city of Houston: this rarely occurs at the project level, except for some major 
downtown redevelopments. In England, section 106 agreements are statutory 
agreements that are used to deal with neighbourhood facilities in order to 
mitigate the possible damage done by the development to the surroundings. 
One of the obligations in the Bristol case was the improvement of a junction 
nearby, and another the construction of combined cycle and foot path. It took 
around 7 months before the agreement was signed and permission granted. 
Compared to the Dutch case this is a very short process, since there it took 
approximately five years from the first discussion till the final development 
agreement. It must be noted that while these processes were going on, the 
schemes were being drawn up and the calculations made. One of the main 
reasons for this relatively long span in Nijmegen was the discussions in the 
early stages of the project. Trust was an important mechanism that kept the 
developer and the city together, but at the same time it seemed to have 
prevented both parties from doing business, since that could have harmed the 
relationship. 
The agreements in both Bristol and Nijmegen can be seen (see also 
chapter 2) as relational governance structures under the shadow of hierarchy. 
For both cases, the local authority could ultimately withhold permission for the 
development in the case of non-compliance. However, this similarity does not 
mean that the transaction costs are the same. In the Dutch case many costs 
that were made for the preparation were shared more equally since all elements 
are mutually agreed upon. In Bristol, most of the costs are borne by the local 
authority sine it is the city council that wants the developer to perform certain 
tasks. However, as we will see in the next chapter, in both England and the 
Netherlands there are ways of transferring the costs to the developer. 
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4 Planning penmission 
The planning permission stage in the Netherlands is a formalised, technical and 
hierarchical stage in which there is very little room for politics. It is an 
administrative exercise in which the plans are reviewed for compliance with all 
the appropriate conditions (like e.g. the bestemmingsplan). The same counts for 
Houston, where the plans for Montebello were reviewed for accordance with the 
building code, health codes, water, waste water et cetera. 
The situation in Bristol was quite different, because after the planning 
application was submitted, the development process entered a very political 
stage, due to the central location of the site and the nature of English 
development control (something I will come back to in the next section). In 
England there are targets; applications should be determined within 8 or 13 
weeks. In the case of Wapping Wharf this target was 13 weeks. The review of 
the application for Wapping Wharf however took 7 months (together with the 
section 106 agreement). Within these 7 months - in the absence of a legally 
binding plan - all decisions with regard to the appropriate development (i.e. the 
most important land use decisions) had to be made. However, because this is 
still rather short, the city postponed many detailed decisions to later stages, by 
imposing conditions that require the submission of more detailed proposals later 
in the development process. 
If we look at the role of participation in the planning permission stage, we 
see an especially interesting example in Wapping Wharf. As it is often said (see 
e.g. Webster 2005 p. 53-54), public participation can raise the transaction costs 
in the development process significantly. In the Dutch case, some months were 
spent (some would say lost) in redesigning the plan by reducing the volume and 
adding a parking garage. However, when the public opinion is not taken 
seriously, something which seemed to have happened at Wapping Wharf, the 
consequences for the transaction costs can be even worse. The plan was 
rejected and had to be redrawn and recalculated, communicated with the 
neighbourhood and resubmitted. It is remarkable that the developer let this 
happen because Wapping Wharf has a prominent and eye-catching position in 
the city, combined with an architecture that is at odds with traditional English 
(Georgian) architecture. In contrast, the Marialaan is situated in an area that is 
in need of regeneration, and spatial and financial injections. In addition, it has a 
rather average architecture97, which would make it less controversial. In the 
end, in neither of the cases, were there third party appeals that could have 
increased the costs even further. 
7.2 Transaction costs entangled in structures 
As we saw in chapters 4, 5 and 6, there are transaction costs that are made 
because of requirements imposed from higher tiers of government, like certain 
procedures that need to be followed or instruments that can and / or have to be 
used. In addition, the situation at the site, like land ownership, has a strong 
In another research (Buitelaar et al. 2006), we also saw a Dutch example of a project - the 
Hofpoort - in the city of Amhem which showed that neglecting the opinion of the public can 
cause serious delays and increases in transaction costs. 
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influence on the way the development process is carried out and how that 
affects transaction costs. This means that we can not for a particular project 
change and create governance structures, and thereby reduce transaction 
costs, as we would like. Institutions are path dependent and situated in an 
institutional framework, as discussed in chapter 2. For actors at the level of 
location development, it is difficult to change structures at higher levels, like the 
national, regional and sometimes even the municipal level. 
Despite those constraints, institutions (at the micro level) are social 
constructions, with room for agents to design them. Many of the transaction 
costs are the result of the way the user rights regimes are constructed and used 
at the site level. Why did it take so long before the city of Nijmegen and the 
developer reached a decision? Why did the Bristol City Council impose so many 
conditions? Why was the city of Houston so passive with regard to Montebello? 
In this light the assumptions I made in table 7.1 and 3.2 too little acknowledge 
institutions as social constructions. As said before, the transaction costs are not 
caused by for instance the rules for a procedure or public consultation, but also 
by the way these are mainly used. Personal characteristics are important for the 
way these institutions are used. The developer in the English case, for instance, 
emphasised the importance of the changes in staff both on the side of the 
developer and the city of Bristol. This decreased the 'collective memory' and 
increased transaction costs. Another example is the importance of Georgio 
Borlenghi, the director of the developer in the Houston case: he led the project 
through all the stages. In other words, agents can make a difference. 
However, many of the decisions with regard to the developments do not 
stand on their own and are often not the result of fluid and transient behaviour, 
but are embedded in social structures and cultural settings, which are 
reproduced (or challenged) by those actions. Transaction cost economics 
assumes that agents are aware (within the limits of bounded rationality) of the 
transaction costs they bear, and as a result of that, search for the governance 
structures that economise most on transaction costs. But this research 
demonstrates (see also 8.3) that there are different degrees of transaction cost 
awareness. More general, transaction cost economics takes very little account 
of the institutional context; it literally regards it is "as a given" (Williamson 1996 
p. 5). The cases have shown that many differences in the way user rights 
regimes are created and used, and the transaction costs that are related to that, 
are strongly intertwined with the institutional context - in this case the macro 
institutions - in which they are situated98. 
Based on the findings from chapter 4, 5 and 6, the comparison in section 
7.1, and additional literature, I have identified four (interrelated) dimensions of 
the macro level that I will briefly describe here, and that will be elaborated in 
more detail in the next chapter. The (spatial) level at which an institution is 
analysed depends on its relevance and is therefore not necessarily the same for 
all cases. For instance, in the case of Houston, planning practice will often be 
placed in the context of Houston's urban regime, while in the case of the 
Netherlands, and especially England, the national context provides many leads 
Once again, the word 'context' (or 'environment') might suggest that these institutions are 
external to the site and influence / structure the actions in the project exogenously The duality 
of structure is explicitly acknowledged here, without entirely conflating both 
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for explanation. In the case of the US - a federal state - local autonomy and 
diversity is greater, which makes the specific urban regime a relevant context. 
England and the Netherlands are nation-states, which makes the urban regime 
not always the only appropriate level of analysis (Wood 2004). 
1 The quest for control over development 
The first category deals with the quest for control (Van Gunsteren 1976). 
Planning is - beside other functions - an instrument of control (Friedmann 
2003). However, the way in which and the extent to which countries, regions 
and localities exercise control varies between them. 
If there is only one party that wants to control, there will not be any 
conflicting interest and hence the transaction costs will be relatively low. 
Obviously a developer wants to increase his control over a development as 
much as possible, in order to reduce risk and uncertainty, so as to increase his 
returns on investment. In many cases governments also have a desire to 
control development. The directive role of the city of Nijmegen fits within the 
Dutch planning culture. This role, and also the level of detail in which agencies 
want to exercise it, have had their consequences for the transaction costs at the 
Marialaan, but also in many other cases. Because of the involvement of the 
municipality, many meetings were held between it and the developer, on the 
choice of the architect, the design, materials and so on. The situation is entirely 
different in Houston where the local government stays at a distance. A few 
meetings were held in which a local officer explained what the requirements of 
the city were and nothing more. Therefore, specific attention has to be given to 
the wish to control of local governments, and how that bears on transaction 
costs. 
2 Relationship public and private sector 
What we have also seen in the cases, as an important factor behind the 
transaction costs and their incidence, is the relationship between the local 
authority and the developer, or in more general terms, the links between the 
public and the private sector. 
In the Dutch case, these links were close: the site was developed jointly. 
In Houston, this was rather the opposite, since the development was solely 
carried out by the developer, and the city was only involved as the enforcer of 
its own code of ordinances. In Bristol, the city takes an intermediary position. 
These positions are not exclusively and specifically related to these cases, but 
reflect a more general pattern in each country. This affects transaction costs". 
Dimension one and two - i.e. the quest for control and the relationship between public and 
private - have in similar forms been the subject of compensons between planning cultures ( see 
e.g. Sanyal 2005). Planning cultures can be defined as: "[...] the collective ethos and dominant 
attitudes of planners regarding the appropriate role of the state, market forces, and civil society 
in influencing social outcomes" (Sanyal 2005 p. XXI). But also urban regime research (see e.g. 
Kantor, Savitch & Vicari Haddock 1997) makes comparisons that focus on the power balance in 
coalitions between the public and the private sector. The relation between these kinds of 
research and transaction costs will be made in the next chapter. 
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3 Attitudes towards transaction costs 
A more specific, transaction-cost related, element of the relationship between 
public and private, is the attitude towards (the incidence of) transaction costs. 
There are different perceptions and attitudes towards transaction costs and how 
to reduce them. Transaction cost economics implicitly assumes actors who 
strive to reduce transaction costs. But possibly one of the reasons for the 
occurrence and size of transaction costs, is transaction cost awareness, or a 
lack thereof. Looking at the cases, there seem to be different degrees of 
awareness. Where the cases also differ is the way local governments think and 
deal with the transaction costs borne by private developers. Efficiency and 
customer service play a bigger role in Houston than in the city of Nijmegen. The 
three cities and the three countries show differences in their attitude towards 
and treatment of transaction costs (see chapter 8). 
4 Legal styles: flexibility, certainty and accountability 
The last element of the institutional context that gets attention in the next 
chapter is the legal style (see also Newman & Thomley 1996; Booth 1996), 
which is closely related to the meso level institutions - public and private law 
rules with regard to land use and exchange - as I defined it in chapter 3 and 
discussed it in the subsequent case chapters. 
The legal style in the case studies largely follows from the national legal 
styles. This has a consequence for transaction costs. In Houston, legal certainty 
is very high, since all the rules are known in advance and are the same for 
nearly every location. The English case is the opposite, since there are no 
legally binding conditions that are known in advance. In the Netherlands, there 
is more legal certainly than in England, but less than in Houston. The situation 
for accountability is different. Because the city of Houston is involved in specific 
land use decisions only to a limited extent, it cannot account for the decisions 
made about the kind of use to which the land is put. Accountability to third 
parties is decentralised to the landowners. The Dutch municipalities are at the 
other extreme, whereas the English cites are once again somewhere in 
between. This has a major effect not only on the size but also on the way 
transaction costs are distributed. The legal style, together with the other three 
categories, in relation to transaction costs will be elaborated in more detail in 
the next chapter. 
108 
8 
Transaction costs and the institutional context 
Chapter 7 concluded with four dimensions of the social structure that might best 
explain the emergence, size and distribution of transaction costs as have been 
observed in the three case studies. These dimensions are elaborated in this 
chapter. Although they are analytically distinguished, they are in practice closely 
intertwined. In their turn they are related to and embedded in other structural 
levels, like doctrines about the role of the state in general, or other deeply 
rooted social values. However, it goes too far to analyse all of this 
systematically. When necessary and appropriate, reference will be made to 
those other elements. The analysis in this chapter is based on findings from the 
three case studies, additional empirical research and literature in the planning 
field and related areas. 
B.1 The quest for control over development 
There is a clear link between the level of control which public authorities want to 
exercise and the transaction costs that result from that. In the Houston case, the 
city restricted itself to enforcing its own ordinances, whereas the city of 
Nijmegen was actively involved in the development from the very first 
beginning, seeking for as much control over the final output as possible. This 
approach requires much more input from the local bureaucracy. In addition, it 
significantly extends the development process, since more negotiation and 
deliberation between the developer and the local authority is needed. 
The emphasis on control is related to the unit of analysis: the transaction. 
In chapter 2, I defined - following John Commons - the transaction as a legal 
action to increase (or take) control over property rights. What this research 
showed is that not every authority has the same ambition or desire to control. It 
is not only the general wish to control, but also the level of detail in which local 
authorities want to control that might differ between government agencies. 
Therefore, the quest for control has been divided into two dimensions: the wish 
to control and the level of detail at which control is exercised (see figure 8.1 ). 
If we look at figure 8.1, the Dutch case could be situated somewhere 
around the letter A, because the city wanted to be in control, and wanted to be 
in control at a high level of detail. In the Houstonian case, the city quite clearly 
takes more distance and has less desire to regulate land use. However, when it 
does want to take control, like in floodplain management or subdivision reviews, 
it does it at a similar level of detail as the city of Nijmegen did at the Marialaan. 
It can therefore be placed around C. Wapping Wharf has a more intermediary 
position. The wish to control is higher than in Houston. But because of the 
English reactionary, instead of anticipatory100, development control system, it is 
lower than in the Dutch case. The level of detail, however, is quite similar (i.e. 
high) as that in the other situations (see e.g. Allmendinger & Ball 2006). 
Therefore, it must be positioned somewhere between A and C. It must be noted 
Despite the changes that have been made, since the adoption of the Planning and 
Compensation Act 1991, and the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004, to make it a 
more plan-led system. 
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that this is purely an analytical and indicative distinction that is not applicable 
one-to-one. 
Figure 8.1: The quest for control 
High 
Much 
Level of detail low 
The wish to 
control 
Little 
A 
C 
Β 
D 
The position of each case in the matrix is to some extent representative for its 
country. There seems to be a greater quest for control over spatial development 
in the Netherlands than in England and Houston. The qualification of Nadin et al 
(1997) of the nature of planning traditions illustrates this nicely. They argue that 
the Dutch system is associated with a comprehensive integrated approach. 
Paludi argues that the wish to create order in the Dutch landscape is an 
important feature of the planning culture (Paludi & Van Der Valk 1994; Paludi 
2005). Paludi (2005) argues that the Netherlands has a "soft spot for planning." 
A nice illustration of this related to transaction costs is given by Hajer, Sijmons 
& Feddes (2006), who say that they know no other country that spends 
hundreds of millions of Euros on stimulating 'innovative land use' and 'transition 
management'. But it needs to be said that the wish to control is not the same as 
having control, since the amount of control exercised has come under pressure 
lately due to factors as increased competition in planning, globalisation, shifts 
within the public sector and so on (Hajer, Sijmons & Feddes 2006). 
Houston, as mentioned before, clearly does not have such a planning 
culture. There is a limited wish to control development. The city sees itself 
primarily as a facilitator, catalyst and enabler of growth and development rather 
than an actor that wants to steer development in a certain direction. Recently 
there have been several initiatives by the city to initiate development (like a tax 
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increment reinvestment zone). In addition, there are the general and well-known 
ways of facilitating development, like the development of roads, water supply 
and wastewater treatment plants in advance of new developments. There are 
obviously restrictions on land use, like subdivision and building regulations, but 
they are not location-specific, like in the case of land use plans and zoning, and 
hence do not have discriminatory effects. They are general and relate to every 
development on every location. Houston does not plan ahead in terms of 
strategic and land use plans, it hardly develops land itself like Dutch 
municipalities do and it hardly gets involved in making sure that incompatible 
land use are not located next to each other. 
This latter element has been the key feature of the English system for a 
long time. Nadin et al (1997) qualify the English planning tradition as one of 
'land use management', meaning that government intervention does not go 
further than keeping incompatible land uses, like housing and heavy industry, 
apart. This was for instance clearly stated in the 1985 white paper Lifting the 
burden, which said that councils should confine themselves to preventing 
negative externalities and not get involved in determining which design is 
acceptable. It was the development industry's role to come up with the 
initiatives. One result is that transaction costs that are made by the local 
government occur at a different stage in the Netherlands than in England. In 
Holland, planning is more forward-looking than in England. This leads to more 
transaction costs being made in earlier stages of the process of a Dutch 
development scheme. 
Related to this is the difference in the way local authorities are involved 
in land development. Because of their ambition to control, Dutch local 
authorities are active land developers. Therefore, compulsory purchase in the 
Netherlands is used more often than in England101. In 1999, the UK Urban Task 
Force stated that ownership constraints were a major impediment to urban 
regeneration (Cullingworth & Nadin 2006). One of its observations was that 
there was a widespread reluctance among local authorities to use compulsory 
purchase because of the bureaucratic nature of the process, the complexity of 
its legal procedures, the lack of necessary skills, and the inadequacy of 
compensation arrangements (Adams et al. 2002). The lack of skills is the result 
of more market-oriented approaches that developed in the eighties when 
compulsory purchase fell into disuse. In the fifties and sixties it was widely used. 
This shows that practices and cultural elements are never static. This 
also counts for the future. If the newly defined ambitions in the new planning act 
and the planning policy statements are implemented at the local level, forward 
planning, creating sustainable communities, and a more active involvement in 
the implementation of plans will get a more prominent role in England. Recently 
the modifier 'spatial' (instead of town and country, or land use) has become 
more fashionable in England to indicate a shift towards a more comprehensive, 
integrated and proactive approach to planning which goes beyond adjusting and 
regulating land uses102. Especially since the Labour government came to power 
A survey among 294 local planning authorities showed that 243 of them did not use 
compulsory purchase between mid-1992 and mid-1992 (Adams et al. 2001). 
102
 To give an example, the University of the West of England (in Bristol) has set up a master's 
course in spatial planning financed by the ODPM, which is based for a large part on ideas on 
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m 1997, the need was felt that government agencies become more active and 
ambitious with regard to spatial development, to deliver goals like sustamability, 
economic growth (especially in the north of England and the Midlands) and an 
increased housing production Planning Policy Statement 1 now says that 
planning "goes beyond traditional land use planning to bring together and 
integrate policies for the development and use of land with other policies and 
programmes which influence the nature of places and how they function " The 
government has emphasised the importance of a good design for creating 
sustainable communities "This relates to the design of, and matenals used in, 
individual buildings as well as the overall pattern of development, including 
building densities, car parking and street layouts " (Audit Commission 2006b ρ 
11 ) One could say that the ambition to control spatial development is 
increasing The report by the Audit Commission, referred to earlier, clearly links 
transaction costs and the quest for control, as the title of the report indicates 
The planning system matching expectations and capacity (Audit Commission 
2006b) The expectations, and the quest for control, are nsing while the capacity 
both qualitatively as well as quantitatively is lagging There are too few people 
with the appropnate skills to fill the new role More transaction costs need to be 
made to achieve the new ambitions (but also to achieve old ambitions)103 If we 
compare the number of people working in 'planning' in the Netherlands to the 
number in some English cities we see a big difference in the number of officers 
(see Appendix B), both absolute and related to the number of inhabitants The 
Audit Commission therefore suggests making more use of pnvate consultants, 
for work for which local authonties have insufficient expertise and for work for 
which it has not enough capacity Consultancy companies are mainly employed 
by the development industry and not so much by the public sector, although this 
seems to be changing (Audit Commission 2006b ρ 35-36) The use of 
consultants by municipalities in the Netherlands is much more widespread 
(Askew & Hartogs 2005) In England, more transaction costs (ι e more staff) 
will have to be made to meet the goals and the expectations 
This poses not only senous challenges in quantitative terms -1 e the 
transaction costs - but also for the planning culture People working in 
development control are used to imposing conditions and separating land uses 
But "As councils move away from narrow land use planning, planners 
increasingly interact with other professionals in order to plan for the 
interrelationships that happen in mixed communities This poses challenges for 
established planners " (Audit Commission 2006b) People need to be trained 
more in land policy (e g compulsory purchase and valuation), design skills and 
communicative skills Local planning authonties will also have to overcome the 
rather negative image that has evolved A job in development control is 
generally valued lower than one in the pnvate sector (see also Allmendinger & 
Ball 2006) One reason is people's perception of the planning system "The 
planning system in local government has suffered from many years of being 
portrayed as the problem rather than the solution "(Burning & Glasson 2004) 
planning, and especially integration, that have emerged in countries in continental Europe like 
the Netherlands 
103
 At the moment of wntmg, there were 18 000 planning positions in England, of which 4000 
were vacant (interview Eamon Mythen) 
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8.2 Relationship public and private sector 
Before the development of the Marialaan entered the formal bestemmingsplan 
procedure, numerous meetings were held, both between municipal departments 
and between the municipality and the developer. It took five years before an 
agreement was reached and the plans were made definite. Although this might 
seem exceptionally long for outsiders, it is fairly common in the Netherlands that 
public and private parties incur high transaction costs on deliberation and 
negotiation. Transaction costs are subordinate to this institutionalised practice in 
which building trust is essential. Even the municipality of Breda, a city with an 
explicit business-like attitude, admits that it has sometimes difficulty refraining 
from open and non-committal discussions with developers in the early stages of 
the development process, which give rise to (in their view) unnecessary 
transaction costs. Trust can reduce transaction costs, but unconditional trust 
can lead to uncertainties and a lack of progress (Van Ark 2005), and hence 
more transaction costs, since no need is felt to confirm decisions by formalising 
them. At the Marialaan, this was also the case for it took several years before 
the municipality and the developer decided that the process needed to 
accelerate and that agreements had to be formalised. 
This Dutch practice in which private parties and public authorities closely 
cooperate with each other is not limited to spatial planning, but is common in 
many areas of government regulation. Social security issues have (until 
recently) been solved by close co-operation between the government, 
employers' associations and labour associations. This has become famous as 
the Dutch miracle, as opposed to the Dutch disease, which was used to qualify 
the severe problems Holland had with social-economic issues in the seventies. 
The collaborative or corporatist model is generally referred to as the 
Poldermodel. It must be noted that there has been criticism lately, which led to a 
gradual decline of the confidence in this model. 
In England there is a much more distant and less intimate relationship in 
general between public and private parties. Pre-application meetings - also 
called front-loading - between local officers and developers is an emerging 
phenomenon, but is still by no means comparable to the way Dutch 
municipalities and developers co-operate before the submission of the planning 
application. Nor are the planning agreements - following section 106 of the 
Town and Country Planning Act 1990 - similar to the development and intention 
agreement which the city of Nijmegen and the developer signed. A planning 
agreement contains actions that the developer has to take to compensate the 
community for the development. It can be a unilateral undertaking, meaning that 
the developer can impose planning obligations on himself to enhance his 
chances for getting a planning permission. In the other situation, when both the 
local planning authority and the developer sign the 'agreement', it is not 
voluntarily entered into. To use Scharpf s words, it is "bargaining under the 
shadow of law" (Scharpf 1997). The agreements hardly ever contain obligations 
for the local authority, in contrast to many of the agreements Dutch 
municipalities sign. Intimacy between developers and local authorities can have 
positive effects for transaction costs, for trust can prevent deadlocks, but it can 
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also raise transaction costs, by removing an incentive to proceed quickly. The 
latter is often the case in the Netherlands. 
The relationship in Houston between the city of Houston and the 
business elite is very close. Moreover, it is one of the key features and forces 
behind Houston's economic development (Feagin 1988). With regard to spatial 
development, the city plays an important role. One of the major catalysts for 
urban development is infrastructure. Subsidising and developing major 
infrastructure projects, like roads, light rail, the extension of the airport and 
developments in the maritime port have been the main pillars of the city 
development strategy to facilitate urban development and economic growth 
(see also Neuman 2003b). However, when it comes to development control -
i.e. the 'nitty gritty' of planning practice - the city refrains from getting involved 
too much in decisions about how the land should be used. The municipality 
merely acts as an enforcer of the Code of Ordinances. This role limits the 
involvement of the city of Houston and the transaction costs it bears. 
8.3 Attitudes towards transaction costs 
The attitudes towards transaction costs, especially from public agencies, are a 
particular aspect of the relationship between the public and the private sector. 
We look at it in more detail for each country separately. 
Netherlands 
From the case studies, general observations in the three countries and 
secondary literature (e.g. Nadin et al. 1997; Sanyal 2005), we could conclude 
that Dutch local authorities are more actively involved in the development 
process than their equivalents in the other two countries. This observation is 
also supported if we look at the number of people involved in planning (see 
Appendix B). 
This big involvement has consequences for the transaction costs that are 
directly related to a project. This makes it interesting to look at this in more 
detail. To do this, I have looked at several cities (particularly Nijmegen, Breda 
and Den Haag). How do these municipalities deal with transaction costs, how 
do they keep them under control and how do they cover their expenses? This 
question cannot be answered in general terms, since there are very few 
national and general rules for transaction costs. There are similarities, but also 
many differences, in the way local authorities deal with them. 
In chapter 4, it was mentioned that Dutch municipalities, when drawing 
up a land servicing account, include a certain percentage of the costs of 
(physically) preparing the land for housing to cover their own administrative 
costs. This norm is called VTA, - although there are many equivalents - which 
stands for preparation, supervision and administration. This has become 
common practice for land development in general. Initially, this norm was set by 
the national government in the sixties and seventies, between 19 and 22 
percent104. The assumption was that 12-15 percent is needed for all the costs 
The reason for the national government to do that was because It subsidized land for social 
housing. It wanted to keep the land prices under control. The more land municipalities gave out 
for social housing, the more subsidies they would get from the national government. To keep 
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related to the land servicing works (but not the production costs of the works 
themselves) and that 7 percent is needed for related research, like 
investigations of soil contamination. Many municipalities have used this (and 
some still do) for many decades. However, it is now done to cover other costs 
as well, like the costs of financial experts, project managers, municipal 
designers etcetera (see chapter 4 for a more complete overview for the city of 
Nijmegen). It must be noted however that it varies significantly between 
municipalities what activities are included in the VTA costs. Nijmegen and 
Breda for instance include every activity related to the project, up to approval of 
the bestemmingsplan by the province. Many other municipalities do not include 
the formal procedures (see e.g. Van Hoek 2004). 
These VTA percentages however often do not necessarily reflect the real 
costs that will be or have been made. First, they are an estimation of the costs. 
During the process the financial experts, based on information from planning & 
control, can monitor whether the reservation must be adjusted. In practice, 
however, hardly any municipality calculates whether the estimation was correct; 
it is found too complex and costly. In addition, VTA is a percentage of the land 
servicing works, while many of the activities that are regarded as part of the 
VTA, like project management, urban design and even strategic spatial policy, 
have very little to do with these works. Another difficulty is that VTA is a 
percentage of the costs of the physical preparation of site. In a project with a lot 
of engineering works (like bridges, roads and railways) and high costs related to 
that, the VTA amount, which is based on a percentage of those costs, could be 
low but the absolute process costs can be quite high. 
From the literature (Nijland 2005; Van Hoek 2004) and the interviewees 
we can see an increase in the VTA costs. Many local authorities now use a 
percentage that is above 22% (depending on the type of project), usually 
somewhere between 25-30%. There are various explanations why these costs 
have risen. First, projects have become more complex, for many reasons. One 
is that local authorities do not have the land monopoly they used to have. 
Developers have acquired much land. In addition, in 1995 the housing 
associations were cut loose from national subsidies which forced them to 
become more active developers to cover the costs of letting social houses. 
These two developments have led to a 'busier' land market, which forced 
municipalities to co-operate more with other actors (for instance in public-private 
partnerships). This increases the transaction costs. There is also an increase in 
the number of rules and regulations, especially in the environmental field, not 
the least due to an increase of European rules. The last important element is 
the gradual shift from greenfield development to the redevelopment of city 
centres, and pre- and early post-war housing areas. Redevelopment projects 
are generally more complex and transaction-cost consuming than greenfield 
sites. 
A second reason for the increased VTA costs is the increase in number 
of activities that are included in it and an increase in the wages of the various 
departments that bear on the individual land servicing accounts. There are two 
reasons. Project-based working has been introduced in many municipalities, 
the land prices, and therewith the subsidies under control, the national government made norms 
for each cost item, so also for VTA. 
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which means the project managers and the land development department have 
become principals and the other departments have become agents. In addition, 
municipalities and their departments have to deal with budget cutbacks, so they 
try to cover as much expenditure as possible by land development projects. In 
Nijmegen, the (internal) costs of a man hour have been increased by nearly 10 
percent each year the last couple of years, leading to the situation that the costs 
of internal labour are no longer significantly lower than those of external 
consultants. The city of Breda argues that the internal costs of labour in some 
departments (like geo-information) are even higher than externally. One reason 
is that overheads are being charged for. It depends on the project managers 
and politically on the municipal councils, to what extent this is allowed. A major 
disadvantage of this practice is that the VTA could reduce the amount of money 
available for other, more substantial issues in urban development projects. 
The third reason is that the transaction costs have been made more 
explicit and transparent in some cities, because of the project-based way of 
working. Also, due to the earlier mentioned cutbacks, departments try to cover 
as many of their departmental costs -overheads as well - by land development. 
As a result, it has become more clear and explicit what urban development 
costs. The VTAs that are now often charged are in line with a research that was 
carried out in 1981 by a consultant commissioned by the Ministry for spatial 
planning (VROM). This calculated that the percentage instead of the generally 
used 19 and 22 percent should be around 37 percent for small (fewer than 500 
units) and 30 percent for bigger projects105. 
Dutch municipalities are in general not very good at controlling the (rise of the) 
transaction costs. The design and the financial side are often not well 
connected (Vrom-Raad 2004). One way of dealing with the rise in transaction 
costs is by reserving a bigger percentage (25-30%) than before (19-22%) on the 
land servicing account. The city of Breda tries to avoid that, because increasing 
the percentage does not reduce the costs, it simply acknowledges higher costs. 
Breda sticks to the 22% that is used since sixties and seventies and tries the 
keep the real VTA costs within that percentage. When there are unanticipated 
costs, the budget is sometimes increased - if the rise in costs in motivated 
properly - but this is not a default mechanism. The development department of 
the city divides the percentage among the various activities (i.e. the 
departments the carry out those activities), based on standard data and 
percentages, which gives an indication of what the various departments can 
spend. Then the departments have to make a proposal about what they can do, 
in how much time and with how much money. This gives the development 
department insight in what to expect, when and for how much. This provides a 
tool to control the costs and the length of the process. However, this requires a 
different attitude, and even a different culture, in public organisations. The city 
of Breda has been working with this approach for around 20 years. It has taken 
many years before people got used to it. One can design new management 
structures but the 'soft infrastructure' (or the informal institutions) need to be in 
place as well. The Hague started this way of working formally a few years ago, 
Interview Gerrit Verkerk 
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but it has not succeeded in implementing and - more important - sticking to it 
entirely106. The Hague is probably no exception. 
In the Netherlands, there can be various ways of recouping the transaction 
costs made by the municipality. When the municipality owns the land and 
develops it, transaction costs can be recouped if the development gain is big 
enough. Currently a new act is prepared in which it will be made easier for local 
authorities to recoup plan costs along the lines of public law (if it does not own 
the land). It could be that this will take away an incentive to speed up the 
process and to keep the costs of the process low. Municipalities could take a 
relaxed attitude, knowing that they can receive a certain sum for their efforts, 
irrespective of these efforts. Developers often need the municipalities to change 
the land use plan, or they need public space for building land. When 
development is carried out by the municipality itself, interest rates provide an 
incentive to make sure that there are no unnecessary delays. 
Beside these practices, there are the fees to recoup the costs of the 
formal development control procedure. Municipalities determine the size of the 
fees107, and the city of Nijmegen proves to be quite successful in optimising its 
benefits from them, since these are higher than the real costs of processing the 
planning applications (see chapter 4). Until now, there seems to be little 
resistance from the development industry against having to pay municipalities 
for transaction costs over which they - the developers - have no control. As 
long as there are profits in abundance, developers accept the recovery of 
transaction costs by municipalities. Moreover, all municipalities do it, so there is 
no point in shopping around. The new land management act - that was 
preparation at the moment of writing- will most likely discipline this practice. 
England 
Unlike the Netherlands, in England the initiatives to manage transaction cost 
come primarily from central government, and are related to development 
control. In addition, England has, as one of the interviewees phrased it, an 
'auditing culture', meaning that performance of local authorities is measured 
and made transparent (i.e. naming and shaming), by the central government. 
One of the major goals of central government with regard to the planning 
system is speeding up the planning process, since it is assumed that this will 
improve the economic competitiveness of the whole country (Audit Commission 
2006b). Speed is seen as the key issue for delivering a higher quality of 
planning services. The time taken to determine planning applications is one of 
the indicators for the Audit Commission108 to assess overall performance of 
local authorities. The audit commission says about Bristol: "The council needs 
What happens is that sometimes the different departments put costs on a project of which 
the project manager is not able to check whether these were necessary and if they were 
actually spent. With clear tasks, assignments and agreements, managing accounts becomes 
easier. 
107
 Although the fees should not compose more than 100% of the real costs. 
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 The Audit Commission is an independent statutory body responsible for assessing and 
reporting on the performance of local authorities. It describes itself as an agency that ensures 
that "[...] public money is spent economically, efficiently, and effectively, to achieve high quality 
local services for the public." 
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to achieve value for money more consistently, and routinely make the link 
between the cost of the service, its performance and public satisfaction." (Audit 
Commission 2006a) On the basis of this assessment local authorities are 
categorized, which affects the amount of funding they get from central 
government. 
The bigger developments, called 'major decisions', are supposed to be 
decided within 13 weeks, while 'minor' and 'other' should have been decided in 
8 weeks. If one looks at the performance of local planning authorities on major 
decisions, we can see - not surprisingly - that the smaller authorities with fewer 
applications perform best109. The top 5 of the ODPM rank decides all its major 
decisions within 13 weeks; but they had no major decisions. Bristol is ranked as 
number 240 (out of total of 362 local planning authorities), with 182 decisions 
made, of which 51% was decided within 13 weeks. This rank is used for 
rewarding local planning authorities that perform according or above the 
standards. The size of the grant - Planning Delivery Grant (PDG) - is 
determined on the basis of the performance rank of the local planning authority 
and its workload110. To give an example for the major decisions again: when a 
local planning authority decides between 60-65 % of its decisions within 13 
weeks, it will get £33,333 if it makes 20 or fewer decisions, £50,000 between 
20-39 decisions, £ 66,667 between 40-99 decisions, and £100,000 for 100 
decisions or more, per year (Odpm 2005b). The other two categories for the 
major decisions are '65-70' and 70+. The 'minor' and 'other" decisions have 
other (higher) percentages, related to different (higher) numbers of decisions to 
meet. 
According to the Audit Commission and the ODPM, these incentive 
structures have led in many cases to councils performing better, like the London 
boroughs and many rural districts, which have streamlined their organizational 
structure and processes. Between 2003 and 2005, 160 local planning 
authorities had improved their performance (Odpm 2005a). In addition, it is 
claimed that the incentives have changed the culture in many local authorities 
towards more performance orientated cultures (Odpm 2005c), especially with 
regard to transaction costs. A positive effect is also that authorities who were 
able to increase their grant have tended to spend it on forward (or strategic) 
planning alongside development control (Odpm 2005a). 
However, the grant has also led to more 'unwanted', or at least 
unplanned, effects111 that give rise to transaction costs. First, there has been a 
rise in the number of refusals of planning permissions (Audit Commission 
2006b); in 2004 there was an increase of 13.7% more than in 2005 (Odpm 
These are data for district councils, London Boroughs, unitary authorities and national park 
authorities. They can be found on the ODPM website: www.odpm.gov.uk 
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 There are not only quantitative criteria with regard to development control (i.e. speed), but 
also quantitative and qualitative data for policy-making as well. 
111
 The ODPM (in an interview) argues that in many cases it is good that applications are 
refused under the pressure of the performance systems. Before, planning officers were 
probably more inclined to process applications that contained very little detail and provided very 
little information. Now they refuse it more easily, which can be seen as an improvement of 
efficiency. 
118 
2005c)112 In addition, the better performing authonties (in terms of decision 
time) have marginally higher refusal rates (Odpm 2004) Most likely as a result 
of the increase in refusals (Arup 2004), there is a growing number of appeals 
received and handled by the Planning Inspectorate, from 2001 till 2005 the 
number increased every year from 16,737 to 23,161 appeals per year, an 
increase of 38% (Planning Inspectorate 2005) Developers often go to an 
appeal if permission is refused Another way to meet the target is to try to 
persuade the developer to withdraw his application if it does not meet the 
requirements There has been a nse in withdrawals of 16 4% between 2003 and 
2004 Notwithstanding the nse in the number of refusals, withdrawals and 
appeals, only few authorities felt that the quality was being compromised by the 
increased speed in development control (Odpm 2005a) 
Yet another practice which has emerged, and which is welcomed by the 
central government, is the use of pre-apphcations The pre-apphcation stage is 
a more informal stage which is not exposed in the performance rankings It is 
used by local authonties to communicate their requirements to the developers 
and make suggestions for change, so that the formal application process runs 
more smoothly It is used by developers to obtain advice and to assess the 
likelihood of getting planning permission and to know the kind of planning 
conditions and obligations that might be imposed Many stakeholders are 
enthusiastic about this new practice, since it can save time and money (ι e 
transaction costs) in later stages Private developers are even willing to pay for 
it, as long as they meet people at the appropnate level to give a nght response 
(Audit Commission 2006b ρ 54-55) 
The Audit Commission itself questions whether the emphasis on speed is 
always correct For the major applications, certainty of the time scale is often 
more important than speed, something which has also been noted before with 
regard to projects in the Netherlands (De Bruijn et al 1996) Due to the increase 
in agencies involved and a growing complexity, a standard performance 
measure for major decisions is less appropnate than for small-scale projects 
(see also Allmendinger & Ball 2006) Nevertheless, the general opinion is that 
development control has become more efficient and absorbs fewer transaction 
costs It should be noted that some of these gams are reduced by some of the 
side effects that have been mentioned 
A major difference with the Netherlands is that the fees of local planning 
authonties are by no means sufficient to cover the costs of running the planning 
system At the moment of wntmg, an accountant's office was carrying out a 
national research to investigate the relationship between the real costs to the 
planning authonties of the planning process, and the fees charged The 
absolute maximum fee at this moment for any kind of residential development is 
£50,000 Since applying for building regulations is separate from development 
control, there is a different and additional fee for building permissions 
As a result of the PDG, the emphasis now put on pre-apphcation 
discussions between developers and local authonties has led to tensions, since 
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 However it remains subject to debate whether the emphasis on speed is responsible for the 
increase in refusals The ODPM is not so sure about this (2005a) But the Audit Commission 
(2006b) held many interviews in which this was repeatedly argued 
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authorities do not want to use the formal determination time for extensive 
discussions and negotiations. For that purpose, central government allows local 
authorities to charge fees for pre-application. This 'front-loading', implies that 
more of the decision-making (and hence transaction costs) takes place in the 
earlier stages of the development process. The size of the fees for pre-
applications is at the discretion of the local planning authority. In a recent report 
by the ODPM, it was noted that, from a sample it held, that moment no local 
authority has charged anything for the pre-application stage (Odpm 2005c). 
This is consistent with what the interviewees told me. 
Houston 
Government regulation is an issue in every country, no matter how (favourably) 
that country compares to others. Nation-wide research on subdivision 
regulations (Seidel 1978; Ben-Joseph 2003) show that in the US also there is 
debate on land use regulations in relation to transaction costs. Ben-Joseph 
says: "With our survey indicating a steady increase over the last 25 years in the 
average time it takes to receive subdivision approval the increase in costs has 
undoubtedly been transferred to the consumer."113 (Ben-Joseph 2003 p. 15) 
Another interesting quotation in the light of transaction costs is that of the Urban 
Land Institute: "American developers of housing must deal with an expanding 
array of regulations at every level of government. Unreasonable regulations on 
development inevitably inflate paperwork required for a project and intensify the 
complexity of data, analysis, and review procedures for both pubic and private 
sector. Ultimately, the delay caused by the regulatory maze produces higher 
cost housing through holding costs, increased expenses due to risk, 
uncertainty, overhead, and inflated cost of labour and materials, and other more 
hidden costs." (Ben-Joseph 2003 p. 17) Both surveys report many delays in the 
approval process. The reasons for delay vary. Almost all public officials point to 
the developers and argue that they provide inadequate information and change 
their plans. However, there are also officials that say that the coordination 
between different agencies and commissions and the inefficient management of 
the approval process can be blamed for the delays. Despite all these criticisms, 
it seems as if development control, in especially Houston, is less costly and 
time-consuming than in English and Dutch cases. 
Houston has much autonomy - compared to the other cases - in 
deciding how to handle transaction costs. Although Houston seems to compare 
favourably in terms of transaction costs (also when looking at Appendix B), 
especially to Dutch cities, there are also complaints about the regulations. For 
that reason, the mayor of Houston installed a taskforce - the mayor's building 
permit task force - to investigate the practice of public reviews of the 
development process. The taskforce reported in 2004 (The Mayor's Building 
Permit Task Force 2004) that although Houston compares well with other cities 
in the US114, in terms of the effectiveness and quality of customer services, it 
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 It should be noted that when a residual pnce model is applied (see e.g. Needham 1992), it is 
not the costs that determine the price. The costs only influence the size and the distribution of 
the margins in the building chain. 
114
 In addition, one of the interviewees noted that companies that develop nationally - like Wall 
Mart - are enthusiastic about the speed of plan review in Houston. 
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should also be noted that there are many process inefficiencies and that the 
city's bureaucracy is complex. 
After this report, a steering committee was appointed with the task of 
implementing the report's proposals. The report contains some interesting 
findings about transaction costs that are caused by the creation and the use of 
the user rights regime. It notes that, although it may sound paradoxical for a city 
that is called the Free Enterprise City (Feagin, 1988), Houston's plan review 
process is "far more extensive" than many other major cities (which contradicts 
one of the central conclusions that Houston compares favourably with other 
cities). Various workshops were held with both suppliers (city officials and staff) 
and users (professionals from Houston's real estate development community) of 
the permitting services. In a survey that was held among the participants, 60 
percent said it was "hard or very hard" to secure the necessary site 
development approvals (like platting, utilities, easements, flood plain and related 
requirements). 52 Percent of them said the plan review process was "hard or 
very hard" compared to other cities. One common factor mentioned in the plan 
review process that leads to inefficiencies, is the communication between plan 
reviewers and applicants. This is especially the case for first time applicants 
who are not familiar with the process and do not exactly know which 
requirements they have to meet and which steps they have to go through. This, 
together with the relatively short time frame for plan reviews (between 45 and 
90 days on average), are factors behind rejections and sometimes 
inefficiencies. 
The validity of this report however, is questionable. As one of the 
interviewees from the City of Houston said: "No attempts have been made to 
make the survey statistically reliable." But what the report at least shows is the 
city's intention to reduce transaction costs, not only for itself but also for the 
applicant. The transaction cost awareness seems to be much higher in 
Houston, than in the English and especially the Dutch cities. Reducing 
transaction costs for developers and inhabitants is explicitly seen as a tool to 
attract investment in the context of territorial competition. There are all sorts of 
initiatives aimed at reducing transaction costs for applicants. Two of them - the 
building permit taskforce and the steering committee - have already been 
mentioned. Another is the Neighbourhood Technical Assistance Center, 
established by the city, which helps and facilitates communities to set up and 
enforce restrictive covenants. In addition, there is the city's Deed Restrictions 
Pro Bono Program, in collaboration with the Houston Bar Association and the 
Houston Volunteer Lawyer's Program (HVLP), to provide free legal assistance 
for low income people who want to create or modify their restrictive covenants. 
The City of Houston is not only looking for ways to cut its own costs, but it also 
and primarily pays attention to how transaction costs might affect development 
and private initiatives. In Houston, the City wants to be competitive on 
transaction costs by providing short 'customer' time. The word customer already 
indicates how it wants to deal with applicants. This orientation on 'customers' 
and the wish to reduce transaction costs for them seems much stronger in 
Houston than in Bristol and Nijmegen. 
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Although projects can have lower transaction costs in Houston, compared to 
Nijmegen and Bristol, it does not mean that the costs of regulating spatial 
development in the city are lower. In the absence of zoning, and often in the 
presence of fear, people decide to enter into restrictive covenants to govern 
neighbourhoods. This development is widespread all around the US (Mckenzie 
2003). In 2006, the US had 286,000 'association-governed communities' that 
include homeowners associations, condominiums, cooperatives and other 
planned communities. These communities comprise 23.1 million housing units 
occupied by 57 million Americans (www.caionline.org). The deed restricted 
neighbourhoods often have far greater levels of micro-regulation (Mckenzie 
2003). There are many websites and discussion forums in the US that are used 
by people to complain about the restrictiveness of some of these community or 
homeowners' associations. However, there is an increasing number of people 
that wants to live in deed restricted estates. When an estate is developed, the 
developer often decides to impose deed restrictions to the plat that run with the 
land. These are mainly designed to prevent negative externalities. In this way, 
each single landowner does not have to enter into bilateral arrangements with 
neighbours to achieve the same result. This joining up in housing associations 
or residential clubs thus reduces transaction costs. Needham (2006b) argues 
that the transaction costs of private law should not be under estimated; in the 
US there ten times more advocates per head of the population than there are in 
the Netherlands. 
Secondly, there are consequences of the fact that the City of Houston is 
not accountable for the decision to develop. When there is an objection from an 
adjacent plot owner, he has to direct his attention and objections to the 
developer directly. This can lead to serious conflicts and even cancellation. An 
interesting example is Near Rice University (the self-declared 'Harvard of the 
South') where a developer called off the development of a high-rise 
condominium development (Houston Chronicle 2005), because of objections by 
the neighbourhood. For that reason, developers are not necessarily against 
transaction costs, if that reduces transaction costs in later stages. 
There are some clear differences in the way municipalities in each country deal 
with transaction costs. In England, central government has introduced 
performance management, planning delivery grants and so on, all initiatives to 
reduce transactions costs. There is not a great deal of variation in the way local 
authorities can manage their performance in terms of transaction costs. This is 
different in the Netherlands and even more so in the US. But what is also 
different is the attitude towards the incidence of transaction costs. What the 
performance measures in England and the Netherlands have in common is the 
quest for reducing transaction costs mainly for the public authorities 
themselves, whereas the city Houston is also looking explicitly at the costs that 
applicants bear as a result of public rules. 
This raises the question to what extent the developer should pay for 
public services, most notably development control. An argument that is used 
quite often is that it is in the interest of the developer that the planning services 
are offered, for that makes development possible. But the developer is often not 
the only one who benefits from the result of the development process. 
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Therefore, in England there is some opposition from the development industry 
against ideas from central government about 'full cost recovery' (Cbi 2005). A 
neighbourhood and even a whole city could benefit from certain 
(re)developments. Local authorities too often have their own particular wishes. 
Development control is not only used to facilitate and enable development 
(which could possibly justify payment by a developer), but also, quite like the 
term indicates, to exercise control over development. So when should 
developers be made accountable for the transaction costs of public planning? It 
is striking that Dutch developers accept the demands that they pay 100% of the 
municipality's development costs. In England also, there are examples of 
developers that prefer to pay some of the transaction costs if that increases 
certainty and reduces risks. Solicitors employed by the local planning authority 
to draw up the section 106 agreements are sometimes paid by the developers 
to keep the process going. 
As we also saw in especially the Houston case, developers sometimes 
willingly accept transaction costs, especially the (interest) costs of a longer 
development process, if they expect that the benefits of waiting - i.e. higher 
house prices - to exceed the costs. Therefore there is ambivalence toward the 
costs of using user rights regimes. They are seen as barriers, inevitabilities and 
sometimes even as welcome all at the same time. 
8.4 Legal styles: flexibility, certainty and accountability 
Every system of development control is different, but there is one major theme 
that runs through all the systems. Each tries to find balance between flexibility 
and certainty in decision making (Allmendinger & Ball 2006). The way the 
balance is established differs in every country. The English system has become 
known as a discretionary system, which means that the plan is indicative and 
not legally binding, and the planning decision is determined on its merits, taking 
into account various 'material considerations'. For the transaction costs related 
to the user rights regime, this means that most are made and borne both by the 
developer and by the municipality in the later stages of the development 
process. The growing importance of pre-application discussions, as a result of 
the Planning Delivery Grants, and the intention to keep the planning policies 
(Local Development Frameworks) more up to date than the development plans 
used to be, should result in 'front-loading' which means that transaction costs of 
development control itself should be reduced and shifted to an earlier stage in 
the process. 
The Netherlands and Houston have a system that is based primarily on 
legal certainty, with an emphasis on codified planning regulations. If an 
application fits within the planning and building requirements, permission has to 
be granted, and if it does not, permission has to be refused. For the 
Netherlands this is at least the situation on paper. In practice, the certainty that 
is provided is not as great as one would expect. There are many possibilities for 
deviating from the plan, and many plans (because of their generally high level of 
detail) are not made ahead, but are put in place or changed when a developer 
or the municipality comes up with a development initiative. This has led in the 
city of Nijmegen to the existence of 600 bestemmingsplannen, most of which 
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are older than the required 10 years115. Therefore, the presumed association 
with the 'rule of law' is characterised as 'the big lie' (Needham 2006a). Although 
the system is not as rigid, or trustworthy, or predictable, as it might seem, the 
way that changes are made to the user rights regime are along the lines of the 
formal-legal procedures. This means that local authorities can deviate from the 
existing regime, but only after the changes have gone through a prescribed 
procedure, with room for third party involvement. This makes it probably more 
transaction-cost consuming than the English system, but also less arbitrary. 
Closely related to the previous point, is the difference in the language 
and the style in which regulations are written the Netherlands and the US on the 
one hand, and England on the other. This is the result of the role of the plan in 
the system. The plan in England is a policy document, while in the US and the 
Netherlands it has the legal status of planning law. In the English case, the 
planning regulations are sometimes written in broad multi-interpretable terms, 
especially in the local plans and local development frameworks, but also in the 
planning conditions and section 106 agreements. In the Netherlands and the 
US, bestemmingsplannen, zoning and development ordinances and building 
permissions are written by lawyers, while in England they are produced by 
policy-makers that often have a planning background. This leads to flexible 
planning guidance, but also to ambiguous messages from local authorities to 
developers. This can be particularly problematic when planning permissions are 
granted. Many planning conditions and obligations that are attached to the 
planning permission are subject to interpretation and discussion, after 
permission has been granted. Research by Adair et al (1998), on private 
investments in land and property, demonstrates the importance of clarity in 
public policies in reducing risk and uncertainties for developers and investors. 
Of the three case studies, the city of Houston provides the most certainty 
for developers. The regulations are relatively stable, generic (i.e. city-wide) and 
not location-specific, and written down in an unambiguous way. The transaction 
costs borne by the developers that are related to the user rights regime are 
therefore relatively low. At the same time, the regime is very permissive, since 
many developments, or land uses, are allowed. The reverse side is that the city 
of Houston is not accountable to third parties, like neighbouring landowners and 
other stakeholders, for incompatible land uses (apart from some exceptions). 
One of the main aims of planning in many developed countries is internalising 
externalities, and related to that, being accountable if two land uses that do not 
fit are located next to each other. To a large extent, the privately set up 
restrictive covenants cover this problem, since these regulate the externality 
issue at the level of the location to which covenant is concerned. But problems 
sometimes arise when conflicts emerge between areas, as demonstrated in the 
previous section by the example of the development project that was withdrawn 
in Rice Village, as a result of an insurmountable conflict with the 
neighbourhood. This leads indirectly to more transaction costs that should also 
be taken into the equation. 
115
 Under the existing act, the plans do not loose their validity if they are not renewed. 
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9 
Planning at what cost? Conclusions and discussion 
Transaction cost theory offers a very interesting vocabulary for investigating 
property development practices. In this study, I have applied transaction cost 
economics - which is usually applied in business studies, organisation studies 
and applied economics - to land use planning and land development. This 
branch of planning and property research is relatively new, and there are very 
few empirical studies. I have suggested some modifications to transaction cost 
economics, based on insights from the original institutional economics, 
economic sociology and sociological institutionalism. The two most important 
modifications concern the assumptions about human behaviour and the 
multiplicity of institutions. Transaction cost economics assumes that agents act 
autonomously, based on an economic rationality, with only one goal: utility 
maximisation. But economists like Veblen drew our attention to irrational 
behaviour, such as what he called 'conspicuous behaviour'. More importantly, 
we have learned that behaviour is not autonomous and unconstrained but is 
embedded and institutionalised. Institutions reveal themselves at many levels 
and in many different forms, with complicated relationships between them. Due 
to this institutional complexity, we cannot explain transaction costs in a 
particular development process, just by referring to the costs produced by the 
governance structures chosen for that process. So this book has posed the 
following question: how are the different institutional levels and transaction 
costs interrelated under different circumstances, and how does this affect the 
existence, size and incidence of transaction costs in the development process? 
In chapter 3, I operationalised governance structures in what I called 
'user rights regimes', which could be seen as the formal rules that restrict and 
define the way land can be used and exchanged in a particular location. This 
user rights regime is mainly created and used during the development process, 
but within the public and private law rules that are set at the meso level. The 
pilot case, literature review and the first experiences with the case studies 
pointed out that in general we can distinguish four stages in the development 
process, in which the user rights regime is either used or created. These stages 
are land exchange, making or changing a land use plan, drawing up an 
agreement about how the land should be used, and finally the planning or 
building permission stage. These four stages can be used to analyse 
development practices. It must be noted that these four are not always present. 
In the Houston case for instance, there was no land use plan and none was 
made. Neither was there an agreement similar to the section 106 agreement in 
the Bristol case or the development agreement in the Nijmegen case. Some of 
these differences can be explained by the differences in institutions at the meso 
level. 
User rights regimes are created within the limits of the formal rules of the 
game. These limits allow choices to be made for a particular development 
process (i.e. the mirco level). Transaction costs are the result of the actions by 
agents within the development process. There is much specificity in the cases 
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that has an influence on transaction costs. An example is the attitude of the 
developer at Wapping Wharf that led to much opposition from the residents, 
which led to a delay. Interfin decided to design its condominiums after the 
example of another project - Villa d'Esté - that was constructed some years 
earlier. And in the Dutch case, there were some problems with the land 
acquisition that caused delays. 
These actions by the agents involved in the development process 
however, are influenced by factors that go beyond the site and the individual 
level. In chapter 7, I identified four key dimensions from, what I have called, the 
macro level that affect the existence, size and incidence of transaction costs, 
namely the quest for control, the relationship between public and private, the 
attitudes towards transaction costs, and the legal style. The four dimensions, 
which have been elaborated in chapter 8, are major discriminating factors 
between the way development is carried out in the three cities and the three 
countries. The insights that are derived from this study offer interesting 
perspectives on transaction cost economics, theoretically, methodologically and 
ontologically. Although the vocabulary of transaction cost theory offers useful 
analytical tools, I deviate from the basic causal relations that the theory makes 
between the central concepts. 
9.1 Applying transaction cost theory to planning and development 
Institutions and transaction costs 
In chapter 2, the relationship between institutions and transaction costs has 
been discussed. One observation is that institutions cannot only reduce 
transaction costs, but increase them also. Governance structures are not only 
used to facilitate exchange, and economise on transaction costs, they are also 
used to exercise power and restrict others, irrespective of the transaction costs 
which that produces. 
Starting with The nature of the firm by Coase (1937), organisations (like 
firms) and institutions are treated as devices that facilitate exchange, by 
reducing transaction costs. If the costs of exchanging through the market 
become too high, the firm becomes an appropriate governance structure. 
However, reducing transaction costs is not the only reason for the existence of 
and changes to institutions. Zoning, planning conditions, planning obligations, 
expropriation et cetera, which are all public law tools, are not only (or maybe 
often not) devised to facilitate exchange, they are primarily used to influence the 
behaviour of others in a direction that is desired by the planning agency that 
sets them up, often irrespective of the transaction costs they cause. 
Related to that, transaction costs are generally seen as costs that are 
made in reaction to external factors (like interdependencies, uncertainty and 
timing) and the internal human features (like opportunism and bounded 
rationality). Actors respond and adapt to these circumstances - i.e. both the 
external factors and the human features - and that leads to transaction costs. 
Following from this, differences in transaction costs can be explained by 
differences in these factors. But this says very little about why and to what end 
human actors want to design governance structures. The wish of an (public) 
agency to have control over the outcome of a development process, and hence 
126 
over the actions of others, seems to be the most important driving force behind 
transaction costs. 
I conclude tentatively from this study that it is the level of control which 
particularly local authorities want to exercise that is the main discriminating 
factor for the difference in transaction costs116. Gaining control is what a 
transaction is about. The level is of control is not static and changes over time. 
In addition, it is relational and dependent on the relative power of other 
agencies. This power-oriented perspective is close to Pearce's view (Pearce 
2005), who criticises transaction cost economics for its premise that institutions 
change towards reducing transaction costs and increasing efficiency. Rather, 
institutions like the example he uses of the English planning system, change as 
a result of a change in the balance of power in society. 
If institutions, organisations and even cities, as it is sometimes argued 
(see e.g. Webster & Lai 2003), always move towards economising on and 
reducing transaction costs, then why is there any diversity between cities, 
institutions and organisations? The problem with transaction cost economics 
and mainstream economics is that it is a-historical (Hodgson 2004). Each city 
and each nation develops its own culture. As we have seen in the previous 
chapter, the three cities can be differently characterised. 
But even if the claim of many transaction cost economists is right, 
namely that institutions change so as to reduce transaction costs, it still does 
not tell us much about how, when and under which circumstances institutions 
change, nor who changes them. Transaction costs are part of a wider range of 
factors, and are not the single one determining factor. 
Remediableness: a difficult criterion 
Williamson's remediableness criterion, which has been adopted by Alexander 
(2001a)117, is applied to choosing between alternative feasible, real-life, 
institutional arrangements by comparing the transaction costs they produce, 
and holding the output and all other circumstances constant. The arrangement 
that produces the given output with the least transaction costs is assumed to be 
most efficient. 
However, what the cases have shown is that although the output at the 
project level might be similar (i.e. housing projects of around 100 units)118, the 
output at the city level might be quite different. There is not much difference in 
the quality of the three projects, however that is measured; that could lead to 
the conclusion that the user rights regime of Montebello in Houston is most 
efficient, because it had the lowest transaction costs. The absence of zoning 
saves costs in the individual housing project, since the building application does 
not need to be subjected to a zoning review. However, the absence of zoning 
reveals itself not only at the site level. There are also transaction costs that are 
dispersed among the landowners within one neighbourhood who enter into 
There does not seem to be a lot of difference (in the case studies) in the way developers 
want to control the outcome. 
117
 In some previous publications (Buitelaar 2003; 2004), I also endorsed it as a promising 
concept. 
118
 It must be said that although the cases have a similar housing program, small locational 
differences can have significant consequences for the transactions, like soil that is 
contaminated or a site that lies (partly) on a floodplain. 
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restrictive covenants with their neighbours to prevent or reduce negative 
externalities. Other costs are the costs that both neighbourhoods and 
developers bear when they argue over or negotiate land uses that are locally 
unwanted. Zoning would make the city of Houston accountable for the land use 
designations and could save costs for the landowners. 
A user rights regime is inevitably connected to higher-level institutions 
(like zoning laws) that have their influence not only on the user rights regime in 
one location but on all the user rights regimes in a city, village or the whole 
country. This means that the outcome of a local user rights regime has to be 
assessed not just at that local level. When we move up the spatial scale, 
towards the city or national level, we see quite different results in each of the 
three cities and countries. The lack of zoning, but more importantly the weakly 
developed planning culture and the strongly developed growth culture in 
Houston, give the city a pro-growth image, in which the City of Houston refrains 
from controlling in detail the actions of landowners, and hence the spatial 
output. The Netherlands is seen as a country which endorses values as 
integration and order (Paludi & Van Der Valk 1994) in its spatial structure, two 
things that are less apparent in Houston and Bristol. One could argue that this 
seemingly costly integrated-comprehensive approach (Nadin et al. 1997) 
produces a higher quality, and hence a different output. But it must be said that 
this is difficult to prove, since not only beauty but also quality is in the eye of the 
beholder. 
Neither the spatial output nor the institutional arrangements stand on 
their own, but are related to other outputs and arrangements (i.e the institutional 
environment) at other levels. This makes an evaluation of remediableness at 
one level, without taking account of other levels, inadequate, at least as a 
methodology for land use planning and land development. 
Another issue of which remediableness, and transaction cost theory in general, 
takes very little notice is the incidence of the transaction costs. Who bears the 
costs and who has power over whom to determine that incidence? What might 
be efficient for one party might be highly inefficient for the other (Keogh & D'arcy 
1999). If we look at the Dutch case, we see that although the municipality bore 
a lot of transaction costs during the process, it has been able to recoup a large 
share from the developer in the form of fees and contributions in the 
development agreement. This was possible because the developer had to rely 
on the co-operation of the city. This means that the municipality does not need 
to be bothered by high transaction costs, because it can rely on its power 
position to recover those costs. In the Netherlands, this seems to be especially 
the case with smaller projects that do not have high political priority and in 
which the municipality does not bear any risks. If the municipality is not actively 
involved in acquiring and developing the land, it does not have the risk of 
interest costs that are caused by delays. Without these costs and with the 
certainty, when municipal co-operation is required to change the user rights 
regime, of being able to recoup the costs it makes during the process, local 
authorities do not seem to be concerned about duration and transaction costs. 
Transaction cost theory assumes an equal drive among stakeholders to 
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economise on transaction costs. This takes too little notice of differences in 
interest and power. 
The ontology of transaction cost economics 
Governance structures, and institutions in general, do not cause transaction 
costs. It is the way in which institutions are created and used that determines 
the transaction costs. This dynamic and constructivist view on institutions is 
important to avoid the pitfall of a deterministic view on institutions. Institutions 
are social constructions, and so are transaction costs. 
This does however not mean that the actor can optimise his choices at 
will. What became clear in the case studies (and Buitelaar et al. 2006), in 
relation to transaction cost theory, is the importance of acknowledging Giddens' 
duality of the structure. Transaction cost theory implicitly assumes that 
governance structures are 'chosen' voluntarily. But this choice is never 
unconstrained. This view ignores the role of structures and it is therefore an 
undersocialised view of human behaviour. We need to take account of what 
Hodgson calls 'cumulative downward causation' (see chapter 2), which comes 
down to the notion that individuals are not rational actors that live only in the 
moment, but are historically and institutionally embedded. Dependencies, 
relations, conventions, rules et cetera have an important influence on the way 
actors behave. Therefore user rights regimes, and institutional arrangements in 
general, are not chosen freely from an unlimited number of alternatives, but are 
created out of a limited range of alternatives. This limits the capacity to 
influence transaction costs. They are embedded in an institutional and relational 
context. In line with Furubotn (1997), I argue that new institutional economists 
should try to disassociate itself more from neo-classical economics and its 
assumptions on rationality. It is important not to overemphasise the role of 
institutions (which is done by methodological collectivists), because human 
behaviour and its results are not dictated by structures. But structures do make 
certain actions and outcomes - like the size and the incidence of transaction 
costs - more likely than others. 
In the field of planning and property, more research should be done on 
how people are related, how they interact and how institutions shape that 
interaction. This should be done on an even more detailed level than is done in 
this study. Especially ethnographic research could help to unravel the informal 
linkages and rules of the game between people. This could complement 
mainstream economic analyses. 
9.2 Transaction costs as dead weight losses or means with a purpose? 
Transaction cost economics, when applied normatively, tends to emphasise that 
transaction costs ought to be reduced, in order to allow exchange to proceed 
more smoothly, which should ultimately lead to a higher level of allocative 
efficiency. The assumption behind this seems to be that transaction costs are 
dead weight losses. But what about the benefits associated with them? 
Sometimes the costs can be high; but the benefits of incurring these costs can 
be high as well (see also Pearce 2005). Below, I discuss two topical issues 
where there is a clear trade-off between the costs and the benefits. 
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Spatial quality / order: control over space has a price 
There are differences in the spatial structure between Nijmegen, Bristol and 
Houston, partly because of a difference in planning style. The Dutch 'integrated-
comprehensive' approach differs from the English 'land use management' (see 
for both labels Nadin et al. 1997), and the Houstonian 'privately led 
development' approach 
The transaction costs associated with the way the Dutch carry out spatial 
planning appear to be high. This is closely related to the ambitions they have for 
space and related to that, the quest for control over space. The wish for rule 
and order seems to justify sometimes immense planning departments (see 
appendix B). Transaction costs are subordinate to concepts like spatial order. 
Currently, both the ambitions and the size of bureaucracy are under pressure. 
The ambitions and the goals are being moderated due to a political neo-liberal 
discourse and an increased importance of private parties on the land market. 
Bureaucracy is under pressure because of the economic depression in the early 
years of the new millennium and the reduction in tax incomes as a result. In 
addition, it has been one of the key issues on the agenda of the Balkenende 
cabinet that came to power in 2002. 
The ambitions in English planning after the Second World War have 
been lower than in Dutch planning, especially during the Thatcher era. Planning 
has long been confined to land use management, or in other words a way of 
planning that tries to do no more than preventing incompatible land uses from 
developing next to each other. However there is an emerging discourse in 
which concepts like forward planning, sustainability, integration, spatial planning 
(instead of land use) are gaining ground. To live up to the expectations that 
have been raised by the adoption of the 2004 Planning and Compulsory 
Purchase Act, the capacity, and hence the transaction costs have to be raised. 
Central government deliberately wants to raise transaction costs, although it 
obviously prefers to use the word capacity, to achieve the ambitions it has put 
forward. 
The costs related to public planning appear to be lower in Houston than 
in the Dutch and English situation, and this perhaps counts for most American 
cities. The kind of public controls which most European countries have are 
absent in most US cities (see also Pearce 2005). But at the same time, there 
are many people that are sceptical about the quality of the American cities and 
villages, which are contemptuously called 'anywhere' or 'nowhere' America. 
Kunstler (2001) cynically and provocatively compares American cities with 
Berlin, that has recovered from the Second World War and is recovering from 
the post-war division, by saying that: "[...] Cleveland, St. Louis, Baltimore, 
Detroit, Buffalo, Hartford, Indianapolis, Nashville, Houston, Birmingham, 
Richmond, Raleigh, Topeka, Des Moines, Scranton, Worcester, Louisville, and 
other cities of the victorious United States, leader of the Free World, look as if 
the enemy bombers flew over them yesterday." (Kunstler 2001 p. 140) 
Due to suburbanisation and edge city developments, cities, city centres 
and city life has come under pressure, something which is clearly visible in 
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Houston as well119 Urban problems seem to be much more profound and 
severe than in Western Europe In the past, the city of Houston hardly 
stimulated spatial and economic development in the core of the city, and 
actively facilitated suburban development including the Galleria area (the area 
surrounding Montebello), Houston's famous edge city (Garreau 1988) The city 
centre has become an area where hardly anybody lives, with very few cultural, 
retail and other facilities, and which is dominated by offices and parking lots 
This makes it a surreal and spooky place to be at night The situation is 
probably even worse in the fringe that surrounds downtown Oust outside the 
Interstate Highway 610), where many sites are vacant, derelict and 
neglected120 Economising on (transaction) costs in planning can mean high 
(social) costs in the end, as Donald Shoup also emphasised in his book The 
high cost of free parking (Shoup 2005) In this book, he demonstrates what 
supplying ample freely accessible parking space in the US means in terms of 
congestion, energy use and urban development This leads to the question 
what the costs are, in terms of spatial and environmental quality, of the wish to 
leave as much as possible to the discretion of commercial developers 
However, this question has very little pnonty in Houston, where many celebrate 
the motto "industry was a man's occupation, and it was never meant to be 
pretty " (Neuman 2003b) High ambitions go along with high transaction costs 
But it was Sir Henry Royce, co-founder of Rolls-Royce, who said "The quality 
remains long after the price has been forgotten" 
Legitimacy collaborative planning at what cost ? 
Public participation, for instance in the form of a local public inquiry or in more 
informal sessions led by a mediator (as at Wappmg Wharf), can have vanous 
benefits (Henneberry 2005) People can exercise their civic nghts, plans can 
become better (due to involving more creative minds), decisions are better 
informed and plans more likely receive acceptance and support from the local 
community However, there is also a downside related to this 
One of the dominant paradigms within planning theory at the moment is 
the communicative or collaborative paradigm (Healey 1997, Innes & Booher 
2003), in which interactive processes are advocated The planning process has 
no pre-established goal, and the outcome of the process is the result of the 
interaction between the actors involved This might be a major step forward 
compared to the monocentnc and technocratic process view that dominated the 
sixties and the seventies However, deliberation, consultation and negotiation 
are not without costs The more people who are involved, the more opinions 
and interests there are, the more likely it becomes that conflicts of interest arise 
which give nse to transaction costs Community involvement and stakeholder 
participation m general is often discussed as benevolent for both process and 
outcome, but it can have disadvantages for the duration and the process costs 
This is something Amencan scholars and practitioners try to come to terms with in 
developments like growth management, smart growth and new urbamsm 
120
 Robert Campbell says about the perception of cites "The city has become, in the Amencan 
imagination, the place where foreigners live It is the place where people have funny accents, 
worship strange gods, and probably can't be entirely trusted " (quoted in Kunstler 2001 ρ 195) 
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On the other hand, planning agencies might incur transaction costs not only to 
achieve quality and legitimacy, but also to preserve their own bureaucracies. 
Bureaucracy has gained a negative connotation, but Max Weber showed as 
that it could be seen as a rational from of organisation, compared to 'the market' 
(Parsons 1995). This line could be extended to transaction cost theory, by 
which the government can be seen as a specific type of firm that exists to 
reduce transaction costs of private persons and firms. Public choice theorists 
(see e.g. Downs 1967) are however more sceptical about the purposes of public 
bureaucracies; they question whether government agencies serve the public 
interest. In their view public bureaucracies serve their own interest, which 
reveals itself in ever-expanding bureaucratic organisations, also at the local 
level, notwithstanding the cutbacks or other restrictions that are imposed by for 
instance the national government. As we saw the chapter 8, some cities do not 
choose to make the transaction cost streams more transparent, because that 
would most likely reveal inefficiencies, and related to that, redundancies. 
In the case studies there were examples of transaction costs that could 
be attributed to inefficiencies. In the Bristol case we see a lot of correspondence 
and discussions on planning conditions and conformance to these conditions, 
before they can be discharged. In the Dutch case, it takes at least four years 
before some tangible commitment between the city of Nijmegen and the 
developer is created. And in the Houston case, the developer decided to slow 
down the process to wait for momentum in the real estate market (more 
specifically the market for condominiums) to sell the units121. 
The question is how to draw the boundary between functional costs and 
dead weight costs? And who is to judge? It is good in many cases to make an 
explicit trade-off between what you want to achieve and what that would cost in 
transactions. I am not making a plea for calculated behaviour of planners in 
every decision, because that would make them accountants and kill creativity 
and out-of-the-box thinking. But it is sometimes good to appreciate the notion 
that everything has its price. This does not always imply that the institutional 
arrangement with the least transaction costs should be chosen. Sometimes it is 
appropriate to incur transaction costs in planning for the longer term benefits 
that can bring to society through a better way of using land. 
121
 However, this cannot be attnbuted to the user rights regime. 
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Appendix A: interviewees 
Interviewee 
The Netherlands 
Cees Zoon 
Peter Jensen 
Wout van Hees 
Jan Alberts 
Ramon Kemperman 
Rene Schippers 
Bram de Deugd 
Henk-Jan Oostlander 
Rene van der Straaten 
Chantal Robbe 
Ad van der Ven 
Hans Voesenek 
Gerrit Verkerk 
Jan Fokkema 
England 
Nigel Honer 
Wayne Window 
Bryan Cadman 
Mass Palacco 
Ian Thomas 
Janet Askew 
Mike Devereux 
Vincent Nadin 
Christine Lambert 
Neil Harris 
Wayne Dyer 
Eamon Mythen 
Houston 
Cecilia Giusti 
Dawn Jourdan 
Atef Sharkawi 
Micheal Neuman 
Georgio Borlenghi 
Kyle Styles 
Dan Pruitt 
Sheila Blake 
Suzy Hartgrove 
Affiliation 
Municipality of Nijmegen 
Municipality of Nijmegen 
Municipality of Nijmegen 
Municipality of Nijmegen 
Municipality of Nijmegen 
KDO developers 
Municipality of Hilversum 
Municipality of Hilversum 
Metafoor consultants / 
Municipality of Doetinchem 
Municipality of Den Haag 
Akro Consult 
Municipality of Breda 
Ecorys 
NEPROM 
Bruges Tozer architects 
Bristol City Council 
Bristol City Council 
Beaufort Homes 
Beaufort Homes 
University of the West of England 
University of the West of England 
University of the West of England 
University of the West of England 
Cardiff University 
ARUP 
ODPM 
Texas A&M University 
Texas A&M University 
Texas A&M University 
Texas A&M University 
Interfin 
Interfin 
City of Houston 
City of Houston 
City of Houston 
Date 
interview 
08-09-2003 
28-03-2006 
15-09-2003/ 
09-01-2004 
30-03-2006 
30-03-2006 
16-01-2004 
05-08-2003 
12-08-2003 
12-10-2005 
05-04-2006 
04-04-2006 
06-04-2006 
03-04-2006 
19-04-2006 
19-05-2004 
17-05-2004 
03-07-2006 
06-05-2004 
08-05-2004 
various times 
various times 
various times 
various times 
17-05-2006 
18-05-2006 
19-05-2006 
various times 
various times 
various times 
various times 
05-04-2005 
04-05-2005 / 
21-05-2005 
26-04-2005 
26-04-2005 
31-03-2005/ 
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15-04-2005 
Amar Mohite City of Houston 31-03-2005 
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Appendix Β: People working in planning 
It is difficult to identify, and practically nearly impossible to quantify, the 
transaction costs of a user rights regime let alone a whole planning systems. A 
good indicator however of the transaction costs that are related to land use 
planning is the size of the planning departments. As we see in for instance 
chapter 8, a good transaction cost analysis almost requires a whole government 
evaluation. This is obviously impossible, but a comparison of the size of local 
planning departments in the three countries might shed a light on the costs 
associated with the way planning is carried out. 
The problem is that there might be no such thing as a 'planning 
department', and if there is, it might not include the exact same activities as in 
other planning departments, not even in the same country, let alone in other 
countries. Therefore I have chosen to investigate how many people working on 
various planning and related tasks. The categories that have been chosen are: 
- strategic planning (including transport, housing, heritage, public space, 
environmental and economic policy) 
- making the land use regulations (zoning, bestemmingsplan et cetera) 
- project development (active land development by the city) 
- plan review (zoning, platting, building regulations, environmental regulations et 
cetera) 
- inspections (on building and environmental regulations) 
These categories do not include the design, construction and maintenance of 
real estate, public space and infrastructure by local authorities, but are in 
essence only the 'soft' side of development. 
Although the investigation has been done thoroughly, it is impossible to 
prevent omissions and overlap entirely. For instance, if in one municipality all 
the categories are clustered in one planning department the overhead is also 
counted, but when all four categories are part of four bigger separate 
departments the overhead is not taken into account because it then also 
concerns the other activities in the department. Because of this, the data should 
be seen as indications of the size of the planning departments. 
The information was collected by a detailed analysis of organisation 
structures on websites, and by over one hundred phone calls and numerous e-
mails. The cities investigated should not be seen as representative for their 
country. Cities from the top 10 - population-wise - in each country have been 
chosen, including Houston, Nijmegen and Bristol. It proved to be difficult to 
acquire the information for all the top 10 cities. Therefore, only the cities are 
shown that were able to provide accurate information 
A/ef/7erfancisf22 
Collecting the data for the Dutch planning departments proved to be the most 
difficult of all countries. Rotterdam and Amsterdam, in particular, have a nearly 
impenetrable municipal organisation: they have decentralised many activities. In 
absolute terms, this means extra bureaucracy /overhead. In Amsterdam, the 
I am grateful to Harm Mertens for his help with finding the data for the Dutch cities. 
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municipal land department alone employs 433 people, against 434 in 
Rotterdam. 
Table B. 1: Planning departments in the Netherlands 
Cities 
1. Amsterdam 
2. Rotterdam 
3. Den Haag 
4. Utrecht 
5. Eindhoven 
9. Breda 
10. Nijmegen 
City population 
200512i 
742,783 
596,407 
472,096 
275,258 
208,455 
168,054 
158,215 
'Planning 
department'124 
1910 
1413 
915 
780 
280 
230 
400 
Inhabitants per 
planning official 
389 
422 
516 
353 
744 
731 
396 
England125 
In England, the numbers - related to the population - are much lower than in the 
Netherlands (see also table B.4). One reason could be the general lack of 
planners, which makes most planning departments short-staffed. Another major 
difference is the number of people working in forward - or strategic - planning. 
To give one example the city of Leeds, a city with over 400,000 inhabitants, has 
73 people working in forward planning, while the city of Nijmegen, which has 
40% of the the population of Leeds, employs over 150 people for this. 
Table B.2 Planning departments in England 
Cities1"6 
2. Birmingham 
4. Leeds 
5. Sheffield 
6. Bristol 
City population 
20011" 
970,892 
443,247 
439,866 
420,556 
'Planning 
department' 128 
254 
254 
230 
228 
Inhabitants per 
planning official 
3822 
1745 
1912 
1845 
USA 
US planning departments seem to be smallest, when related to the population 
(see also table B.4). Even more than in the English cities, this is because of the 
limited number of people working in strategic planning and in active project 
development and management. Of the 380 people working in planning in 
Houston, only 80 of them deal with policy making, neighbourhood initiatives, 
historic preservations, economic planning and so on. 
Neuman (2003a) wrote that Houston has the biggest planning 
department of the US. But this is a matter of how you measure that. Before 
October 2004, the Department of Planning and Development of the City of 
Houston had around 380 employees. By comparison, the Department of City 
http://www cbs.nl 
124
 The data for this were collected in January 2006 
1251 am grateful to Bas Zonnenberg for his help with finding the data for the English cities. 
126
 There are all unitary authorities. 
127
 http://www.statistics.gov.uk 
128
 The data for this were collected in June and July 2006. 
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Planning of New York City employs 334 people in 2005 But 300 of the 380 
people in Houston's planning department worked in the division of code 
enforcement they dealt with plan reviews, inspections, and the issuance of 
building permits and certificates of occupancy In October 2004 this division was 
taken out of the planning department and joined with the Department of Public 
Works and Engineenng, leaving the planning department with only 80 people If 
one looks at the kind of activities that the code enforcement division does and 
searches for the department that does that in New York City, the Department of 
Buildings will be found which has a total number of 885 people who do the 
inspections and the plan reviews, adding up to a total of 1220 people doing 
similar activities as the 380 in Houston In the case of New York there are 
various housing departments, like New York City Housing Authonty (NYCHA) 
and the Department of Housing Preservation and Development (DHPD), but 
they have not been included in the research, because in the Dutch and the 
English case most of these activities are carried out by housing associations 
This would make the comparison out of balance, since the NYCHA, for instance 
employs around 15,000 people 
Table Β 3 Planning departments in the US 
Cities 
1 New York 
2 Los Angeles 
4. Houston 
8 San Antonio 
9 Dallas 
City population 
2003129 
8,085,742 
3,819,951 
2,009,690 
1,214,725 
1,208,318 
'Planning 
department'130 
1220 
1160 
380 
260 
330 
Inhabitants per 
planning official 
6628 
3293 
5289 
4672 
3662 
http //www citypopulation de/USA html 
' The data for this were collected in May 2005 
147 
Table B.4 Planning departments compared, from 'small' to 'big', related to 
the population 
Cities 
New York 
Houston 
San Antonio 
Birmingham 
Dallas 
Los Angeles 
Sheffield 
Bristol 
Leeds 
Eindhoven 
Breda 
Den Haag 
Rotterdam 
Nijmegen 
Amsterdam 
Utrecht 
City population 
2003131 
8,085,742 
2,009,690 
1,214,725 
970,892 
1,208,318 
3,819,951 
439,866 
420,556 
443,247 
208.455 
168.054 
472.096 
596.407 
158.215 
742.783 
275.258 
'Planning 
department' 
1220 
380 
260 
254 
330 
1160 
230 
228 
254 
280 
230 
915 
1413 
400 
1910 
780 
Inhabitants per 
planning officer 
6628 
5289 
4672 
3822 
3662 
3293 
1912 
1845 
1745 
744 
731 
516 
422 
396 
389 
353 
131
 http //www citypopulation de/USA html 
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Summary 
The production of our built environment is accompanied by many transaction 
costs. It is because of these costs that many project budgets are exceeded. 
Therefore the literature on transaction costs within the property research area is 
growing. But systematic empirical applications are rare. This book explores and 
analyses how transaction costs emerge during development -housing- projects 
in different institutional contexts. Three countries have been chosen with 
significantly different urban planning styles to provide those differences. The 
Netherlands is known for its plan-led development and its focus on legal 
certainty. England is the opposite in this respect, since its planning system can 
be characterized as development-led and discretionary. Houston (Texas, USA) 
is the third place that will be looked at because it is generally regarded as the 
city with no planning at all. Within each country a small development project 
(respectively in the cities of Nijmegen, Bristol and Houston) of around 100 units 
has been selected to look at the transaction costs in more detail. 
The framework that is used for carrying out the analysis is based on transaction 
cost economics. A transaction is defined here as a legal action to increase (or 
take) control over property rights. In the case land use management, control 
can be achieved either by acquiring ownership or changing the content of the 
property rights over land. Governance structures are the means by which 
transactions are carried out and property rights are changed. Three archetypes 
are market, hierarchical and relational structures. The creation and use of either 
or combinations of these produces transaction costs. Transaction cost 
economics assumes that the choice for the appropriate governance structure 
depends on the transaction costs associated with them. It assumes actors who 
behave rationally so as to maximise their utility and to reduce transaction costs. 
These preferences are taken as given. However, in this research it is argued 
that institutions, like governance structures are designed and changed because 
of other factors - than transaction costs - as well. Therefore, the insights from 
transaction cost economics have been complemented with ideas from new 
economic sociology and old institutional economics. These alternative economic 
approaches - and the empirical analysis - point us to the fact that behaviour is 
embedded in an institutional context. In line with some 'old' institutionalists, I 
chose a stratified ontology of institutions. This implies that the behaviour of 
agencies, the governance structures they use and the transaction costs that are 
produced by that are embedded in a wider institutional context that consists of 
multiple layers. 
In this book, governance structures are further defined in terms of what are 
called user rights regimes. If we perceive of property rights as a bundle, it is 
particularly the right to use land that is important when we look at transactions 
that are aimed at increasing control over land use. The site-specific formal 
arrangement that structures the way land can be used or exchanged is what I 
call a user rights regime. Four transactions -changes in the user rights regime -
that are important within the development process of any site have been 
identified, namely land acquisition, the imposition of a zoning or land use plan, 
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the design of some sort of development agreement and finally the planning and 
/ or building permission. This does not mean that every type exists in all the 
development processes that have been analysed. In the Houston case, the 
agreement and the land or zoning plan were absent. The latter is obvious since 
Houston does not have a plan or zoning. The way these user rights regimes are 
used and applied is partly structured by the way the central (or national) 
planning and property acts are set up. But then still there is quite some room for 
manoeuvre. The way agencies act within that room is different in each case. 
Therefore the way user rights regimes are created and used - and the 
transaction costs associated with that - is different in each case. 
This is not to say that each development process - also going back to the 
stratified ontology - stand on its own. If we look at the development project in 
Houston, Nijmegen and Bristol we see that many actions are embedded within 
a wider context of informal and cultural rules. These rules are place-, regional-
er nation-specific. Four categories of rules in that institutional context have been 
deduced from the three case studies. The first is the quest for control. There is 
difference among the three countries to what extent local authorities have the 
ambition to control the way land is used, which is reflected in the case studies. 
The city of Nijmegen is involved heavily from the beginning, which affects the 
transaction cost and their incidence. The city of Houston acts much more in the 
background. The second category is the relationship between public and private 
parties. Deliberation and collaboration between those two is almost a key 
feature of Dutch society, sometimes irrespective of the transaction costs that 
are produced by that. The third element of the institutional context that is closely 
related to the former is the attitude of especially public authorities towards 
transaction costs. England has set up a performance management system for 
development control which forces local authorities to speed up the plan review 
stage. Houston has a culture of treating applicants as customers that need to be 
served quickly. Dutch local authorities in general seem to have a lower 
transaction-cost awareness. But also developers accept and sometimes even 
deliberately increase them to achieve their purposes. The last important part of 
the institutional structure is the legal style in each country the level discretion (or 
legal certainty) affects the (distribution) of transaction costs. The production of 
legally binding land use plans is supposed to create more certainty for society, 
but it increases transaction costs, especially in the earlier stages of 
development. In England, there are only county- or city-wide indicative 
development plans or local development frameworks with lower transaction 
costs at the local level than in the Dutch case. But the lower level of certainty 
causes rises in transaction costs at the stage of development control. 
It is important to appreciate the influence of the institutional context on the 
emergence, change and incidence of transaction costs and not treat it as a 
given as Williamson does. This institutional context for instance affects the 
preferences of real estate developers and local authorities. As a result of that, 
the actors in the development process do not necessarily (only) want to reduce 
transaction costs. They make decisions, for instance in their quest to control the 
outcome of the process or to maintain a good relationship with other actors, 
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irrespective of the transaction costs which that produces. This does not need to 
be a bad thing; not all transaction cost should be seen as dead weight losses as 
many often do. They can for instance lead to higher quality living environments 
and greater legitimacy. It is for politics to make this trade-off. More transaction-
cost awareness could lead to better choices. 
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Samenvatting (Dutch summary) 
Er gaan vele transactiekosten gepaard met de ontwikkeling van onze gebouwde 
omgeving. Hoge transactiekosten zijn bij veel projecten een belangrijke oorzaak 
achter budgetoverschrijdingen. Het is onder om die reden dat de aandacht voor 
transactiekosten in grond- en vastgoedonderzoek de afgelopen jaren is 
toegenomen. In dit boek wordt onderzocht hoe transactiekosten ontstaan 
gedurende het ontwikkelingsproces van (woning)bouwprojecten binnen 
verschillende institutionele contexten Om die reden zijn drie landen gekozen 
met zeer uitlopende ruimtelijke ordeningsstijlen, namelijk Engeland, Nederland 
en de Verenigde Staten (in het bijzonder Houston, Texas). Van de ruimtelijke 
ordening in Nederland wordt vaak gezegd dat ze planmatig is en gebaseerd op 
het principe van rechtszekerheid. Het Engelse systeem is wat dit betreft 
tegenovergesteld, omdat het een discretionair systeem is, dat meer volgend is 
op private ontwikkelingen en initiatieven. Houston (Texas) daarentegen wordt 
door velen gezien als de stad waar helemaal niet aan planning of ruimtelijke 
ordening wordt gedaan. Binnen elk land is een woningbouwproject (één in 
Nijmegen, één in Bristol en één Houston) geselecteerd van ongeveer 100 
woningen om de transactiekosten gedetailleerd te analyseren. 
The theoretisch raamwerk dat hiervoor gebruikt is, is gebaseerd op de 
transactiekosteneconomie. Een transactie is in dit onderzoek gedefinieerd als 
een juridische handeling om de controle over eigendomsrechten te vergroten. 
Binnen de ruimtelijke planning kan dit bereikt worden door of de 
eigendomsrechten te verkrijgen of de inhoud ervan te veranderen. Deze 
transacties kunnen op verschillende manieren plaatsvinden. De archetypen zijn 
markt-, hiërarchische en relationele governance structuren. De vorming en het 
gebruik van deze structuren brengen transactiekosten met zich mee. De 
transactiekosteneconomie veronderstelt dat de keuze voor de structuur afhangt 
van de kosten die daar mee gepaard gaan. In dit onderzoek wordt echter 
betoogd dat de keuze ook van andere factoren afhangt; 
transactiekostentheorieën hebben hier onvoldoende aandacht voor. In deze 
theorieën wordt verondersteld dat actoren rationeel (zij het begrensd) handelen 
en uit zijn op nutsmaximalisatie, en om die reden streven naar de minimalisatie 
van transactiekosten. Deze preferenties worden als vast gegeven beschouwd. 
Andere economische benaderingen geven aan dat de preferentie van een actor 
ook een afhankelijke variabele is, en beïnvloed wordt door culturele en 
institutionele factoren. Om die reden worden de inzichten uit de 
transactiekosteneconomie aangevuld met inzichten uit de economische 
sociologie en de 'oude' institutionele economie. Dit heeft geleid tot een 
raamwerk waarbij actoren, governance structuren en de transactiekosten die 
daarmee verbonden zijn ingebed zijn in een institutionele context bestaande uit 
verschillende lagen. 
Governance structuren zijn verder ingevuld door het begrip user rights regime. 
Als het eigendomsrecht worden opgevat als een bundel van deelrechten, dan is 
in het kader van transacties gericht op de vergroting van de controle over het 
grondgebruik met name het gebruiksrecht - user right - van belang. Het 
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locatiespecifieke regime dat het gebruik van en de handel in grond structureert 
wordt het user rights regime genoemd. Vier transacties of veranderingen in het 
user rights regime die bij ontwikkelingsprocessen een rol spelen worden 
onderscheiden: de grondverwerving of-uitgifte, het opleggen van 
gebruiksvoorschriften door een grondgebruiksplan -bestemmingsplan -, een 
exploitatieovereenkomst en de bouwvergunningverlening. Het is niet zo dat alle 
vier bij elk project voorkomen. Zo werd er binnen de case in Houston geen 
gebruik gemaakt van een exploitatieovereenkomst (of iets soortgelijks) of een 
bindend grondgebruiksplan. Dit laatste is goed te verklaren vanuit het gegeven 
dat de stad niet aan planvorming of zonering doet. Dit voorbeeld geeft goed aan 
dat de manier waarop op locatieniveau omgegaan wordt met user rights 
regimes verbonden is met wet- en regelgeving op hogere bestuursniveaus. 
Ondanks die verbondenheid blijft er op projectniveau ruim voldoende 
manoeuvreerruimte over. Daarom is in elk project de vorming en het gebruik 
van het user rights regime - en daarmee de transactiekosten - anders. 
Dit wil niet zeggen dat ieder project op zichzelf staat. Als we naar de drie cases 
kijken zien we dat veel handelingen ingebed zijn in bredere informele en 
culturele regels. Die regels zijn locatie-, regio- of landsspecifiek. Die 
institutionele context is in het onderzoek opgedeeld in vier categorieën die zijn 
afgeleid uit de casestudies. De eerste is wat genoemd wordt 'the quest for 
control'. Tussen de landen bestaat verschil in de mate waarin lokale besturen 
grondgebruik willen sturen, hetgeen in de drie cases duidelijk naar voren komt. 
De gemeente Nijmegen was vanaf het begin van het ontwikkelingsproces zeer 
nadrukkelijk aanwezig met een duidelijk eigen ruimtelijke agenda. Het 
stadsbestuur van Houston blijft veel meer op de achtergrond en toetst plannen 
alleen aan de gemeentelijke verordening. De tweede categorie betreft de relatie 
tussen publieke en private partijen. In Nederland zijn de banden tussen beiden 
zeer nauw. Een derde element binnen de institutionele context, dat sterk 
verbonden is met het voorgaande, is de houding ten opzichte van 
transactiekosten -en de verdeling over de betrokken partijen - in het 
ontwikkelingsproces. In Engeland is bijvoorbeeld een prestatiegericht systeem 
geïntroduceerd, gericht op het zo snel mogelijk laten verlopen van het proces 
van vergunningverlening. In Houston worden de aanvragers van vergunningen 
meer als klanten gezien die zo snel en goed mogelijk geholpen dienen te 
worden. Bij Nederlandse gemeenten lijkt het transactiekostenbewustzijn lager. 
Maar ook ontwikkelaars zijn niet altijd gericht op het verlagen van 
transactiekosten; soms kan het ten behoeve van de afzet van woningen gunstig 
zijn om het proces te vertragen en de transactiekosten toe te laten nemen. Het 
vierde en laatste onderdeel van de institutionele context dat wordt behandeld is 
de juridische stijl. Bestemmingsplannen worden geacht de rechtszekerheid voor 
belanghebbenden te vergroten. Aan de andere kant verhogen ze vaak de 
transactiekosten, met name in het begin van het ontwikkelingsproces. In 
Engeland worden alleen gemeentelijke indicatieve plannen gemaakt, los van 
individuele projecten. Enerzijds verlaagt dit de ruimtelijke ordeningskosten. Aan 
de andere kant zorgt de geringe zekerheid die deze plannen leveren voor veel 
onderhandeling, en dus transactiekosten, rond de bouwaanvraag. 
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Het is al met al van belang om de invloed van de institutionele context op 
transactiekosten in ogenschouw te nemen, iets waar institutioneel economen 
zoals Williamson weinig aandacht aan besteden. Deze context beïnvloedt de 
preferenties van gemeenten en ontwikkelaars. Als gevolg daarvan zijn de 
actoren binnen een ontwikkelingsproces niet alleen uit op het minimaliseren van 
transactiekosten. Andere doelen zoals het behouden of creëren van een goede 
verstandhouding of het vergoten van de invloed op de ruimtelijke ordening 
worden nagestreefd, vaak los van de (transactie)kosten die daar mee gepaard 
gaan. Dit is niet per definitie slecht; transactiekosten duiden niet alleen maar 
inefficiënties. Ze kunnen ook leiden tot een hogere ruimtelijke kwaliteit of 
besluiten met meer draagvlak. De politik moet die afweging maken. Maar een 
groter bewustzijn van het bestaan van transactiekosten, en de oorzaken 
daarvan, kan wellicht leiden tot betere besluiten. 
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